Multiparty Computation with Covert Security and Public Verifiability

Peter Scholl*, Mark Simkin, Luisa Siniscalchi

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport/proceedingKonferencebidrag i proceedingsForskningpeer review

Abstract

Multiparty computation protocols (MPC) are said to be secure against covert adversaries if the honest parties are guaranteed to detect any misbehavior by the malicious parties with a constant probability. Protocols that, upon detecting a cheating attempt, additionally allow the honest parties to compute certificates, which enable third parties to be convinced of the malicious behavior of the accused parties, are called publicly verifiable. In this work, we make several contributions to the domain of MPC with security against covert adversaries. We identify a subtle flaw in a protocol of Goyal, Mohassel, and Smith (Eurocrypt 2008), meaning that their protocol does not allow to identify a cheating party, and show how to fix their original construction to obtain security against covert adversaries. We present generic compilers that transform arbitrary passively secure preprocessing protocols, i.e. protocols where the parties have no private inputs, into protocols that are secure against covert adversaries and publicly verifiable. Using our compiler, we construct the first efficient variants of the BMR and the SPDZ protocols that are secure and publicly verifiable against a covert adversary that corrupts all but one party, and also construct variants with covert security and identifiable abort. We observe that an existing impossibility result by Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Seyalioglu (TCC 2012) can be used to show that there exist certain functionalities that cannot be realized by parties, that have oracle-access to broadcast and arbitrary two-party functionalities, with information-theoretic security against a covert adversary.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
Titel3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography, ITC 2022
RedaktørerDana Dachman-Soled
ForlagSchloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing
Publikationsdatojul. 2022
Artikelnummer8
ISBN (Elektronisk)9783959772389
DOI
StatusUdgivet - jul. 2022
Begivenhed3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography, ITC 2022 - Cambridge, USA
Varighed: 5 jul. 20227 jul. 2022

Konference

Konference3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography, ITC 2022
Land/OmrådeUSA
ByCambridge
Periode05/07/202207/07/2022
NavnLeibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs
Vol/bind230
ISSN1868-8969

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