TY - JOUR
T1 - Measuring Backsliding with Observables
T2 - Observable-to-Subjective Score Mapping
AU - Weitzel, Daniel
AU - Gerring, John
AU - Pemstein, Daniel
AU - Skaaning, Svend Erik
PY - 2024/4/11
Y1 - 2024/4/11
N2 - Multiple well-known democracy-rating projects—including Freedom House, Polity, and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)—have identified apparent global regression in recent years. These measures rely on partly subjective indicators, which—in principle—could suffer from rater bias. For instance, Little and Meng (2023) argue that shared beliefs driven by the current zeitgeist could lead to shared biases that produce the appearance of democratic backsliding in subjectively coded measures. To assess this argument and the strength of the evidence for global democratic backsliding, we propose an observable-to-subjective score mapping (OSM) methodology that uses only easily observable features of democracy to predict existing indices of democracy. Applying this methodology to three prominent democracy indices, we find evidence of backsliding—but beginning later and not as pronounced as suggested by some of the original indices. Our approach suggests that the Freedom House measure particularly does not track with the recent patterns in observable indicators and that there has been a stasis or—at most—a modest decline in the average level of democracy.
AB - Multiple well-known democracy-rating projects—including Freedom House, Polity, and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)—have identified apparent global regression in recent years. These measures rely on partly subjective indicators, which—in principle—could suffer from rater bias. For instance, Little and Meng (2023) argue that shared beliefs driven by the current zeitgeist could lead to shared biases that produce the appearance of democratic backsliding in subjectively coded measures. To assess this argument and the strength of the evidence for global democratic backsliding, we propose an observable-to-subjective score mapping (OSM) methodology that uses only easily observable features of democracy to predict existing indices of democracy. Applying this methodology to three prominent democracy indices, we find evidence of backsliding—but beginning later and not as pronounced as suggested by some of the original indices. Our approach suggests that the Freedom House measure particularly does not track with the recent patterns in observable indicators and that there has been a stasis or—at most—a modest decline in the average level of democracy.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85182557535&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S1049096523001075
DO - 10.1017/S1049096523001075
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85182557535
SN - 1049-0965
VL - 57
SP - 216
EP - 223
JO - PS: Political Science & Politics
JF - PS: Political Science & Politics
IS - 2
ER -