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Lobbying from Inside the System: Why Local Governments Pay for Representation in the U.S. Congress

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avis › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

Standard

Lobbying from Inside the System: Why Local Governments Pay for Representation in the U.S. Congress. / Loftis, Matt W.; Kettler, Jaclyn J.
I: Political Research Quarterly, Bind 68, Nr. 1, 2015, s. 193-206.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avis › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

Harvard

Loftis, MW & Kettler, JJ 2015, 'Lobbying from Inside the System: Why Local Governments Pay for Representation in the U.S. Congress', Political Research Quarterly, bind 68, nr. 1, s. 193-206. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912914563764

APA

Loftis, M. W., & Kettler, J. J. (2015). Lobbying from Inside the System: Why Local Governments Pay for Representation in the U.S. Congress. Political Research Quarterly, 68(1), 193-206. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912914563764

CBE

Loftis MW, Kettler JJ. 2015. Lobbying from Inside the System: Why Local Governments Pay for Representation in the U.S. Congress. Political Research Quarterly. 68(1):193-206. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912914563764

MLA

Loftis, Matt W. og Jaclyn J. Kettler. "Lobbying from Inside the System: Why Local Governments Pay for Representation in the U.S. Congress". Political Research Quarterly. 2015, 68(1). 193-206. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912914563764

Vancouver

Loftis MW, Kettler JJ. Lobbying from Inside the System: Why Local Governments Pay for Representation in the U.S. Congress. Political Research Quarterly. 2015;68(1):193-206. doi: 10.1177/1065912914563764

Author

Loftis, Matt W. ; Kettler, Jaclyn J. / Lobbying from Inside the System : Why Local Governments Pay for Representation in the U.S. Congress. I: Political Research Quarterly. 2015 ; Bind 68, Nr. 1. s. 193-206.

Bibtex

@article{b9e4fb1654914b6086ea7f75f9cac93c,
title = "Lobbying from Inside the System: Why Local Governments Pay for Representation in the U.S. Congress",
abstract = "Why do cities spend scarce resources lobbying the federal government? The hierarchy of U.S. government provides various pathways for local representation. Nevertheless, cities regularly invest in paid representation. This presents a puzzle for American democracy. Why do cities lobby, and do they lobby strategically? We quantify for the first time the extent of this phenomenon and examine its determinants using new data on 498 cities across forty-five states from 1998 to 2008. We find that economic distress pushes cities to lobby, but does not impact expenditures. Cities in competitive congressional districts, and therefore crucial to national politics, spend more on lobbying.",
keywords = "Congress, government lobbying, local government, Interest Groups",
author = "Loftis, {Matt W.} and Kettler, {Jaclyn J.}",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1177/1065912914563764",
language = "English",
volume = "68",
pages = "193--206",
journal = "Political Research Quarterly",
issn = "1065-9129",
publisher = "Sage Publications, Inc.",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Lobbying from Inside the System

T2 - Why Local Governments Pay for Representation in the U.S. Congress

AU - Loftis, Matt W.

AU - Kettler, Jaclyn J.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Why do cities spend scarce resources lobbying the federal government? The hierarchy of U.S. government provides various pathways for local representation. Nevertheless, cities regularly invest in paid representation. This presents a puzzle for American democracy. Why do cities lobby, and do they lobby strategically? We quantify for the first time the extent of this phenomenon and examine its determinants using new data on 498 cities across forty-five states from 1998 to 2008. We find that economic distress pushes cities to lobby, but does not impact expenditures. Cities in competitive congressional districts, and therefore crucial to national politics, spend more on lobbying.

AB - Why do cities spend scarce resources lobbying the federal government? The hierarchy of U.S. government provides various pathways for local representation. Nevertheless, cities regularly invest in paid representation. This presents a puzzle for American democracy. Why do cities lobby, and do they lobby strategically? We quantify for the first time the extent of this phenomenon and examine its determinants using new data on 498 cities across forty-five states from 1998 to 2008. We find that economic distress pushes cities to lobby, but does not impact expenditures. Cities in competitive congressional districts, and therefore crucial to national politics, spend more on lobbying.

KW - Congress

KW - government lobbying

KW - local government

KW - Interest Groups

U2 - 10.1177/1065912914563764

DO - 10.1177/1065912914563764

M3 - Journal article

VL - 68

SP - 193

EP - 206

JO - Political Research Quarterly

JF - Political Research Quarterly

SN - 1065-9129

IS - 1

ER -