Les intuitions rationnelles sont-elles des intuitions modales?

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Les intuitions rationnelles sont-elles des intuitions modales? / Saint-Germier, Pierre Laurent G.

I: Philosophiques, Bind 44, Nr. 1, 2017, s. 49-71.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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@article{228ae2cddb8c448d959b7322866e6ff0,
title = "Les intuitions rationnelles sont-elles des intuitions modales?",
abstract = "We discuss the view, accepted by many rational intuition theorists, that rational intuitions involve appearances of necessity. The fact that we can have rational intuitions of contingent propositions casts a doubt on the adequacy of this view. This fact can be accommodated by a fallibilist theory of rational intuitions, provided one accepts that these intuitions generate ineliminable modal illusions. Drawing on two-dimensional explanations of the contingent a priori, we defend an alternative view according to which the appearances involved in rational intuitions are not appearances of necessity but rather an expression of their a priori status.",
keywords = "Intuition, Necessity, Two-dimensional semantics, A priori",
author = "Saint-Germier, {Pierre Laurent G}",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.7202/1040327ar",
language = "Fransk",
volume = "44",
pages = "49--71",
journal = "Philosophiques",
issn = "0316-2923",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Les intuitions rationnelles sont-elles des intuitions modales?

AU - Saint-Germier, Pierre Laurent G

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - We discuss the view, accepted by many rational intuition theorists, that rational intuitions involve appearances of necessity. The fact that we can have rational intuitions of contingent propositions casts a doubt on the adequacy of this view. This fact can be accommodated by a fallibilist theory of rational intuitions, provided one accepts that these intuitions generate ineliminable modal illusions. Drawing on two-dimensional explanations of the contingent a priori, we defend an alternative view according to which the appearances involved in rational intuitions are not appearances of necessity but rather an expression of their a priori status.

AB - We discuss the view, accepted by many rational intuition theorists, that rational intuitions involve appearances of necessity. The fact that we can have rational intuitions of contingent propositions casts a doubt on the adequacy of this view. This fact can be accommodated by a fallibilist theory of rational intuitions, provided one accepts that these intuitions generate ineliminable modal illusions. Drawing on two-dimensional explanations of the contingent a priori, we defend an alternative view according to which the appearances involved in rational intuitions are not appearances of necessity but rather an expression of their a priori status.

KW - Intuition

KW - Necessity

KW - Two-dimensional semantics

KW - A priori

U2 - 10.7202/1040327ar

DO - 10.7202/1040327ar

M3 - Tidsskriftartikel

VL - 44

SP - 49

EP - 71

JO - Philosophiques

JF - Philosophiques

SN - 0316-2923

IS - 1

ER -