Les intuitions rationnelles sont-elles des intuitions modales?

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  • Pierre Laurent G Saint-Germier
We discuss the view, accepted by many rational intuition theorists, that rational intuitions involve appearances of necessity. The fact that we can have rational intuitions of contingent propositions casts a doubt on the adequacy of this view. This fact can be accommodated by a fallibilist theory of rational intuitions, provided one accepts that these intuitions generate ineliminable modal illusions. Drawing on two-dimensional explanations of the contingent a priori, we defend an alternative view according to which the appearances involved in rational intuitions are not appearances of necessity but rather an expression of their a priori status.
Bidragets oversatte titelAre rational intuitions modal?
OriginalsprogFransk
TidsskriftPhilosophiques
Vol/bind44
Nummer1
Sider (fra-til)49-71
Antal sider22
ISSN0316-2923
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2017

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