Is there a wage premium for volunteer OSS engagement? - signalling, learning and noise

Juergen Bitzer; Ingo Geishecker; Philipp J. H. Schroeder

doi:10.1080/00036846.2016.1218427

Is there a wage premium for volunteer OSS engagement? - signalling, learning and noise

Juergen Bitzer, Ingo Geishecker, Philipp J. H. Schroeder^*

^*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Institut for Økonomi

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avis › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

3 Citationer (Scopus)

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Abstract

Volunteer-based open-source production has become a significant new model for the organization of software development. Economics often pictures this phenomenon as a case of signalling: individuals engage in the volunteer programming of open-source software (OSS) as a labour-market signal resulting in a wage premium. Yet, this explanation could so far not be empirically tested. This article fills this gap by estimating an upper-bound composite wage premium of voluntary OSS contributions and by separating the potential signalling effect of OSS engagement from other effects. Although some 70% of OSS contributors believe that OSS involvement benefits their careers, we find no actual labour-market premium for OSS engagement. The presence of other motives, such as fun of play or altruism, renders OSS contributions too noisy to function as a signal.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Applied Economics
Vol/bind	49
Nummer	14
Sider (fra-til)	1379-1394
Antal sider	16
ISSN	0003-6846
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2016.1218427
Status	Udgivet - 2017

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10.1080/00036846.2016.1218427

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KW - peer production

KW - wage formation

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KW - STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION

KW - MOTIVATIONS

KW - DEVELOPERS

KW - PARTICIPATION

KW - COMMUNITIES

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Is there a wage premium for volunteer OSS engagement? - signalling, learning and noise

Abstract

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