Indirect Revelation Mechanisms for Cake Cutting

TY - ABST

T1 - Indirect Revelation Mechanisms for Cake Cutting

AU - Branzei, Simina

AU - Miltersen, Peter Bro

PY - 2014/3/14

Y1 - 2014/3/14

N2 - We consider discrete protocols for the classical Steinhaus cake cutting problem. Under mild technical conditions, we show that any deterministic strategy-proof protocol in the standard Robertson-Webb query model is dictatorial, that is, there is a fixed agent to which the protocol allocates the entire cake. In contrast, we exhibit randomized protocols that are truthful in expectation and compute approximately fair allocations.

AB - We consider discrete protocols for the classical Steinhaus cake cutting problem. Under mild technical conditions, we show that any deterministic strategy-proof protocol in the standard Robertson-Webb query model is dictatorial, that is, there is a fixed agent to which the protocol allocates the entire cake. In contrast, we exhibit randomized protocols that are truthful in expectation and compute approximately fair allocations.

M3 - Conference abstract for conference

T2 - Economics and Computational Aspects of Game Theory and Social Choice

Y2 - 14 March 2014 through 14 March 2014

ER -