Aarhus University Seal / Aarhus Universitets segl

Incentives in Supply Function Equilibrium

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

  • Det Kgl. Bibliotek
The author analyses delegation in homogenous duopoly under the assumption that firm-managers compete in supply functions. He reverses earlier findings in that owners give managers incentives to act in an accommodating way. That is, optimal delegation reduces per-firm output and increases profits to above-Cournot profits. Moreover, in supply function equilibrium, the mode of competition is endogenous. This means that the author avoids results that are sensitive with respect to assuming either Cournot or Bertrand competition.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEconomics
Vol/bind9
Sider (fra-til)1-20
Antal sider20
ISSN1864-6042
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2015

Se relationer på Aarhus Universitet Citationsformater

ID: 84779464