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If the Price is Right: The Ethics and Efficiency of Market Solutions to the Organ Shortage

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If the Price is Right: The Ethics and Efficiency of Market Solutions to the Organ Shortage. / Albertsen, Andreas.

I: Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, Bind 17, Nr. 3, 06.2020, s. 357-367.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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Albertsen, Andreas. / If the Price is Right: The Ethics and Efficiency of Market Solutions to the Organ Shortage. I: Journal of Bioethical Inquiry. 2020 ; Bind 17, Nr. 3. s. 357-367.

Bibtex

@article{0b97075d7820493f96783782a13effd2,
title = "If the Price is Right: The Ethics and Efficiency of Market Solutions to the Organ Shortage",
abstract = "Due to the shortage of organs, it has been proposed that the ban on organ sales is lifted and that a market-based procurement system is introduced. This paper assesses four prominent proposals for how such a market could be arranged: unregulated current market, regulated current market, payment for consent futures market and the family reward futures market. These are assessed in terms of how applicable prominent concerns with organ sales are for each model. The concerns evaluated are that organ markets will crowd out altruistic donation, that consent to sell organs is invalid, that the sellers will be harmed, and that the commodification of organs will affect human relationships in a negative way. The paper concludes that the family reward futures market fares best in this comparison, but also that it provides the weakest incentive to potential buyers. There is an inverse relationship between how applicable prominent critiques are to organ market models, and the increase in organs they can be expected to provide.",
keywords = "Coercion, Exploitation, Future markets, Organ markets, Organ trade, IRANIAN MODEL, DONATION, COMPENSATION, PAID, HARMS, KIDNEY SALES, TRANSPLANTATION, SELL, LEGAL, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES",
author = "Andreas Albertsen",
year = "2020",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1007/s11673-020-09981-y",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "357--367",
journal = "Journal of Bioethical Inquiry",
issn = "1176-7529",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - If the Price is Right: The Ethics and Efficiency of Market Solutions to the Organ Shortage

AU - Albertsen, Andreas

PY - 2020/6

Y1 - 2020/6

N2 - Due to the shortage of organs, it has been proposed that the ban on organ sales is lifted and that a market-based procurement system is introduced. This paper assesses four prominent proposals for how such a market could be arranged: unregulated current market, regulated current market, payment for consent futures market and the family reward futures market. These are assessed in terms of how applicable prominent concerns with organ sales are for each model. The concerns evaluated are that organ markets will crowd out altruistic donation, that consent to sell organs is invalid, that the sellers will be harmed, and that the commodification of organs will affect human relationships in a negative way. The paper concludes that the family reward futures market fares best in this comparison, but also that it provides the weakest incentive to potential buyers. There is an inverse relationship between how applicable prominent critiques are to organ market models, and the increase in organs they can be expected to provide.

AB - Due to the shortage of organs, it has been proposed that the ban on organ sales is lifted and that a market-based procurement system is introduced. This paper assesses four prominent proposals for how such a market could be arranged: unregulated current market, regulated current market, payment for consent futures market and the family reward futures market. These are assessed in terms of how applicable prominent concerns with organ sales are for each model. The concerns evaluated are that organ markets will crowd out altruistic donation, that consent to sell organs is invalid, that the sellers will be harmed, and that the commodification of organs will affect human relationships in a negative way. The paper concludes that the family reward futures market fares best in this comparison, but also that it provides the weakest incentive to potential buyers. There is an inverse relationship between how applicable prominent critiques are to organ market models, and the increase in organs they can be expected to provide.

KW - Coercion

KW - Exploitation

KW - Future markets

KW - Organ markets

KW - Organ trade

KW - IRANIAN MODEL

KW - DONATION

KW - COMPENSATION

KW - PAID

KW - HARMS

KW - KIDNEY SALES

KW - TRANSPLANTATION

KW - SELL

KW - LEGAL

KW - FINANCIAL INCENTIVES

U2 - 10.1007/s11673-020-09981-y

DO - 10.1007/s11673-020-09981-y

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 32557218

VL - 17

SP - 357

EP - 367

JO - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry

JF - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry

SN - 1176-7529

IS - 3

ER -