Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avis › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avis › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - How governments strategically time welfare state reform legislation
T2 - empirical evidence from five European countries
AU - Wenzelburger, Georg
AU - Jensen, Carsten
AU - Lee, Seonghui
AU - Arndt, Christoph
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Building on studies on the political business cycle, the literature on welfare state retrenchment has argued that governments which cut the welfare state try to avoid blame by implementing painful measures in the beginning of the mandate and expanding benefits as elections approach. In contrast to this linear relationship, this article argues that governments often feel pressured to fulfil (mostly expansionary) campaign promises during the first months in office. Consequently, cutting right away is not what should be expected. Instead, a more nuanced, U-shaped timing trajectory is probable with a period in the beginning characterised by both cuts and fulfilment of expansionary pledges, followed by a period of cutbacks, and finally an expansive phase towards the end of a mandate. This argument is tested on our new original dataset of legislative changes in five European countries–Britain, Denmark, Finland, France and Germany–during the last four decades.
AB - Building on studies on the political business cycle, the literature on welfare state retrenchment has argued that governments which cut the welfare state try to avoid blame by implementing painful measures in the beginning of the mandate and expanding benefits as elections approach. In contrast to this linear relationship, this article argues that governments often feel pressured to fulfil (mostly expansionary) campaign promises during the first months in office. Consequently, cutting right away is not what should be expected. Instead, a more nuanced, U-shaped timing trajectory is probable with a period in the beginning characterised by both cuts and fulfilment of expansionary pledges, followed by a period of cutbacks, and finally an expansive phase towards the end of a mandate. This argument is tested on our new original dataset of legislative changes in five European countries–Britain, Denmark, Finland, France and Germany–during the last four decades.
KW - Electoral pledges
KW - electioneering
KW - political business cycle
KW - welfare state
KW - FULFILLMENT
KW - RETRENCHMENT
KW - POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES
KW - RESPONSIBILITY
KW - ELECTION PLEDGES
KW - FISCAL CONSOLIDATION
KW - HONEYMOON
KW - ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES
KW - PUNISHMENT
KW - BLAME AVOIDANCE
U2 - 10.1080/01402382.2019.1668245
DO - 10.1080/01402382.2019.1668245
M3 - Journal article
VL - 43
SP - 1285
EP - 1314
JO - West European Politics
JF - West European Politics
SN - 0140-2382
IS - 6
ER -