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Historical Essences and Scientific Realism: The Case of Species

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Historical Essences and Scientific Realism: The Case of Species. / Godman, Marion Kathe.

I: Synthese, 2021, s. 3041–3057.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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@article{756a53bb4c7e455da85b47575d1b647c,
title = "Historical Essences and Scientific Realism: The Case of Species",
abstract = "Natural kinds, real kinds, or, following J.S. Mill simply, Kinds, are thought to be an important asset for scientific realists in the non-fundamental (or “special”) sciences. Essential natures are less in vogue. I show that the realist would do well to couple her Kinds with essential natures in order to strengthen their epistemic and ontological credentials. I argue that these essential natures need not however be intrinsic to the Kind{\textquoteright}s members; they may be historical. I concentrate on assessing the merits of historical essential natures in a paradigm case of Kinds in the non-fundamental sciences: species. I specify two basic jobs for essential natures: (1) offering individuation criteria, and (2) providing a causal explanation of the Kind{\textquoteright}s multiple projectable properties. I argue that at least in the case of species historical essences are fit for both tasks. The principled resistance to Kinds with historical essences should also be cleared.",
author = "Godman, {Marion Kathe}",
year = "2021",
language = "English",
pages = "3041–3057",
journal = "Synthese",
issn = "0039-7857",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Historical Essences and Scientific Realism: The Case of Species

AU - Godman, Marion Kathe

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - Natural kinds, real kinds, or, following J.S. Mill simply, Kinds, are thought to be an important asset for scientific realists in the non-fundamental (or “special”) sciences. Essential natures are less in vogue. I show that the realist would do well to couple her Kinds with essential natures in order to strengthen their epistemic and ontological credentials. I argue that these essential natures need not however be intrinsic to the Kind’s members; they may be historical. I concentrate on assessing the merits of historical essential natures in a paradigm case of Kinds in the non-fundamental sciences: species. I specify two basic jobs for essential natures: (1) offering individuation criteria, and (2) providing a causal explanation of the Kind’s multiple projectable properties. I argue that at least in the case of species historical essences are fit for both tasks. The principled resistance to Kinds with historical essences should also be cleared.

AB - Natural kinds, real kinds, or, following J.S. Mill simply, Kinds, are thought to be an important asset for scientific realists in the non-fundamental (or “special”) sciences. Essential natures are less in vogue. I show that the realist would do well to couple her Kinds with essential natures in order to strengthen their epistemic and ontological credentials. I argue that these essential natures need not however be intrinsic to the Kind’s members; they may be historical. I concentrate on assessing the merits of historical essential natures in a paradigm case of Kinds in the non-fundamental sciences: species. I specify two basic jobs for essential natures: (1) offering individuation criteria, and (2) providing a causal explanation of the Kind’s multiple projectable properties. I argue that at least in the case of species historical essences are fit for both tasks. The principled resistance to Kinds with historical essences should also be cleared.

UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-018-02034-3

M3 - Journal article

SP - 3041

EP - 3057

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

SN - 0039-7857

M1 - 198

ER -