Higher-order knowledge and sensitivity

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It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively appealing instances of higher-order knowledge. In this paper, we argue that it can once careful attention is paid to the methods or processes by which we typically form higher-order beliefs. We base our argument on what we take to be a well-motivated and commonsensical view on how higher-order knowledge is typically acquired, and we show how higher-order knowledge is possible in a sensitivity theory once this view is adopted.

Bidragets oversatte titelHøjereordens viden og sensitivitet
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Vol/bind50
Nummer3
Sider (fra-til)339-349
ISSN0045-5091
DOI
StatusUdgivet - apr. 2020

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