TY - JOUR
T1 - Government formation in presidentialism
T2 - Disentangling the combined effects of pre-electoral coalitions and legislative polarization
AU - Couto, Lucas
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of University of Miami.
PY - 2025/2/1
Y1 - 2025/2/1
N2 - Recent research has shed light on the impact of pre-electoral coalitions on government formation in presidential democracies. However, the fact that pre-electoral coalitions are not automatically transformed into coalition cabinets has often gone under the radar. In this article, I argue that the importance of pre-electoral pacts for government formation depends on the degree of legislative polarization. When parties are distant from one another in the ideological spectrum, presidents face more difficulties in breaking away from the pre-electoral pact and rearranging their multiparty alliances. Conversely, when polarization is not pervasive, presidents have more leeway to build coalition cabinets different from the ones prescribed by pre-electoral coalitions. Drawing on a dataset of 13 Latin American countries, the results support my claim and suggest that the relationship between government formation and the concession of office benefits for pre-electoral coalition members is more nuanced than previously assumed.
AB - Recent research has shed light on the impact of pre-electoral coalitions on government formation in presidential democracies. However, the fact that pre-electoral coalitions are not automatically transformed into coalition cabinets has often gone under the radar. In this article, I argue that the importance of pre-electoral pacts for government formation depends on the degree of legislative polarization. When parties are distant from one another in the ideological spectrum, presidents face more difficulties in breaking away from the pre-electoral pact and rearranging their multiparty alliances. Conversely, when polarization is not pervasive, presidents have more leeway to build coalition cabinets different from the ones prescribed by pre-electoral coalitions. Drawing on a dataset of 13 Latin American countries, the results support my claim and suggest that the relationship between government formation and the concession of office benefits for pre-electoral coalition members is more nuanced than previously assumed.
KW - Coalitional presidentialism
KW - government formation
KW - Latin America
KW - pre-electoral coalitions
KW - presidentialism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=86000437149&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/lap.2024.30
DO - 10.1017/lap.2024.30
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:86000437149
SN - 1531-426X
VL - 67
SP - 36
EP - 55
JO - Latin American Politics & Society
JF - Latin American Politics & Society
IS - 1
ER -