Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining

TY - JOUR

T1 - Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining

AU - Maaser, Nicola

AU - Paetzel, Fabian

AU - Traub, Stefan

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.

PY - 2022/1

Y1 - 2022/1

N2 - In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron–Ferejohn model. This paper re-analyzes the data from that experiment, looking at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in particular with respect to the proposed distribution of payoffs and coalition size. By contrast, nominal weights have only minor gender-specific effects.

AB - In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron–Ferejohn model. This paper re-analyzes the data from that experiment, looking at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in particular with respect to the proposed distribution of payoffs and coalition size. By contrast, nominal weights have only minor gender-specific effects.

KW - Bargaining

KW - Gender differences

KW - Laboratory experiment

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85123257090&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.3390/g13010011

DO - 10.3390/g13010011

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85123257090

SN - 2073-4336

VL - 13

JO - Games

JF - Games

IS - 1

M1 - 11

ER -