From Bonus to Burden: The Cost of Ruling From a New(s) Perspective

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Abstract

Studies have repeatedly documented the cost of ruling: governing parties generally suffer electoral defeats. We approach this empirical law of political science from the perspective of another empirical law: the incumbency bonus, the fact that incumbents get more media attention than the opposition. Our claim is that the bonus constitutes an electoral liability because it reflects the critical approach of media to government power. News featuring incumbents is therefore associated with a more negative tone than news featuring the opposition. This incumbency burden in turn affects government support negatively. Empirically, we draw on an extensive news corpus covering four European countries over two decades, combined with monthly poll data. Analyses show that the incumbency burden in political news is an empirical reality, and that variations in the burden contribute substantially to predictions of government support. Finally, the negative burden effect is stronger for single-party cabinets, but stable throughout government tenure.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEuropean Journal of Political Research
Vol/bind63
Nummer4
Sider (fra-til)1601-1621
Antal sider21
ISSN0304-4130
DOI
StatusUdgivet - nov. 2024

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