Institut for Forretningsudvikling og Teknologi

Fractional hedonic games

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Links

DOI

  • Haris Aziz, University of New South Wales (UNSW) Australia
  • ,
  • Florian Brandl, Technische Universitat Munchen
  • ,
  • Felix Brandt, Technische Universitat Munchen
  • ,
  • Paul Harrenstein, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.
  • ,
  • Martin Olsen
  • Dominik Peters, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.

The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games (FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. FHGs thus not only constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games but also provide an interesting framework for network clustering.We propose a number of conditions under which the core of FHGs is nonempty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide non-emptiness of the core.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
Artikelnummera6
TidsskriftACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Vol/bind7
Nummer2
ISSN2167-8375
DOI
StatusUdgivet - jun. 2019

Se relationer på Aarhus Universitet Citationsformater

ID: 157146550