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Fighting Windmills: The Coalition of Industrialists and Environmentalists in the Climate Change Issue

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Standard

Fighting Windmills: The Coalition of Industrialists and Environmentalists in the Climate Change Issue. / Brandt, Urs Steiner; Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard.

I: International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Bind 4, Nr. 4, 2004, s. 327–337.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Harvard

Brandt, US & Svendsen, GT 2004, 'Fighting Windmills: The Coalition of Industrialists and Environmentalists in the Climate Change Issue', International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, bind 4, nr. 4, s. 327–337. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-004-2330-5

APA

Brandt, U. S., & Svendsen, G. T. (2004). Fighting Windmills: The Coalition of Industrialists and Environmentalists in the Climate Change Issue. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 4(4), 327–337. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-004-2330-5

CBE

Brandt US, Svendsen GT. 2004. Fighting Windmills: The Coalition of Industrialists and Environmentalists in the Climate Change Issue. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. 4(4):327–337. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-004-2330-5

MLA

Brandt, Urs Steiner og Gert Tinggaard Svendsen. "Fighting Windmills: The Coalition of Industrialists and Environmentalists in the Climate Change Issue". International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. 2004, 4(4). 327–337. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-004-2330-5

Vancouver

Author

Brandt, Urs Steiner ; Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard. / Fighting Windmills: The Coalition of Industrialists and Environmentalists in the Climate Change Issue. I: International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. 2004 ; Bind 4, Nr. 4. s. 327–337.

Bibtex

@article{66575ef2bd9a435a9e162c84fa7889c0,
title = "Fighting Windmills: The Coalition of Industrialists and Environmentalists in the Climate Change Issue",
abstract = "This paper extends the political economy idea developed by Ackerman and Hassler [Clean Coal/Dirty Air, or How the Clean Air Act became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-out for High Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should Be Done About It. New Haven: Yale University Press], which suggested that a coalition of environmentalists and industrialists successfully lobbied the US Congress. More strict technology-based standards for new emitting sources than for existingsources was the resulting policy outcome serving the common interest of the coalition because it offered both a barrier to entry for new firms and improved environmental quality. We focus on the case of international climate negotiations and the promotion of wind-based energy. Along the lines of the Ackerman and Hassler approach, we suggest that one reason for EU eagerness to push forward ambitious reduction target levels (and thereby promote new green industries) could be a similar coalition between industrialists and environmentalists. Such a strategy can be seen in the context of the Bootleggers and Baptist theory developed by Yandle [{\textquoteleft}Bootleggers and Baptists: the Education of a Regulatory Economist,{\textquoteright} Regulation, 7, 12–16], where the Baptists (in our case the environmentalists) demand changes in behaviour on moral grounds. In contrast, the Bootleggers (the producers of renewable energy), who profit from the very regulation, keep a low profile. The actual heavy subsidisation of renewable energy sources, such as wind energy, can be viewed as a successful policy outcome for the coalition of industrialists and environmentalists offering both market protection and improved environmental quality. Solving the current deadlock in international climate negotiations may well imply fighting the strong coalition of industrialists and environmentalists. Such a political battle may turn out to be just as tough asfighting windmills and needs to be addressed in future and more rigorous empirical research. At the end of the day, transparent incentives of relevant stakeholders in the climate change issue are necessary preconditions for progress in the climate change negotiations.",
keywords = "baptists, bootleggers, EU, Kyoto Protocol, political economy, technology-based standards, US, wind turbine industry",
author = "Brandt, {Urs Steiner} and Svendsen, {Gert Tinggaard}",
year = "2004",
doi = "10.1007/s10784-004-2330-5",
language = "English",
volume = "4",
pages = "327–337",
journal = "International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics",
issn = "1567-9764",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fighting Windmills: The Coalition of Industrialists and Environmentalists in the Climate Change Issue

AU - Brandt, Urs Steiner

AU - Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - This paper extends the political economy idea developed by Ackerman and Hassler [Clean Coal/Dirty Air, or How the Clean Air Act became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-out for High Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should Be Done About It. New Haven: Yale University Press], which suggested that a coalition of environmentalists and industrialists successfully lobbied the US Congress. More strict technology-based standards for new emitting sources than for existingsources was the resulting policy outcome serving the common interest of the coalition because it offered both a barrier to entry for new firms and improved environmental quality. We focus on the case of international climate negotiations and the promotion of wind-based energy. Along the lines of the Ackerman and Hassler approach, we suggest that one reason for EU eagerness to push forward ambitious reduction target levels (and thereby promote new green industries) could be a similar coalition between industrialists and environmentalists. Such a strategy can be seen in the context of the Bootleggers and Baptist theory developed by Yandle [‘Bootleggers and Baptists: the Education of a Regulatory Economist,’ Regulation, 7, 12–16], where the Baptists (in our case the environmentalists) demand changes in behaviour on moral grounds. In contrast, the Bootleggers (the producers of renewable energy), who profit from the very regulation, keep a low profile. The actual heavy subsidisation of renewable energy sources, such as wind energy, can be viewed as a successful policy outcome for the coalition of industrialists and environmentalists offering both market protection and improved environmental quality. Solving the current deadlock in international climate negotiations may well imply fighting the strong coalition of industrialists and environmentalists. Such a political battle may turn out to be just as tough asfighting windmills and needs to be addressed in future and more rigorous empirical research. At the end of the day, transparent incentives of relevant stakeholders in the climate change issue are necessary preconditions for progress in the climate change negotiations.

AB - This paper extends the political economy idea developed by Ackerman and Hassler [Clean Coal/Dirty Air, or How the Clean Air Act became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-out for High Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should Be Done About It. New Haven: Yale University Press], which suggested that a coalition of environmentalists and industrialists successfully lobbied the US Congress. More strict technology-based standards for new emitting sources than for existingsources was the resulting policy outcome serving the common interest of the coalition because it offered both a barrier to entry for new firms and improved environmental quality. We focus on the case of international climate negotiations and the promotion of wind-based energy. Along the lines of the Ackerman and Hassler approach, we suggest that one reason for EU eagerness to push forward ambitious reduction target levels (and thereby promote new green industries) could be a similar coalition between industrialists and environmentalists. Such a strategy can be seen in the context of the Bootleggers and Baptist theory developed by Yandle [‘Bootleggers and Baptists: the Education of a Regulatory Economist,’ Regulation, 7, 12–16], where the Baptists (in our case the environmentalists) demand changes in behaviour on moral grounds. In contrast, the Bootleggers (the producers of renewable energy), who profit from the very regulation, keep a low profile. The actual heavy subsidisation of renewable energy sources, such as wind energy, can be viewed as a successful policy outcome for the coalition of industrialists and environmentalists offering both market protection and improved environmental quality. Solving the current deadlock in international climate negotiations may well imply fighting the strong coalition of industrialists and environmentalists. Such a political battle may turn out to be just as tough asfighting windmills and needs to be addressed in future and more rigorous empirical research. At the end of the day, transparent incentives of relevant stakeholders in the climate change issue are necessary preconditions for progress in the climate change negotiations.

KW - baptists

KW - bootleggers

KW - EU

KW - Kyoto Protocol

KW - political economy

KW - technology-based standards

KW - US

KW - wind turbine industry

U2 - 10.1007/s10784-004-2330-5

DO - 10.1007/s10784-004-2330-5

M3 - Journal article

VL - 4

SP - 327

EP - 337

JO - International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics

JF - International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics

SN - 1567-9764

IS - 4

ER -