Abstract
In this article I issue a challenge to what I call the Independence Thesis of Theory Assessment (ITTA). According to ITTA, the evidence for (or against) a theory must be assessed independently from the theory explaining the evidence. I argue that ITTA is undermined by cases of evidential uncertainty, in which scientists have been guided by the explanatory power of their theories in the assessment of the evidence. Instead, I argue, these cases speak in favor of a model of theory assessment in which explanatory power may indeed contribute to the stabilization of the evidential basis.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Philosophy of Science |
Vol/bind | 92 |
Nummer | 1 |
Sider (fra-til) | 204 - 222 |
Antal sider | 19 |
ISSN | 0031-8248 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 1 jan. 2025 |