Institut for Statskundskab

Explaining the judicial independence of international courts: a comparative analysis.

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskning

  • Institut for Statskundskab
What factors allow some international courts (ICs) to rule against the express preferences of powerful member states, whereas others routinely defer to governments? While judicial independence is not the only factor explaining the strength of a given international institution, it is a necessary condition. The paper first develops three sets of competing explanatory variables that potentially can explain variations in the judicial independence of ICs. The causal effects of these explanatory variables upon variance in judicial independence are investigated in a comparative analysis of the ACJ, ECJ, ECtHR and IACHR. It is found that the threat of governmental noncompliance and the strength of the constituency possessed by an IC have the most explanatory power, although there is still a significant residual that can only be explained by looking at factors relating to judicial choices and agency.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Udgivelsesår2008
Antal sider47
StatusUdgivet - 2008
BegivenhedInternational Studies Association - San Francisco, USA
Varighed: 26 mar. 200829 mar. 2008

Konference

KonferenceInternational Studies Association
LandUSA
BySan Francisco
Periode26/03/200829/03/2008

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