Equal representation in two-tier voting systems

TY - JOUR

T1 - Equal representation in two-tier voting systems

AU - Maaser, Nicola

AU - Napel, Stefan

PY - 2007/4

Y1 - 2007/4

N2 - The paper investigates how voting weights should be assigned to differently sized constituencies of an assembly. The one-person, one-vote principle is interpreted as calling for a priori equal indirect influence on decisions. The latter are elements of a one-dimensional convex policy space and may result from strategic behavior consistent with the median voter theorem. Numerous artificial constituency configurations, the EU and the US are investigated by Monte-Carlo simulations. Penrose's square root rule, which originally applies to preference-free dichotomous decision environments and holds only under very specific conditions, comes close to ensuring equal representation. It is thus more robust than previously suggested.

AB - The paper investigates how voting weights should be assigned to differently sized constituencies of an assembly. The one-person, one-vote principle is interpreted as calling for a priori equal indirect influence on decisions. The latter are elements of a one-dimensional convex policy space and may result from strategic behavior consistent with the median voter theorem. Numerous artificial constituency configurations, the EU and the US are investigated by Monte-Carlo simulations. Penrose's square root rule, which originally applies to preference-free dichotomous decision environments and holds only under very specific conditions, comes close to ensuring equal representation. It is thus more robust than previously suggested.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33847354727&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s00355-006-0186-z

DO - 10.1007/s00355-006-0186-z

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:33847354727

SN - 0176-1714

VL - 28

SP - 401

EP - 420

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

IS - 3

ER -