Epistemic Injustice and Psychiatric Classification

Anke Bueter*

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

52 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

This article supports calls for an increased integration of patients into taxonomic decision making in psychiatry by arguing that their exclusion constitutes a special kind of epistemic injustice: preemptive testimonial injustice, which precludes the opportunity for testimony due to a wrongly presumed irrelevance or lack of expertise. Here, this presumption is misguided for two reasons: (1) the role of values in psychiatric classification and (2) the potential function of first-person knowledge as a corrective means against implicitly value-laden, inaccurate, or incomplete diagnostic criteria sets. This kind of epistemic injustice leads to preventable epistemic losses in psychiatric classification, diagnosis, and treatment.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftPhilosophy of Science
Vol/bind86
Nummer5
Sider (fra-til)1064-1074
Antal sider11
ISSN0031-8248
DOI
StatusUdgivet - dec. 2019
Udgivet eksterntJa

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