Abstract
Calum Miller recently argued that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism - equality between non-disabled human adults - implies fetal personhood. Miller claims that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human - an attribute which fetuses have - therefore, abortion is likely to be morally wrong. In this paper, I offer a plausible defence for the view that equality between non-disabled human adults does not imply fetal personhood. I also offer a challenge for Miller's view.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Journal of Medical Ethics |
Vol/bind | 49 |
Nummer | 10 |
Sider (fra-til) | 717-718 |
Antal sider | 2 |
ISSN | 0306-6800 |
DOI |
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Status | Udgivet - okt. 2023 |