Egalitarianism, moral status and abortion: A reply to Miller

Joona Räsänen*

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisKommentar/debat/letter to the editorForskningpeer review

4 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

Calum Miller recently argued that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism - equality between non-disabled human adults - implies fetal personhood. Miller claims that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human - an attribute which fetuses have - therefore, abortion is likely to be morally wrong. In this paper, I offer a plausible defence for the view that equality between non-disabled human adults does not imply fetal personhood. I also offer a challenge for Miller's view.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of Medical Ethics
Vol/bind49
Nummer10
Sider (fra-til)717-718
Antal sider2
ISSN0306-6800
DOI
StatusUdgivet - okt. 2023

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