Distributional consequences of political representation

Nicola Maaser*, Thomas Stratmann

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

17 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the effect of the geographic concentration of representatives on the geographic distribution of fiscal transfers. Our theoretical model predicts that more representatives residing in a geographic area leads to higher government funds to that area. Our empirical analysis uses the fact that in Germany, due to Germany[U+05F3]s electoral rules in state elections, the number of representatives varies across electoral districts. Controlling for various socio-economic, demographic, and political variables and using a variety of estimation methods, we find that districts with a greater number of representatives receive more government funds.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEuropean Economic Review
Vol/bind82
Sider (fra-til)187-211
Antal sider25
ISSN0014-2921
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 1 feb. 2016
Udgivet eksterntJa

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