TY - JOUR
T1 - Discussion Note on Hasok Chang: Realism for Realistic People
AU - Hoyningen-Huene, Paul
AU - Wray, K. Brad
PY - 2025/6
Y1 - 2025/6
N2 - We first discuss Chang’s criticism of the correspondence theory of truth and of what he calls ‘correspondence realism’. We think that correspondence can be rescued if properly reshaped. We then take up Chang’s alternative to the correspondence theory of truth, his ‘truth-by-operational-coherence’, which we think does not fit many truths from social life. The topic of realism, implicitly present already in the previous topics, is subsequently explicitly treated. What Chang calls realism is, in effect, very close to what has customarily been called anti-realism. Finally, we discuss the tension that exists in Chang’s book between his vigorous defense of pluralism on the object-level and his apparently taken-for-granted monism on the metalevel, namely pragmatism.
AB - We first discuss Chang’s criticism of the correspondence theory of truth and of what he calls ‘correspondence realism’. We think that correspondence can be rescued if properly reshaped. We then take up Chang’s alternative to the correspondence theory of truth, his ‘truth-by-operational-coherence’, which we think does not fit many truths from social life. The topic of realism, implicitly present already in the previous topics, is subsequently explicitly treated. What Chang calls realism is, in effect, very close to what has customarily been called anti-realism. Finally, we discuss the tension that exists in Chang’s book between his vigorous defense of pluralism on the object-level and his apparently taken-for-granted monism on the metalevel, namely pragmatism.
KW - pragmatism
KW - realism
KW - truth
KW - anti-realism
KW - correspondence theory of truth
KW - philosophy of science
U2 - 10.1007/s10838-024-09704-6
DO - 10.1007/s10838-024-09704-6
M3 - Literature review
SN - 0925-4560
JO - Journal for General Philosophy of Science
JF - Journal for General Philosophy of Science
M1 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-024-09704-6
ER -