Costly voting in weighted committees: The case of moral costs

Nicola Maaser; Thomas Stratmann

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104652

Costly voting in weighted committees: The case of moral costs

Nicola Maaser^*, Thomas Stratmann

^*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Institut for Økonomi

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avis › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

Abstract

We develop a theoretical model of voting behavior in committees when members differ in influence and receive payoffs that condition on the individual vote and the collective decision. Applied to a group decision involving moral costs, the model predicts that the distribution of decision-making power affects committee members’ incentives to make immoral choices: More influential agents tend to support the immoral choice, while less influential agents free-ride. A skewed power distribution makes immoral collective choices more likely. We then present results of a laboratory experiment that studies committee members’ voting behavior and collective choices under different distributions of decision-making power. As hypothesized, we find that the frequency of immoral decisions is positively related to an agent's voting power.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Artikelnummer	104652
Tidsskrift	European Economic Review
Vol/bind	162
ISSN	0014-2921
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104652
Status	Udgivet - feb. 2024

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10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104652

https://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S0014-2921(23)00280-5Licens: CC BY

Citationsformater

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abstract = "We develop a theoretical model of voting behavior in committees when members differ in influence and receive payoffs that condition on the individual vote and the collective decision. Applied to a group decision involving moral costs, the model predicts that the distribution of decision-making power affects committee members{\textquoteright} incentives to make immoral choices: More influential agents tend to support the immoral choice, while less influential agents free-ride. A skewed power distribution makes immoral collective choices more likely. We then present results of a laboratory experiment that studies committee members{\textquoteright} voting behavior and collective choices under different distributions of decision-making power. As hypothesized, we find that the frequency of immoral decisions is positively related to an agent's voting power.",

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AU - Stratmann, Thomas

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N2 - We develop a theoretical model of voting behavior in committees when members differ in influence and receive payoffs that condition on the individual vote and the collective decision. Applied to a group decision involving moral costs, the model predicts that the distribution of decision-making power affects committee members’ incentives to make immoral choices: More influential agents tend to support the immoral choice, while less influential agents free-ride. A skewed power distribution makes immoral collective choices more likely. We then present results of a laboratory experiment that studies committee members’ voting behavior and collective choices under different distributions of decision-making power. As hypothesized, we find that the frequency of immoral decisions is positively related to an agent's voting power.

AB - We develop a theoretical model of voting behavior in committees when members differ in influence and receive payoffs that condition on the individual vote and the collective decision. Applied to a group decision involving moral costs, the model predicts that the distribution of decision-making power affects committee members’ incentives to make immoral choices: More influential agents tend to support the immoral choice, while less influential agents free-ride. A skewed power distribution makes immoral collective choices more likely. We then present results of a laboratory experiment that studies committee members’ voting behavior and collective choices under different distributions of decision-making power. As hypothesized, we find that the frequency of immoral decisions is positively related to an agent's voting power.

KW - Committees

KW - Decision rules

KW - Economic experiments

KW - Moral behavior

KW - Threshold public good games

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DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104652

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85181159325

SN - 0014-2921

VL - 162

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

M1 - 104652

ER -

Costly voting in weighted committees: The case of moral costs

Abstract

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