Institut for Statskundskab

Controlling Delegated Powers in the Post-Lisbon European Union

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Standard

Controlling Delegated Powers in the Post-Lisbon European Union. / Brandsma, Gijs Jan; Blom-Hansen, Jens.

I: Journal of European Public Policy, Bind 23, Nr. 4, 2016, s. 531-549.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Harvard

Brandsma, GJ & Blom-Hansen, J 2016, 'Controlling Delegated Powers in the Post-Lisbon European Union', Journal of European Public Policy, bind 23, nr. 4, s. 531-549. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1055781

APA

CBE

MLA

Vancouver

Author

Brandsma, Gijs Jan ; Blom-Hansen, Jens. / Controlling Delegated Powers in the Post-Lisbon European Union. I: Journal of European Public Policy. 2016 ; Bind 23, Nr. 4. s. 531-549.

Bibtex

@article{9b1529f13f4544c0bff2318e81753583,
title = "Controlling Delegated Powers in the Post-Lisbon European Union",
abstract = "Most European Union rules are made by the Commission, not the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament. But although the Commission is an important rule-maker, it is not autonomous. The member states have always taken care to install committees to control the Commission (comitology). However, the Lisbon Treaty introduced alternative control mechanisms (delegated acts) and a reform of the comitology system (implementing acts). This article investigates how the post-Lisbon control system works in daily legislative practice. It represents the first investigation of the institutional preferences of the Council, the Parliament and the Commission in the new system. Further, it utilizes better data than previous studies. The analysis is based on data on the control preferences of all actors before the first trilogue meeting for a large number of cases in the period 2010–13. The results indicate that the institutional battle over the control of delegated rule-making is far from over.",
author = "Brandsma, {Gijs Jan} and Jens Blom-Hansen",
note = "DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2015.1055781",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1080/13501763.2015.1055781",
language = "English",
volume = "23",
pages = "531--549",
journal = "Journal of European Public Policy",
issn = "1350-1763",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Controlling Delegated Powers in the Post-Lisbon European Union

AU - Brandsma, Gijs Jan

AU - Blom-Hansen, Jens

N1 - DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2015.1055781

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Most European Union rules are made by the Commission, not the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament. But although the Commission is an important rule-maker, it is not autonomous. The member states have always taken care to install committees to control the Commission (comitology). However, the Lisbon Treaty introduced alternative control mechanisms (delegated acts) and a reform of the comitology system (implementing acts). This article investigates how the post-Lisbon control system works in daily legislative practice. It represents the first investigation of the institutional preferences of the Council, the Parliament and the Commission in the new system. Further, it utilizes better data than previous studies. The analysis is based on data on the control preferences of all actors before the first trilogue meeting for a large number of cases in the period 2010–13. The results indicate that the institutional battle over the control of delegated rule-making is far from over.

AB - Most European Union rules are made by the Commission, not the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament. But although the Commission is an important rule-maker, it is not autonomous. The member states have always taken care to install committees to control the Commission (comitology). However, the Lisbon Treaty introduced alternative control mechanisms (delegated acts) and a reform of the comitology system (implementing acts). This article investigates how the post-Lisbon control system works in daily legislative practice. It represents the first investigation of the institutional preferences of the Council, the Parliament and the Commission in the new system. Further, it utilizes better data than previous studies. The analysis is based on data on the control preferences of all actors before the first trilogue meeting for a large number of cases in the period 2010–13. The results indicate that the institutional battle over the control of delegated rule-making is far from over.

U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2015.1055781

DO - 10.1080/13501763.2015.1055781

M3 - Journal article

VL - 23

SP - 531

EP - 549

JO - Journal of European Public Policy

JF - Journal of European Public Policy

SN - 1350-1763

IS - 4

ER -