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Controlling Delegated Powers in the Post-Lisbon European Union

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Most European Union rules are made by the Commission, not the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament. But although the Commission is an important rule-maker, it is not autonomous. The member states have always taken care to install committees to control the Commission (comitology). However, the Lisbon Treaty introduced alternative control mechanisms (delegated acts) and a reform of the comitology system (implementing acts). This article investigates how the post-Lisbon control system works in daily legislative practice. It represents the first investigation of the institutional preferences of the Council, the Parliament and the Commission in the new system. Further, it utilizes better data than previous studies. The analysis is based on data on the control preferences of all actors before the first trilogue meeting for a large number of cases in the period 2010–13. The results indicate that the institutional battle over the control of delegated rule-making is far from over.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of European Public Policy
Vol/bind23
Nummer4
Sider (fra-til)531-549
Antal sider19
ISSN1350-1763
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2016

Bibliografisk note

DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2015.1055781

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