Conflict and salience as drivers of corporate lobbying?: An elite survey experiment

Ellis Aizenberg

doi:10.1111/gove.12682

Conflict and salience as drivers of corporate lobbying? An elite survey experiment

Ellis Aizenberg

Institut for Statskundskab

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avis › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

7 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper argues that a high degree of conflict and a low degree of salience on a policy issue drives corporations to lobby alone rather than via a business association. Previous research has addressed drivers at organizational, sector and structural level. This paper adds an issue perspective. These arguments are important as democracies thrive when business employs its power in a responsible manner. When corporations lobby alone, it can be a challenge to do so as they tend to overlook long-term interests of the broader business community and society. The arguments are tested for the first time in a corporatist context through an original survey experiment among corporate lobbyists in Germany and the Netherlands. The study finds support for the expectation on conflict, which is striking as it indicates that corporations prefer to lobby alone due to conflict even in contexts in which they are not incentivized to do so.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Governance: An international journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions
Vol/bind	36
Nummer	2
Sider (fra-til)	555-574
Antal sider	20
ISSN	0952-1895
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12682
Status	Udgivet - apr. 2023

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10.1111/gove.12682Licens: CC BY-NC-ND

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Conflict and salience as drivers of corporate lobbying? An elite survey experiment

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