Computing sequential equilibria for two-player games.

    Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport/proceedingKonferencebidrag i proceedingsForskningpeer review

    23 Citationer (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel showed how to
    efficiently compute minimax strategies for two-player extensive-form zero-sum
    games with imperfect information but perfect recall using linear programming
    and avoiding conversion to normal form. Their algorithm has been used by AI
    researchers for constructing prescriptive strategies for concrete, often
    fairly large games. Koller and Pfeffer pointed out that
    the strategies obtained by the algorithm are not necessarily sequentially
    rational and that this deficiency is often problematic for the practical
    applications. We show how to remove this deficiency by modifying the linear
    programs constructed by Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel so that pairs of
    strategies forming a sequential equilibrium are computed. In particular, we
    show that a sequential equilibrium for a two-player zero-sum game with
    imperfect information but perfect recall can be found in polynomial
    time. In addition, the equilibrium we find is normal-form perfect.
    We also describe an extension of our technique to general-sum
    games which is likely to be prove practical, even though it is
    not polynomial-time.

    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TitelProc. 17th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA'06)
    Antal sider10
    ForlagACM-SIAM
    Publikationsdato2006
    Sider107-116
    StatusUdgivet - 2006
    BegivenhedACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms - , USA
    Varighed: 17 dec. 2010 → …
    Konferencens nummer: 17

    Konference

    KonferenceACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
    Nummer17
    Land/OmrådeUSA
    Periode17/12/2010 → …

    Fingeraftryk

    Dyk ned i forskningsemnerne om 'Computing sequential equilibria for two-player games.'. Sammen danner de et unikt fingeraftryk.

    Citationsformater