Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

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The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
Artikelnummer23
TidsskriftA C M Transactions on Economics and Computation
Vol/bind5
Nummer4
Sider (fra-til)23:1-23:24
Antal sider24
ISSN2167-8375
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 22 dec. 2017

    Forskningsområder

  • Algorithmic game theory, Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium, extensive-form games, finite sequential games, stackelberg equilibrium

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