Commitment and partial naïveté: Early withdrawal penalties on retirement accounts

Torben M. Andersen, Joydeep Bhattacharya, Pan Liu*

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Abstract

We analyze a portfolio allocation problem in a standard model of conflict within temporal selves who suffer from partial naïveté – the current self holds a deterministic but possibly wrong perception (underestimation) about the present bias of her future selves. The current self can invest in a liquid and a longer-maturity, illiquid asset; the latter offers partial commitment since the future self may prematurely liquidate it at a penalty rate. If the cost is prohibitive, no liquidation happens, and the first-best plan laid out by the current self is followed. When such costs are modest, raising them has countervailing income and substitution effects. Consequently, in a range, a strengthening of the commitment device of illiquidity is not necessarily welfare increasing for the current self.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
Artikelnummer102844
TidsskriftJournal of Mathematical Economics
Vol/bind106
ISSN0304-4068
DOI
StatusUdgivet - maj 2023

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