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Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline

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Standard

Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline. / Fortunato, David; Loftis, Matthew.

I: American Political Science Review, Bind 112, Nr. 4, 2018, s. 939-953.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Harvard

Fortunato, D & Loftis, M 2018, 'Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline', American Political Science Review, bind 112, nr. 4, s. 939-953. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000436

APA

Fortunato, D., & Loftis, M. (2018). Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline. American Political Science Review, 112(4), 939-953. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000436

CBE

Fortunato D, Loftis M. 2018. Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline. American Political Science Review. 112(4):939-953. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000436

MLA

Fortunato, David og Matthew Loftis. "Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline". American Political Science Review. 2018, 112(4). 939-953. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000436

Vancouver

Fortunato D, Loftis M. Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline. American Political Science Review. 2018;112(4):939-953. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000436

Author

Fortunato, David ; Loftis, Matthew. / Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline. I: American Political Science Review. 2018 ; Bind 112, Nr. 4. s. 939-953.

Bibtex

@article{5397dc6befff44489e99412aa1704cca,
title = "Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline",
abstract = "Government durability is critically important, yet the supply of research devoted to its causes far exceeds the supply of research devoted to its consequences. We argue that short government durations in parliamentary democracies increase public spending by driving a political budget cycle. We present a revision of the standard political budget cycle model that relaxes the common (often implicit) assumption that election timing is fixed and known in advance. Instead, we allow cabinets to form expectations about their durability and use these expectations to inform their spending choices. The model predicts that 1) cabinets should spend more as their expected term in office draws to a close and 2) cabinets that outlive their expected duration should run higher deficits. Using data from 15 European democracies over several decades, we show that governments increase spending as their expected duration withers and run higher deficits as they surpass their forecasted life expectancy. ",
keywords = "fiscal discipline, cabinet duration, political budget cycles",
author = "David Fortunato and Matthew Loftis",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1017/S0003055418000436",
language = "English",
volume = "112",
pages = "939--953",
journal = "American Political Science Review",
issn = "0003-0554",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline

AU - Fortunato, David

AU - Loftis, Matthew

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - Government durability is critically important, yet the supply of research devoted to its causes far exceeds the supply of research devoted to its consequences. We argue that short government durations in parliamentary democracies increase public spending by driving a political budget cycle. We present a revision of the standard political budget cycle model that relaxes the common (often implicit) assumption that election timing is fixed and known in advance. Instead, we allow cabinets to form expectations about their durability and use these expectations to inform their spending choices. The model predicts that 1) cabinets should spend more as their expected term in office draws to a close and 2) cabinets that outlive their expected duration should run higher deficits. Using data from 15 European democracies over several decades, we show that governments increase spending as their expected duration withers and run higher deficits as they surpass their forecasted life expectancy.

AB - Government durability is critically important, yet the supply of research devoted to its causes far exceeds the supply of research devoted to its consequences. We argue that short government durations in parliamentary democracies increase public spending by driving a political budget cycle. We present a revision of the standard political budget cycle model that relaxes the common (often implicit) assumption that election timing is fixed and known in advance. Instead, we allow cabinets to form expectations about their durability and use these expectations to inform their spending choices. The model predicts that 1) cabinets should spend more as their expected term in office draws to a close and 2) cabinets that outlive their expected duration should run higher deficits. Using data from 15 European democracies over several decades, we show that governments increase spending as their expected duration withers and run higher deficits as they surpass their forecasted life expectancy.

KW - fiscal discipline

KW - cabinet duration

KW - political budget cycles

U2 - 10.1017/S0003055418000436

DO - 10.1017/S0003055418000436

M3 - Journal article

VL - 112

SP - 939

EP - 953

JO - American Political Science Review

JF - American Political Science Review

SN - 0003-0554

IS - 4

ER -