Institut for Statskundskab

Bureaucratic politics and national preference formation in EU constitutional politics – is the state merely a transmission belt?

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskning

Standard

Bureaucratic politics and national preference formation in EU constitutional politics – is the state merely a transmission belt? / Beach, Derek.

2009. Paper præsenteret ved Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, USA.

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskning

Harvard

Beach, D 2009, 'Bureaucratic politics and national preference formation in EU constitutional politics – is the state merely a transmission belt?', Paper fremlagt ved Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, USA, 15/02/2009 - 18/02/2009.

APA

Beach, D. (2009). Bureaucratic politics and national preference formation in EU constitutional politics – is the state merely a transmission belt?. Paper præsenteret ved Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, USA.

CBE

Beach D. 2009. Bureaucratic politics and national preference formation in EU constitutional politics – is the state merely a transmission belt?. Paper præsenteret ved Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, USA.

MLA

Beach, Derek Bureaucratic politics and national preference formation in EU constitutional politics – is the state merely a transmission belt?. Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 15 feb. 2009, New York, USA, Paper, 2009.

Vancouver

Beach D. Bureaucratic politics and national preference formation in EU constitutional politics – is the state merely a transmission belt?. 2009. Paper præsenteret ved Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, USA.

Author

Beach, Derek. / Bureaucratic politics and national preference formation in EU constitutional politics – is the state merely a transmission belt?. Paper præsenteret ved Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, USA.

Bibtex

@conference{3741b2b0994111dea092000ea68e967b,
title = "Bureaucratic politics and national preference formation in EU constitutional politics – is the state merely a transmission belt?",
abstract = " In a perfect representative democracy, there is a democratic chain of delegation that links voters with their elected representatives and then onwards to the executive branch and finally to civil servants in the bureaucracy (Str{\o}m 2000). But is this an accurate picture of foreign policy making in European parliamentary democracies? This question is especially important as regards negotiations between EU member states on whether they should transfer national competences to the EU level; something that  can be termed EU constitutional politics. The paper utilizes a strong {\textquoteleft}least-likely{\textquoteright} case selection strategy to investigate whether bureaucratic politics actually matter, or whether liberal intergovernmentalism is correct in treating the state as a neutral transmission belt for societal preferences. The findings of the paper point towards some tentative support for the proposition that bureaucratic politics do matter, and that how positions are coordinated did have some independent impact upon national positions. But in the majority of issues, it does appear that the state was merely a transmission belt for executive priorities. ",
author = "Derek Beach",
year = "2009",
language = "English",
note = "null ; Conference date: 15-02-2009 Through 18-02-2009",

}

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - Bureaucratic politics and national preference formation in EU constitutional politics – is the state merely a transmission belt?

AU - Beach, Derek

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 -  In a perfect representative democracy, there is a democratic chain of delegation that links voters with their elected representatives and then onwards to the executive branch and finally to civil servants in the bureaucracy (Strøm 2000). But is this an accurate picture of foreign policy making in European parliamentary democracies? This question is especially important as regards negotiations between EU member states on whether they should transfer national competences to the EU level; something that  can be termed EU constitutional politics. The paper utilizes a strong ‘least-likely’ case selection strategy to investigate whether bureaucratic politics actually matter, or whether liberal intergovernmentalism is correct in treating the state as a neutral transmission belt for societal preferences. The findings of the paper point towards some tentative support for the proposition that bureaucratic politics do matter, and that how positions are coordinated did have some independent impact upon national positions. But in the majority of issues, it does appear that the state was merely a transmission belt for executive priorities.

AB -  In a perfect representative democracy, there is a democratic chain of delegation that links voters with their elected representatives and then onwards to the executive branch and finally to civil servants in the bureaucracy (Strøm 2000). But is this an accurate picture of foreign policy making in European parliamentary democracies? This question is especially important as regards negotiations between EU member states on whether they should transfer national competences to the EU level; something that  can be termed EU constitutional politics. The paper utilizes a strong ‘least-likely’ case selection strategy to investigate whether bureaucratic politics actually matter, or whether liberal intergovernmentalism is correct in treating the state as a neutral transmission belt for societal preferences. The findings of the paper point towards some tentative support for the proposition that bureaucratic politics do matter, and that how positions are coordinated did have some independent impact upon national positions. But in the majority of issues, it does appear that the state was merely a transmission belt for executive priorities.

M3 - Paper

Y2 - 15 February 2009 through 18 February 2009

ER -