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Banquet: Short and Fast Signatures from AES

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  • Carsten Baum
  • Cyprien Delpech de Saint Guilhem, KU Leuven
  • ,
  • Daniel Kales, Graz University of Technology
  • ,
  • Emmanuela Orsini, KU Leuven
  • ,
  • Peter Scholl
  • Greg Zaverucha, Microsoft USA

This work introduces Banquet, a digital signature scheme with post-quantum security, constructed using only symmetric-key primitives. The design is based on the MPC-in-head paradigm also used by Picnic (CCS 2017) and BBQ (SAC 2019). Like BBQ, Banquet uses only standardized primitives, namely AES and SHA-3, but signatures are more than 50% shorter, making them competitive with Picnic (which uses a non-standard block cipher to improve performance). The MPC protocol in Banquet uses a new technique to verify correctness of the AES S-box computations, which is efficient because the cost is amortized with a batch verification strategy. Our implementation and benchmarks also show that both signing and verification can be done in under 10ms on a current x64 CPU. We also explore the parameter space to show the range of trade-offs that are possible with the Banquet design, and show that Banquet can nearly match the signature sizes possible with Picnic (albeit with slower, but still practical run times) or have speed within a factor of two of Picnic (at the cost of larger signatures).

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TitelPublic-Key Cryptography – PKC 2021 : 24th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public Key Cryptography, Virtual Event, May 10–13, 2021, Proceedings, Part I
RedaktørerJuan A. Garay
Antal sider32
ForlagSpringer
Udgivelsesår2021
Sider266-297
ISBN (trykt)9783030752446
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2021
Begivenhed24th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public Key Cryptography, PKC 2021 - Virtual, Online
Varighed: 10 maj 202113 maj 2021

Konference

Konference24th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public Key Cryptography, PKC 2021
ByVirtual, Online
Periode10/05/202113/05/2021
SerietitelLecture Notes in Computer Science
Vol/bindLNCS 12710
ISSN0302-9743

Bibliografisk note

Funding Information:
Acknowledgements. Cyprien Delpech de Saint Guilhem and Emmanuela Orsini have been supported in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under Contract No. HR001120C0085, by CyberSecurity Research Flanders under reference number No. VR20192203, and by ERC Advanced Grant ERC-2015-AdG-IMPaCT. Carsten Baum and Peter Scholl have been supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under Contract No. HR001120C0085. Baum has been additionally supported in part by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Unions’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 669255 (MPCPRO), and Scholl by a starting grant from Aarhus University Research Foundation. Daniel Kales has been supported in part by the European Unions’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 871473 (KRAKEN).

Funding Information:
Cyprien Delpech de Saint Guilhem and Emmanuela Orsini have been supported in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under Contract No. HR001120C0085, by CyberSecurity Research Flanders under reference number No. VR20192203, and by ERC Advanced Grant ERC-2015-AdG-IMPaCT. Carsten Baum and Peter Scholl have been supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under Contract No. HR001120C0085. Baum has been additionally supported in part by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Unions?s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 669255 (MPCPRO), and Scholl by a starting grant from Aarhus University Research Foundation. Daniel Kales has been supported in part by the European Unions?s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 871473 (KRAKEN). Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of any of the funders. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation therein.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, International Association for Cryptologic Research.

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