Institut for Statskundskab

Against the family veto in organ procurement: Why the wishes of the dead should prevail when the living and the deceased disagree on organ donation

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Against the family veto in organ procurement: Why the wishes of the dead should prevail when the living and the deceased disagree on organ donation. / Albertsen, Andreas.
I: Bioethics, Bind 34, Nr. 3, 03.2020, s. 272-280.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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@article{2663115c0707490d8bfdaae00166e455,
title = "Against the family veto in organ procurement: Why the wishes of the dead should prevail when the living and the deceased disagree on organ donation",
abstract = "The wishes of registered organ donors are regularly set aside when family members object to donation. This genuine overruling of the wishes of the deceased raises difficult ethical questions. A successful argument for providing the family with a veto must (a) provide reason to disregard the wishes of the dead, and (b) establish why the family should be allowed to decide. One branch of justification seeks to reconcile the family veto with important ideas about respecting property rights, preserving autonomy, and preventing harm. These arguments are ultimately unsuccessful. Another branch of arguments is consequentialist, pointing out the negative consequences of removing the veto. Whether construed as concerning family distress or as a potential drop in the organs available, these arguments are unsuccessful; the first fails to recognize the tremendous distress associated with waiting for an organ, while the second has little supporting evidence. A final section considers and rejects whether combining some of the arguments just examined could justify the family veto. We should thus remove the family veto in organ donation.",
keywords = "Family veto, organ donation, organ shortage, family veto, autonomy of the dead, family refusal, organ procurement, organ transplantation, first-person authorization, DONOR, PRESUMED CONSENT, TISSUE, TRANSPLANTATION, DECISIONS, RESPECT, WOULD, BEREAVED FAMILIES",
author = "Andreas Albertsen",
year = "2020",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1111/bioe.12661",
language = "English",
volume = "34",
pages = "272--280",
journal = "Bioethics",
issn = "0269-9702",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.",
number = "3",
note = "{\AA}rsm{\o}de Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab ; Conference date: 29-10-2015 Through 30-10-2015",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Against the family veto in organ procurement

T2 - Årsmøde Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab

AU - Albertsen, Andreas

PY - 2020/3

Y1 - 2020/3

N2 - The wishes of registered organ donors are regularly set aside when family members object to donation. This genuine overruling of the wishes of the deceased raises difficult ethical questions. A successful argument for providing the family with a veto must (a) provide reason to disregard the wishes of the dead, and (b) establish why the family should be allowed to decide. One branch of justification seeks to reconcile the family veto with important ideas about respecting property rights, preserving autonomy, and preventing harm. These arguments are ultimately unsuccessful. Another branch of arguments is consequentialist, pointing out the negative consequences of removing the veto. Whether construed as concerning family distress or as a potential drop in the organs available, these arguments are unsuccessful; the first fails to recognize the tremendous distress associated with waiting for an organ, while the second has little supporting evidence. A final section considers and rejects whether combining some of the arguments just examined could justify the family veto. We should thus remove the family veto in organ donation.

AB - The wishes of registered organ donors are regularly set aside when family members object to donation. This genuine overruling of the wishes of the deceased raises difficult ethical questions. A successful argument for providing the family with a veto must (a) provide reason to disregard the wishes of the dead, and (b) establish why the family should be allowed to decide. One branch of justification seeks to reconcile the family veto with important ideas about respecting property rights, preserving autonomy, and preventing harm. These arguments are ultimately unsuccessful. Another branch of arguments is consequentialist, pointing out the negative consequences of removing the veto. Whether construed as concerning family distress or as a potential drop in the organs available, these arguments are unsuccessful; the first fails to recognize the tremendous distress associated with waiting for an organ, while the second has little supporting evidence. A final section considers and rejects whether combining some of the arguments just examined could justify the family veto. We should thus remove the family veto in organ donation.

KW - Family veto

KW - organ donation

KW - organ shortage

KW - family veto

KW - autonomy of the dead

KW - family refusal

KW - organ procurement

KW - organ transplantation

KW - first-person authorization

KW - DONOR

KW - PRESUMED CONSENT

KW - TISSUE

KW - TRANSPLANTATION

KW - DECISIONS

KW - RESPECT

KW - WOULD

KW - BEREAVED FAMILIES

U2 - 10.1111/bioe.12661

DO - 10.1111/bioe.12661

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 31598984

VL - 34

SP - 272

EP - 280

JO - Bioethics

JF - Bioethics

SN - 0269-9702

IS - 3

Y2 - 29 October 2015 through 30 October 2015

ER -