Institut for Statskundskab

A Clarity Model of District Representation: District Magnitude and Pork Priorities

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A Clarity Model of District Representation: District Magnitude and Pork Priorities. / Tromborg, Mathias Wessel; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie.
I: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Bind 47, Nr. 1, 02.2022, s. 37-52.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Harvard

Tromborg, MW & Schwindt-Bayer, L 2022, 'A Clarity Model of District Representation: District Magnitude and Pork Priorities', Legislative Studies Quarterly, bind 47, nr. 1, s. 37-52. https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12319

APA

CBE

MLA

Vancouver

Tromborg MW, Schwindt-Bayer L. A Clarity Model of District Representation: District Magnitude and Pork Priorities. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 2022 feb.;47(1):37-52. Epub 2022. doi: 10.1111/lsq.12319

Author

Tromborg, Mathias Wessel ; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie. / A Clarity Model of District Representation: District Magnitude and Pork Priorities. I: Legislative Studies Quarterly. 2022 ; Bind 47, Nr. 1. s. 37-52.

Bibtex

@article{22cb0b28396a4a4e9d821baf83c4afb6,
title = "A Clarity Model of District Representation:: District Magnitude and Pork Priorities",
abstract = "Carey and Shugart's important personal vote seeking model has long dominated literature on electoral rules and district representation. Empirical support for the model is somewhat mixed, however. We think one reason may be that its applicability depends on the type of district-focused representation. We present an alternative “clarity model,” drawing from Lancaster, that may work better for one specific type of district-targeted representation—pork provision. The clarity model posits district magnitude should be linked to less pork regardless of ballot type because it limits clarity of responsibility for pork outcomes. Legislators not directly responsible for goods and services allocated to the district can still claim credit for them in high magnitude districts. We test this theory with elite survey data on legislators' priorities toward pork provision in 14 Latin American and 10 Western Europe democracies and find empirical support for a clarity theory of pork priorities.",
keywords = "comparative, legislatures, personal vote-seeking, pork, representation, PERSONAL VOTE, INCENTIVES, LEGISLATORS, personal vote&#8208, seeking, BARREL POLITICS, HOME",
author = "Tromborg, {Mathias Wessel} and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer",
year = "2022",
month = feb,
doi = "10.1111/lsq.12319",
language = "English",
volume = "47",
pages = "37--52",
journal = "Legislative Studies Quarterly",
issn = "0362-9805",
publisher = "JohnWiley & Sons, Inc.",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Clarity Model of District Representation:

T2 - District Magnitude and Pork Priorities

AU - Tromborg, Mathias Wessel

AU - Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie

PY - 2022/2

Y1 - 2022/2

N2 - Carey and Shugart's important personal vote seeking model has long dominated literature on electoral rules and district representation. Empirical support for the model is somewhat mixed, however. We think one reason may be that its applicability depends on the type of district-focused representation. We present an alternative “clarity model,” drawing from Lancaster, that may work better for one specific type of district-targeted representation—pork provision. The clarity model posits district magnitude should be linked to less pork regardless of ballot type because it limits clarity of responsibility for pork outcomes. Legislators not directly responsible for goods and services allocated to the district can still claim credit for them in high magnitude districts. We test this theory with elite survey data on legislators' priorities toward pork provision in 14 Latin American and 10 Western Europe democracies and find empirical support for a clarity theory of pork priorities.

AB - Carey and Shugart's important personal vote seeking model has long dominated literature on electoral rules and district representation. Empirical support for the model is somewhat mixed, however. We think one reason may be that its applicability depends on the type of district-focused representation. We present an alternative “clarity model,” drawing from Lancaster, that may work better for one specific type of district-targeted representation—pork provision. The clarity model posits district magnitude should be linked to less pork regardless of ballot type because it limits clarity of responsibility for pork outcomes. Legislators not directly responsible for goods and services allocated to the district can still claim credit for them in high magnitude districts. We test this theory with elite survey data on legislators' priorities toward pork provision in 14 Latin American and 10 Western Europe democracies and find empirical support for a clarity theory of pork priorities.

KW - comparative

KW - legislatures

KW - personal vote-seeking

KW - pork

KW - representation

KW - PERSONAL VOTE

KW - INCENTIVES

KW - LEGISLATORS

KW - personal vote&#8208

KW - seeking

KW - BARREL POLITICS

KW - HOME

U2 - 10.1111/lsq.12319

DO - 10.1111/lsq.12319

M3 - Journal article

VL - 47

SP - 37

EP - 52

JO - Legislative Studies Quarterly

JF - Legislative Studies Quarterly

SN - 0362-9805

IS - 1

ER -