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A Blind Eye to Industry-Level Corruption: The Risk of Favoring Domestic Industries in the EU ETS

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A Blind Eye to Industry-Level Corruption : The Risk of Favoring Domestic Industries in the EU ETS. / Brandt, Urs Steiner; Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard.

I: Energy & Environment, Bind 25, Nr. 2, 2014, s. 263-80.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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Brandt, Urs Steiner ; Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard. / A Blind Eye to Industry-Level Corruption : The Risk of Favoring Domestic Industries in the EU ETS. I: Energy & Environment. 2014 ; Bind 25, Nr. 2. s. 263-80.

Bibtex

@article{a9a8c3fbc4f04b52a65a2ee470cc45d2,
title = "A Blind Eye to Industry-Level Corruption: The Risk of Favoring Domestic Industries in the EU ETS",
abstract = "We investigate the risk of favouring domestic industries in the current EuropeanUnion Emission Trading System (EU ETS). As the EU forms a weak federalstructure compared to the US, there is a risk that single countries may free ride onthe others by choosing to take a blind eye to industry-level corruption whentempted to favour their own industries. In other words, the optimal level ofnational cheating may not take into account the external cost it imposes upon other countries and the risk of wide-scale cheating and the possibility of an EU ETScollapse. Such national incentives to cheat correspond to a well-knowntransnational externality problem from international environmental problems andmultiplayer prisoners{\textquoteright} dilemma games. Thus, there is a strong need for systematicempirical analysis of whether cheating actually occurs in the EU ETS as predictedby theory.",
keywords = "European Union, emission trading, enforcement, corruption, US Acid Rain Program, EU ETS",
author = "Brandt, {Urs Steiner} and Svendsen, {Gert Tinggaard}",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1260/0958-305X.25.2.263",
language = "English",
volume = "25",
pages = "263--80",
journal = "Energy & Environment",
issn = "0958-305X",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Blind Eye to Industry-Level Corruption

T2 - The Risk of Favoring Domestic Industries in the EU ETS

AU - Brandt, Urs Steiner

AU - Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - We investigate the risk of favouring domestic industries in the current EuropeanUnion Emission Trading System (EU ETS). As the EU forms a weak federalstructure compared to the US, there is a risk that single countries may free ride onthe others by choosing to take a blind eye to industry-level corruption whentempted to favour their own industries. In other words, the optimal level ofnational cheating may not take into account the external cost it imposes upon other countries and the risk of wide-scale cheating and the possibility of an EU ETScollapse. Such national incentives to cheat correspond to a well-knowntransnational externality problem from international environmental problems andmultiplayer prisoners’ dilemma games. Thus, there is a strong need for systematicempirical analysis of whether cheating actually occurs in the EU ETS as predictedby theory.

AB - We investigate the risk of favouring domestic industries in the current EuropeanUnion Emission Trading System (EU ETS). As the EU forms a weak federalstructure compared to the US, there is a risk that single countries may free ride onthe others by choosing to take a blind eye to industry-level corruption whentempted to favour their own industries. In other words, the optimal level ofnational cheating may not take into account the external cost it imposes upon other countries and the risk of wide-scale cheating and the possibility of an EU ETScollapse. Such national incentives to cheat correspond to a well-knowntransnational externality problem from international environmental problems andmultiplayer prisoners’ dilemma games. Thus, there is a strong need for systematicempirical analysis of whether cheating actually occurs in the EU ETS as predictedby theory.

KW - European Union

KW - emission trading

KW - enforcement

KW - corruption

KW - US Acid Rain Program

KW - EU ETS

U2 - 10.1260/0958-305X.25.2.263

DO - 10.1260/0958-305X.25.2.263

M3 - Journal article

VL - 25

SP - 263

EP - 280

JO - Energy & Environment

JF - Energy & Environment

SN - 0958-305X

IS - 2

ER -