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Torben M. Andersen

Resolving intergenerational conflict over the environment under the pareto criterion

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Standard

Resolving intergenerational conflict over the environment under the pareto criterion. / Andersen, Torben M.; Bhattacharya, Joydeep; Liu, Pan.

I: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Bind 100, 102290, 03.2020.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Harvard

Andersen, TM, Bhattacharya, J & Liu, P 2020, 'Resolving intergenerational conflict over the environment under the pareto criterion', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, bind 100, 102290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102290

APA

Andersen, T. M., Bhattacharya, J., & Liu, P. (2020). Resolving intergenerational conflict over the environment under the pareto criterion. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 100, [102290]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102290

CBE

Andersen TM, Bhattacharya J, Liu P. 2020. Resolving intergenerational conflict over the environment under the pareto criterion. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 100:Article 102290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102290

MLA

Andersen, Torben M., Joydeep Bhattacharya og Pan Liu. "Resolving intergenerational conflict over the environment under the pareto criterion". Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2020. 100. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102290

Vancouver

Andersen TM, Bhattacharya J, Liu P. Resolving intergenerational conflict over the environment under the pareto criterion. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2020 mar;100. 102290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102290

Author

Andersen, Torben M. ; Bhattacharya, Joydeep ; Liu, Pan. / Resolving intergenerational conflict over the environment under the pareto criterion. I: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2020 ; Bind 100.

Bibtex

@article{039fc5d22e1749479029b084a6746482,
title = "Resolving intergenerational conflict over the environment under the pareto criterion",
abstract = "Climate change policies create intergenerational winners and losers because the costs come first and the benefits later. In such cases, Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysis seeks potential Pareto-improvements by showing the hypothetical potential for the winners to compensate the losers via lump-sum transfers. In their absence, once a costly climate policy is actually implemented, it unleashes distortions and general-equilibrium effects rendering unclear whether Kaldor-Hicks potential improvements lead to actual improvements. We study policies which, once implemented, would pass the Pareto test that no generation subsequent to policy action be made worse off than before. We develop a stylized climate-economy model in which production by the current generation generates pollution which “damages” production for future generations. Over time, the business-as-usual (BAU) economy gets increasingly polluted, consumption falls, and generational welfare levels decline. A government introduces costly pollution abatement and finances it via distorting taxes and the sale of debt (“green bonds”). Pollution levels start to decline, generating downstream welfare gains which may be taxed – without hurting anyone, in a Pareto sense – to help finance the policy and pay off the debt. Along the transition, every generation faces less pollution, consumes more and is happier than if life had continued in the BAU world.",
keywords = "Cost-benefit analysis, Environmental policy, Green bonds, Kaldor-Hicks, Overlapping generations, Pareto criterion, Pollution, Public debt",
author = "Andersen, {Torben M.} and Joydeep Bhattacharya and Pan Liu",
year = "2020",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102290",
language = "English",
volume = "100",
journal = "Journal of Environmental Economics and Management",
issn = "0095-0696",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Resolving intergenerational conflict over the environment under the pareto criterion

AU - Andersen, Torben M.

AU - Bhattacharya, Joydeep

AU - Liu, Pan

PY - 2020/3

Y1 - 2020/3

N2 - Climate change policies create intergenerational winners and losers because the costs come first and the benefits later. In such cases, Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysis seeks potential Pareto-improvements by showing the hypothetical potential for the winners to compensate the losers via lump-sum transfers. In their absence, once a costly climate policy is actually implemented, it unleashes distortions and general-equilibrium effects rendering unclear whether Kaldor-Hicks potential improvements lead to actual improvements. We study policies which, once implemented, would pass the Pareto test that no generation subsequent to policy action be made worse off than before. We develop a stylized climate-economy model in which production by the current generation generates pollution which “damages” production for future generations. Over time, the business-as-usual (BAU) economy gets increasingly polluted, consumption falls, and generational welfare levels decline. A government introduces costly pollution abatement and finances it via distorting taxes and the sale of debt (“green bonds”). Pollution levels start to decline, generating downstream welfare gains which may be taxed – without hurting anyone, in a Pareto sense – to help finance the policy and pay off the debt. Along the transition, every generation faces less pollution, consumes more and is happier than if life had continued in the BAU world.

AB - Climate change policies create intergenerational winners and losers because the costs come first and the benefits later. In such cases, Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysis seeks potential Pareto-improvements by showing the hypothetical potential for the winners to compensate the losers via lump-sum transfers. In their absence, once a costly climate policy is actually implemented, it unleashes distortions and general-equilibrium effects rendering unclear whether Kaldor-Hicks potential improvements lead to actual improvements. We study policies which, once implemented, would pass the Pareto test that no generation subsequent to policy action be made worse off than before. We develop a stylized climate-economy model in which production by the current generation generates pollution which “damages” production for future generations. Over time, the business-as-usual (BAU) economy gets increasingly polluted, consumption falls, and generational welfare levels decline. A government introduces costly pollution abatement and finances it via distorting taxes and the sale of debt (“green bonds”). Pollution levels start to decline, generating downstream welfare gains which may be taxed – without hurting anyone, in a Pareto sense – to help finance the policy and pay off the debt. Along the transition, every generation faces less pollution, consumes more and is happier than if life had continued in the BAU world.

KW - Cost-benefit analysis

KW - Environmental policy

KW - Green bonds

KW - Kaldor-Hicks

KW - Overlapping generations

KW - Pareto criterion

KW - Pollution

KW - Public debt

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85078671252&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102290

DO - 10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102290

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85078671252

VL - 100

JO - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

JF - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

SN - 0095-0696

M1 - 102290

ER -