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Pierre Laurent G Saint-Germier

Conceivability, inconceivability and cartesian modal epistemology

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In various arguments, Descartes relies on the principles that conceivability implies possibility and that inconceivability implies impossibility. Those principles are in tension with another Cartesian view about the source of modality, i.e. the doctrine of the free creation of eternal truths. In this paper, I develop a ‘two-modality’ interpretation of the doctrine of eternal truths which resolves the tension and I discuss how the resulting modal epistemology can still be relevant for the contemporary discussion.
Vol/bindS.I. Cartesian Epistemology
StatusUdgivet - 2016
Eksternt udgivetJa

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