@article{d70aeb516635476fa9b4dec45b64233c,
title = "Terror, tortur og den tikkende bombe",
abstract = "The so-called {"}war on terror{"} has renewed the interest in torture in practice as well as in theory. The philosophical debate about possible justifications for torture has to a large extent revolved about the ticking bomb scenario: would it be justified to torture a terrorist in order to prevent a catastrophe? I criticize arguments based on ticking bomb scenarios in two steps. First, I show that exceptional resort to torture will not be possible in the situations where it is most needed. Second, I state several pragmatic as well as principled objections against a state sanctioned or tolerated practice of torture. Finally, I offer an explanation of what it means to regard the prohibition of torture as absolute.",
keywords = "Tortur, etik, 'krigen mod terror', absolutisme",
author = "Morten Dige",
year = "2012",
language = "Dansk",
pages = "111--127",
journal = "Slagmark",
issn = "0108-8084",
publisher = "Aarhus Universitet Institut for Filosofi og Idehistorie. Afdeling for Idehistorie",
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Terror, tortur og den tikkende bombe
AU - Dige, Morten
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - The so-called "war on terror" has renewed the interest in torture in practice as well as in theory. The philosophical debate about possible justifications for torture has to a large extent revolved about the ticking bomb scenario: would it be justified to torture a terrorist in order to prevent a catastrophe? I criticize arguments based on ticking bomb scenarios in two steps. First, I show that exceptional resort to torture will not be possible in the situations where it is most needed. Second, I state several pragmatic as well as principled objections against a state sanctioned or tolerated practice of torture. Finally, I offer an explanation of what it means to regard the prohibition of torture as absolute.
AB - The so-called "war on terror" has renewed the interest in torture in practice as well as in theory. The philosophical debate about possible justifications for torture has to a large extent revolved about the ticking bomb scenario: would it be justified to torture a terrorist in order to prevent a catastrophe? I criticize arguments based on ticking bomb scenarios in two steps. First, I show that exceptional resort to torture will not be possible in the situations where it is most needed. Second, I state several pragmatic as well as principled objections against a state sanctioned or tolerated practice of torture. Finally, I offer an explanation of what it means to regard the prohibition of torture as absolute.
KW - Tortur, etik, 'krigen mod terror', absolutisme
M3 - Tidsskriftartikel
SP - 111
EP - 127
JO - Slagmark
JF - Slagmark
SN - 0108-8084
ER -
