Aarhus Universitets segl

Morten Dige

Critique of autonomy-based arguments against legalising assisted dying

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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Critique of autonomy-based arguments against legalising assisted dying. / Petersen, Thomas Søbirk; Dige, Morten.

I: Bioethics, Bind 37, Nr. 2, 02.2023, s. 165-170.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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Petersen TS, Dige M. Critique of autonomy-based arguments against legalising assisted dying. Bioethics. 2023 feb.;37(2):165-170. doi: 10.1111/bioe.13125

Author

Petersen, Thomas Søbirk ; Dige, Morten. / Critique of autonomy-based arguments against legalising assisted dying. I: Bioethics. 2023 ; Bind 37, Nr. 2. s. 165-170.

Bibtex

@article{36b8a69d167e45b9a4f1be733c05b758,
title = "Critique of autonomy-based arguments against legalising assisted dying",
abstract = "The aim of this article is to present and critically investigate a type of argumentagainst legalising assisted dying on request (ADR) for patients who areterminally ill and experiencing suffering. This type of argument has severalvariants. These—which we call {\textquoteleft}autonomy‐based arguments{\textquoteright} against legalisingADR—invoke different specifications of the premise that we ought not torespect requests for assistance in dying made by terminally ill and sufferingpatients because the basic conditions of autonomy cannot be met in scenarioswhere such requests are made. Specifically, it is argued either (1) that as a resultof pain, anxiety or desperation, terminally ill patients are not competentdecision makers or (2) that legalisation of ADR would lead to social pressure orin other ways change the patient's context of choice in ways that make suchrequests nonautonomous. We argue that these types of arguments areproblematic in light both of empirical studies and the fact that we usuallyjudge that it is morally right to respect the wishes and decisions of dying peopleeven if they suffer.",
keywords = "assisted dying, autonomy, ethics, pain, terminally ill",
author = "Petersen, {Thomas S{\o}birk} and Morten Dige",
year = "2023",
month = feb,
doi = "10.1111/bioe.13125",
language = "English",
volume = "37",
pages = "165--170",
journal = "Bioethics",
issn = "0269-9702",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Critique of autonomy-based arguments against legalising assisted dying

AU - Petersen, Thomas Søbirk

AU - Dige, Morten

PY - 2023/2

Y1 - 2023/2

N2 - The aim of this article is to present and critically investigate a type of argumentagainst legalising assisted dying on request (ADR) for patients who areterminally ill and experiencing suffering. This type of argument has severalvariants. These—which we call ‘autonomy‐based arguments’ against legalisingADR—invoke different specifications of the premise that we ought not torespect requests for assistance in dying made by terminally ill and sufferingpatients because the basic conditions of autonomy cannot be met in scenarioswhere such requests are made. Specifically, it is argued either (1) that as a resultof pain, anxiety or desperation, terminally ill patients are not competentdecision makers or (2) that legalisation of ADR would lead to social pressure orin other ways change the patient's context of choice in ways that make suchrequests nonautonomous. We argue that these types of arguments areproblematic in light both of empirical studies and the fact that we usuallyjudge that it is morally right to respect the wishes and decisions of dying peopleeven if they suffer.

AB - The aim of this article is to present and critically investigate a type of argumentagainst legalising assisted dying on request (ADR) for patients who areterminally ill and experiencing suffering. This type of argument has severalvariants. These—which we call ‘autonomy‐based arguments’ against legalisingADR—invoke different specifications of the premise that we ought not torespect requests for assistance in dying made by terminally ill and sufferingpatients because the basic conditions of autonomy cannot be met in scenarioswhere such requests are made. Specifically, it is argued either (1) that as a resultof pain, anxiety or desperation, terminally ill patients are not competentdecision makers or (2) that legalisation of ADR would lead to social pressure orin other ways change the patient's context of choice in ways that make suchrequests nonautonomous. We argue that these types of arguments areproblematic in light both of empirical studies and the fact that we usuallyjudge that it is morally right to respect the wishes and decisions of dying peopleeven if they suffer.

KW - assisted dying

KW - autonomy

KW - ethics

KW - pain

KW - terminally ill

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85142644474&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/bioe.13125

DO - 10.1111/bioe.13125

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 36417661

VL - 37

SP - 165

EP - 170

JO - Bioethics

JF - Bioethics

SN - 0269-9702

IS - 2

ER -