Institut for Statskundskab

Martin Bækgaard

Tax Limitations and Revenue Shifting Strategies in Local Government

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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Tax Limitations and Revenue Shifting Strategies in Local Government. / Blom-Hansen, Jens; Bækgaard, Martin; Serritzlew, Søren.

I: Public Budgeting and Finance, Bind 34, Nr. 1, 2014, s. 64-84.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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@article{5fea1afb64bb43a7a36e813a61294238,
title = "Tax Limitations and Revenue Shifting Strategies in Local Government",
abstract = "The literature on tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) shows how limiting the freedom of local governments to levy taxes may have considerable unexpected effects. Entities subjected to such limitations may, as their proponents hope, react by cutting expenditures and revenue, but they may also strategically change their revenue structure and increase reliance on income sources not subjected to limitations. However, these findings are overwhelmingly based on studies of state and local governments in the USA. Their relevance outside this empirical setting remains unclear. A study of Denmark, where the central government imposed tax limitations on municipalities in 2009, makes two contributions. First, it probes the empirical domain of the US findings. Second, it constitutes an empirical testing ground where endogeneity is not a pressing concern. In the USA, TELs are often self-imposed either by local legislatures or by citizens through voter initiatives, which may bias the correlation between TELs and tax rates. We analyze a dataset of all Danish municipalities from 2007–2011 and demonstrate that TELs do indeed stop taxes from increasing but also confirm the findings from the TEL literature that entities subjected to tax limitations employ revenue-shifting strategies. In Denmark, however, these strategies are contingent on the specifics of the Danish intergovernmental system, which render central government grants an attractive object of revenue-shifting strategies. Our analysis thus helps identify the scope conditions of core findings within the literature.",
author = "Jens Blom-Hansen and Martin B{\ae}kgaard and S{\o}ren Serritzlew",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1111/pbaf.12029",
language = "English",
volume = "34",
pages = "64--84",
journal = "Public Budgeting and Finance",
issn = "0275-1100",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Tax Limitations and Revenue Shifting Strategies in Local Government

AU - Blom-Hansen, Jens

AU - Bækgaard, Martin

AU - Serritzlew, Søren

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - The literature on tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) shows how limiting the freedom of local governments to levy taxes may have considerable unexpected effects. Entities subjected to such limitations may, as their proponents hope, react by cutting expenditures and revenue, but they may also strategically change their revenue structure and increase reliance on income sources not subjected to limitations. However, these findings are overwhelmingly based on studies of state and local governments in the USA. Their relevance outside this empirical setting remains unclear. A study of Denmark, where the central government imposed tax limitations on municipalities in 2009, makes two contributions. First, it probes the empirical domain of the US findings. Second, it constitutes an empirical testing ground where endogeneity is not a pressing concern. In the USA, TELs are often self-imposed either by local legislatures or by citizens through voter initiatives, which may bias the correlation between TELs and tax rates. We analyze a dataset of all Danish municipalities from 2007–2011 and demonstrate that TELs do indeed stop taxes from increasing but also confirm the findings from the TEL literature that entities subjected to tax limitations employ revenue-shifting strategies. In Denmark, however, these strategies are contingent on the specifics of the Danish intergovernmental system, which render central government grants an attractive object of revenue-shifting strategies. Our analysis thus helps identify the scope conditions of core findings within the literature.

AB - The literature on tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) shows how limiting the freedom of local governments to levy taxes may have considerable unexpected effects. Entities subjected to such limitations may, as their proponents hope, react by cutting expenditures and revenue, but they may also strategically change their revenue structure and increase reliance on income sources not subjected to limitations. However, these findings are overwhelmingly based on studies of state and local governments in the USA. Their relevance outside this empirical setting remains unclear. A study of Denmark, where the central government imposed tax limitations on municipalities in 2009, makes two contributions. First, it probes the empirical domain of the US findings. Second, it constitutes an empirical testing ground where endogeneity is not a pressing concern. In the USA, TELs are often self-imposed either by local legislatures or by citizens through voter initiatives, which may bias the correlation between TELs and tax rates. We analyze a dataset of all Danish municipalities from 2007–2011 and demonstrate that TELs do indeed stop taxes from increasing but also confirm the findings from the TEL literature that entities subjected to tax limitations employ revenue-shifting strategies. In Denmark, however, these strategies are contingent on the specifics of the Danish intergovernmental system, which render central government grants an attractive object of revenue-shifting strategies. Our analysis thus helps identify the scope conditions of core findings within the literature.

U2 - 10.1111/pbaf.12029

DO - 10.1111/pbaf.12029

M3 - Journal article

VL - 34

SP - 64

EP - 84

JO - Public Budgeting and Finance

JF - Public Budgeting and Finance

SN - 0275-1100

IS - 1

ER -