Institut for Statskundskab

Martin Bækgaard

Intergovernmental Grants and Public Expenditures: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

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Intergovernmental Grants and Public Expenditures: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. / Bækgaard, Martin; Kjærgaard, Marie.

I: Local Government Studies, Bind 42, Nr. 2, 2016, s. 189-207.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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Bækgaard, Martin ; Kjærgaard, Marie. / Intergovernmental Grants and Public Expenditures: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. I: Local Government Studies. 2016 ; Bind 42, Nr. 2. s. 189-207.

Bibtex

@article{6752ea9b047b4a48bd0cd8f63a24f9d5,
title = "Intergovernmental Grants and Public Expenditures: Evidence from a Survey Experiment",
abstract = "The relationship between intergovernmental grants and public expenditures is one of the most studied phenomena in the local public finance literature. However, little is known about whether the impact of unconditional grants is fundamentally different from that of other sources of municipal revenue. We study this question by means of a large-scale randomized survey experiment among Danish local politicians, which allows for a comparison of the impact of changes in various sources of municipal revenue. Our findings challenge the conventional conception in the public finance literature that money works differently depending on which sector they are generated in. Instead, ideology plays an important role in explaining how local politicians want to allocate resources when faced with changes in local government revenue.",
author = "Martin B{\ae}kgaard and Marie Kj{\ae}rgaard",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1080/03003930.2015.1110521",
language = "English",
volume = "42",
pages = "189--207",
journal = "Local Government Studies",
issn = "0300-3930",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Intergovernmental Grants and Public Expenditures: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

AU - Bækgaard, Martin

AU - Kjærgaard, Marie

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - The relationship between intergovernmental grants and public expenditures is one of the most studied phenomena in the local public finance literature. However, little is known about whether the impact of unconditional grants is fundamentally different from that of other sources of municipal revenue. We study this question by means of a large-scale randomized survey experiment among Danish local politicians, which allows for a comparison of the impact of changes in various sources of municipal revenue. Our findings challenge the conventional conception in the public finance literature that money works differently depending on which sector they are generated in. Instead, ideology plays an important role in explaining how local politicians want to allocate resources when faced with changes in local government revenue.

AB - The relationship between intergovernmental grants and public expenditures is one of the most studied phenomena in the local public finance literature. However, little is known about whether the impact of unconditional grants is fundamentally different from that of other sources of municipal revenue. We study this question by means of a large-scale randomized survey experiment among Danish local politicians, which allows for a comparison of the impact of changes in various sources of municipal revenue. Our findings challenge the conventional conception in the public finance literature that money works differently depending on which sector they are generated in. Instead, ideology plays an important role in explaining how local politicians want to allocate resources when faced with changes in local government revenue.

U2 - 10.1080/03003930.2015.1110521

DO - 10.1080/03003930.2015.1110521

M3 - Journal article

VL - 42

SP - 189

EP - 207

JO - Local Government Studies

JF - Local Government Studies

SN - 0300-3930

IS - 2

ER -