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Henrik Vetter

Incentives in Supply Function Equilibrium

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Incentives in Supply Function Equilibrium. / Vetter, Henrik.

I: Economics, Bind 9, 2015, s. 1-20.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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Vetter, Henrik. / Incentives in Supply Function Equilibrium. I: Economics. 2015 ; Bind 9. s. 1-20.

Bibtex

@article{033cf2b5b8eb43b3947764b7ee075de1,
title = "Incentives in Supply Function Equilibrium",
abstract = "The author analyses delegation in homogenous duopoly under the assumption that firm-managers compete in supply functions. He reverses earlier findings in that owners give managers incentives to act in an accommodating way. That is, optimal delegation reduces per-firm output and increases profits to above-Cournot profits. Moreover, in supply function equilibrium, the mode of competition is endogenous. This means that the author avoids results that are sensitive with respect to assuming either Cournot or Bertrand competition.",
author = "Henrik Vetter",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2015-5",
language = "English",
volume = "9",
pages = "1--20",
journal = "Economics: the Open Access, Open Assessment,E-journal",
issn = "1864-6042",
publisher = "Kiel Institute for the world eceonomy, Leibniz Information Centre for Econimics",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Incentives in Supply Function Equilibrium

AU - Vetter, Henrik

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - The author analyses delegation in homogenous duopoly under the assumption that firm-managers compete in supply functions. He reverses earlier findings in that owners give managers incentives to act in an accommodating way. That is, optimal delegation reduces per-firm output and increases profits to above-Cournot profits. Moreover, in supply function equilibrium, the mode of competition is endogenous. This means that the author avoids results that are sensitive with respect to assuming either Cournot or Bertrand competition.

AB - The author analyses delegation in homogenous duopoly under the assumption that firm-managers compete in supply functions. He reverses earlier findings in that owners give managers incentives to act in an accommodating way. That is, optimal delegation reduces per-firm output and increases profits to above-Cournot profits. Moreover, in supply function equilibrium, the mode of competition is endogenous. This means that the author avoids results that are sensitive with respect to assuming either Cournot or Bertrand competition.

U2 - 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2015-5

DO - 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2015-5

M3 - Journal article

VL - 9

SP - 1

EP - 20

JO - Economics: the Open Access, Open Assessment,E-journal

JF - Economics: the Open Access, Open Assessment,E-journal

SN - 1864-6042

ER -