Bo Sandemann Rasmussen

Optimal Tax-Transfer Policies, Life-Cycle Labour Supply and Present-Biased Preferences

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Optimal Tax-Transfer Policies, Life-Cycle Labour Supply and Present-Biased Preferences. / Gunnersen, Lasse Frisgaard; Rasmussen, Bo Sandemann.

Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2012.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Gunnersen, LF & Rasmussen, BS 2012 'Optimal Tax-Transfer Policies, Life-Cycle Labour Supply and Present-Biased Preferences' Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus.

APA

Gunnersen, L. F., & Rasmussen, B. S. (2012). Optimal Tax-Transfer Policies, Life-Cycle Labour Supply and Present-Biased Preferences. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. Economics Working Papers, Nr. 2012-12

CBE

Gunnersen LF, Rasmussen BS. 2012. Optimal Tax-Transfer Policies, Life-Cycle Labour Supply and Present-Biased Preferences. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet.

MLA

Gunnersen, Lasse Frisgaard og Bo Sandemann Rasmussen Optimal Tax-Transfer Policies, Life-Cycle Labour Supply and Present-Biased Preferences. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. (Economics Working Papers; Journal nr. 2012-12). 2012., 37 s.

Vancouver

Gunnersen LF, Rasmussen BS. Optimal Tax-Transfer Policies, Life-Cycle Labour Supply and Present-Biased Preferences. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. 2012 maj 24.

Author

Gunnersen, Lasse Frisgaard ; Rasmussen, Bo Sandemann. / Optimal Tax-Transfer Policies, Life-Cycle Labour Supply and Present-Biased Preferences. Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2012. (Economics Working Papers; Nr. 2012-12).

Bibtex

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title = "Optimal Tax-Transfer Policies, Life-Cycle Labour Supply and Present-Biased Preferences",
abstract = "Using a two-period model with two types of agents that are characterized by present-biased preferences second-best optimal tax-transfer policies are considered. The paternalistic optimal tax-transfer policy has two main concerns: Income redistribution from high to low ability households and correction of undersaving due to present-biasedness. Policies must comply with incentive-compatibility constraints that restricts both how much income redistribution that can take place and how much savings should be subsidized. A main result is that the degree of present-biasedness has important consequences not only for optimal subsidies to savings but also for optimal marginal income taxes.",
keywords = "Optimal tax-transfer policy, paternalistic government, age-dependent taxes, labour supply, present-biasedness, redistribution.",
author = "Gunnersen, {Lasse Frisgaard} and Rasmussen, {Bo Sandemann}",
year = "2012",
month = "5",
day = "24",
language = "English",
publisher = "Institut for {\O}konomi, Aarhus Universitet",
type = "WorkingPaper",
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}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Optimal Tax-Transfer Policies, Life-Cycle Labour Supply and Present-Biased Preferences

AU - Gunnersen, Lasse Frisgaard

AU - Rasmussen, Bo Sandemann

PY - 2012/5/24

Y1 - 2012/5/24

N2 - Using a two-period model with two types of agents that are characterized by present-biased preferences second-best optimal tax-transfer policies are considered. The paternalistic optimal tax-transfer policy has two main concerns: Income redistribution from high to low ability households and correction of undersaving due to present-biasedness. Policies must comply with incentive-compatibility constraints that restricts both how much income redistribution that can take place and how much savings should be subsidized. A main result is that the degree of present-biasedness has important consequences not only for optimal subsidies to savings but also for optimal marginal income taxes.

AB - Using a two-period model with two types of agents that are characterized by present-biased preferences second-best optimal tax-transfer policies are considered. The paternalistic optimal tax-transfer policy has two main concerns: Income redistribution from high to low ability households and correction of undersaving due to present-biasedness. Policies must comply with incentive-compatibility constraints that restricts both how much income redistribution that can take place and how much savings should be subsidized. A main result is that the degree of present-biasedness has important consequences not only for optimal subsidies to savings but also for optimal marginal income taxes.

KW - Optimal tax-transfer policy, paternalistic government, age-dependent taxes, labour supply, present-biasedness, redistribution.

M3 - Working paper

BT - Optimal Tax-Transfer Policies, Life-Cycle Labour Supply and Present-Biased Preferences

PB - Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet

CY - Aarhus

ER -