In Search of an Identity
Canada Looks North

JESSICA SHADIAN

This is perhaps one of the greatest advantages that Canada has as a northern country: our geographic reality has helped to shape our Canadian sense of community and mutual responsibility. The geographical fact of our northerness has moulded our way of viewing the world.

—Honourable Stéphane Dion: June 21, 1999

As we celebrated our 30th anniversary, we [ITK] changed our name from Inuit Tapirisat of Canada to Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami. We also adopted a new logo. At its heart is Canada's maple leaf, circled by Inuit representing the four Settlement Regions, all anchored to the ulu. Together they demonstrate our cultural distinctions and unity, as well as our commitment to Canada. We are more than First Canadians, we are Canadians First!

—Canadian delegation presentation to the 9th ICC General Assembly, 2002

Introduction

How does a once marginalized indigenous group not only grow to signify Canada's emerging "northern" identity but also develop into a figure of authority in Arctic politics? Over the past 35 years, the Canadian Inuit have transformed themselves from a set of peripheral communities throughout the Canadian Arctic, with political inclusion confined to assimilation legislation and welfare policy, into a viable, codified Canadian indigenous political community. Further, this Inuit polity has transcended its domestic border to collaborate with Inuit throughout the Arctic as a transnational actor via the Inuit Circumpolar Council.

From a Canadian state perspective, the success of Canadian Inuit politics serves as a case in point of thriving Canadian multiculturalism, a model which Canada exports into the international community as a means to both (1) assert its sovereignty over the Arctic North and (2) secure a very particular role in international Arctic policy decisions. While Canada boasts of its indigenization, Inuit politicians similarly boast of the Inuit as proud Canadian citizens. Why? And what have been the consequences of this rhetoric?

This article argues that through the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), and Canadian federal and local policy, the Inuit and the Canadian government (encouraged domestically by ITK to live up to its rhetoric of being an archetypal liberal democracy) have constructed
and successfully exported a vision of the Arctic based on a symbiotic relationship. At the Arctic level, they have successfully created a particular "northern" identity. This particular Arctic construction has contributed to Canada's privileged place in Arctic governance regionally, as well as its legitimacy over its Arctic waters internationally. Similarly, the ICC (as a member of the Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC] of the United Nations) and Canada have, at times, worked together at varying UN conferences to promote the significance of Canada's Arctic Inuit and, consequently, Arctic sovereignty. For the Inuit in particular, this relationship has become the overarching means to secure, validate, and maintain Inuit "self-determination" at home. Most explicitly, the success of this process has been through the convergence of certain Inuit and Canadian policies which strive to present the indigenous Inuit as an embodiment of sustainable development policy and governance. Through the discourse of sustainable development, Canada and the Inuit are reshaping Arctic politics and expanding the role of the Arctic in the overall framework of global development.

This article proceeds as follows: The first section provides a brief historical summary of early Inuit and Canadian encounters (from 1800 to the mid-1900s) and the relationship that was constructed at that time as a consequence. With this background, the second section provides a more in-depth discussion of post–World War II Canadian federal policy concerning the Canadian Inuit population. In particular, it focuses on two specific aspects: Canadian Constitution and policy changes over Arctic sovereignty. As these particular domestic circumstances materialized, they also became intertwined with broader regional and international events. The third section first addresses evolving international institutional norms as they came to intersect with Canadian Inuit/state relations. Canada Inuit/state relations, however, not only came to bear on international politics; they also helped to construct a distinct Arctic regional identity. Following the breakdown of the Soviet Union, in the Arctic region a process of Arctic regime building was underway. By the time the Arctic Council was created in 1996, the Canadian Inuit/state relationship had created a very particular Arctic vision—a vision on which Arctic governance came to be predicated. The platform of the Arctic Council helped institutionalize the political reality of Canada as an Arctic state, and the Inuit as fundamental citizens within Canadian identity.

Background

The foundation for the relationship between Inuit and Europeans—European "discovery" of the Canadian Arctic—reaches back to at least 1497, when an Italian named John Cabot sailed west from Bristol, England, in search of a new trade route to the Orient, and stumbled across Cape Breton Island (present-day Newfoundland). Yet it was not until the 16th century that Euro-
pean fishing fleets made almost annual visits to the eastern shores of Canada and contact with the Inuit became more regularized. In 1670, the Hudson Bay Company was established as Europeans began to take interest in the commercial value of the Arctic’s animal resources—namely, whales.

By the 1850s, extensive trading posts were built throughout the Arctic, whereby Inuit and Europeans became increasingly interdependent. By 1925, the Inuit had become subjects (if not quite citizens) of the Canadian state. Furthermore, the settlement of missionaries caused many traditional beliefs and practices of the Inuit either to disappear or to go underground. Despite their interactions with and reliance (in the case of the fur traders) on the Inuit, the missionaries and fur companies as well as the federal government largely ignored the interests of the Canadian Arctic Inuit. What materialized was a credit system originally set up by institutions such as the Hudson Bay Company. The consequence was a slow evolution of Inuit reliance on an exchange economy. Over the period between 1870 and 1930, this relationship progressed into a total Inuit dependence on the state. Furthermore, during this time the price of fur dropped dramatically. Nevertheless, the Inuit population continued to grow, alongside state dependence, and it was not until after the Second World War that the Canadian government began to take an active interest in Inuit welfare. Two reasons for this prevailed: Canadian political ideology and Canadian Arctic sovereignty.

The Debate over Inuit Citizenship

The adverse living conditions of many Inuit began to worsen following World War II. Consequently, a renewed desire for the federal government to incorporate the Inuit into the dominant Canadian society burgeoned. Previously, the debate centered on whether the Inuit should be considered Indians and placed under the Indian Act, or whether they should be more appropriately considered something different. This issue had been a federal debate at several points in Canadian history. Its origins stem back to a 1935 Supreme Court decision that reaffirmed the “unique” position of the Inuit. The court declared that the “Inuit were a different ‘race’ than Indians and, therefore, not covered by Section 91 (24) of the British North American Act.” The debate resurfaced in conjunction with the ongoing political contestation between Canada and role of Quebec. Again the question arose: How would the Canadian government make the Inuit Canadian? The welfare state seemed the most sufficient way to address this question.

After hearing reports of widespread misery and even starvation, the government aggressively persuaded the Inuit to give up their “nomadic” way of life. The welfare policies enacted at that time were premised on the idea of liberal humanitarianism. The means for realizing this vision was assimilation. The resulting assimilationist policies created permanent settlements (which for many were resettlements) in order to foster the least expensive way of adminis-
tering social welfare. Government services and facilities were expanded within these new settlements, including low-cost housing, schools, medical facilities, airports, and modern stores. By the mid 1960s, the whole of the Canadian Inuit were concentrated in these new settlements. Consequent to this new lifestyle, the Inuit became increasingly dependent on the state. While these assimilationist policies have (over time) been abandoned, the rhetoric of liberal humanitarianism has dominated Canadian policy.

_Canadian Sovereignty_

Aside from the socioeconomic issues of the Canadian Arctic Inuit, a resurgence in attempts to undermine Canada’s sovereignty over the Arctic further redirected attention to its North. Canadian Arctic sovereignty issues go back at least to the late 1800s, when United States whalers operating in the Beaufort Sea and the eastern Arctic made repeated threats. These instances were then compounded by British, American, and Scandinavian explorers, adventurers, and scientists who made “voyages of discovery” in the region. There were also Inuit from Greenland who came to hunt across Smith Sound on Ellesmere Island. In 1903 the Canadian government decided to establish three police posts. The government also sent the ship _Neptune_ on an expedition, showing the flag around Baffin and Ellesmere Islands, and by 1922, the government began to send ships for regular summer trips into the eastern Arctic.

This growing interest in the Canadian Arctic expanded further when oil was discovered in 1920 at Norman Wells in the eastern Arctic. Subsequently, the government revised the Northwest Territories Act and created a council whereby a commissioner would assume a greater role in the area, including investing large amounts of money. These revisions, targeted at the issue of sovereignty, were intended to “establish the principle that these aborigines are also under our control.” One of the first mandates of the council was to establish an East Arctic Patrol that would “show the flag.” Police posts were also set up on Craig Harbour, Ellesmere Island, and Pond Inlet to “give evidence of ‘occupation’ as well as the presence of authority. Several Inuit families were moved to these previously uninhabited locations.” These developments soon came to serve as the prelude to a host of future debates and changes in Canadian policies toward the North. Central to all these discussions was renewed deliberation over the future of Canadian identity.

_Reconstructing Canadian Identity_

C. 1960 the Inuit lands which now make up Nunavut were a world wholly distinct, remote, unconnected from Canada. Since that time the two worlds have got to know each other, have had some quarrels, and have negotiated good relations. Today Canadians are proud to include and embrace Nunavut and Nunavummiut; most Nunavummiut are
newly, fully, and demandingly Canadian, trying to take up the new opportunities enhanced or created by the Nunavut claims and territory governance outcomes in national society.\textsuperscript{18}

—Peter Jul 2001

The relationship between the Inuit and the Canadian state, and the symbolic significance of that relationship, did not transform overnight, nor was it a process without intense contestation. By the 1970s, two Canadian concerns—Aboriginal relations and sovereignty over the Arctic—had become central features of Canadian politics. At the domestic level, the primary issue concerned the discovery of natural resources in the North, fueling a larger examination over who owned the rights to economic development in the region. The debate over these rights eventually culminated with the need to resolve Aboriginal land claims.

Analogous to the discussions throughout the Canadian Arctic to resolve Inuit land claims, internationally there was once again heightened anxiety concerning another issue. This concern was U.S. and Canadian disagreement over international claims to the Northwest Passage. The Canadian process that addressed these issues of Arctic sovereignty and Aboriginal land claims can be traced through the discussions over responsibility for the Inuit in the Canadian Constitution over time.

\textit{Aboriginal Self-Determination: The Canadian Constitution}

In the late 1960s, a “White Paper” on Aboriginal policy was introduced under Pierre Trudeau’s government. This policy was created with the intent to end the collective rights of Aboriginal people in favor of individual rights and accompanied Trudeau’s 1968 campaign for a \textit{just society}.\textsuperscript{19} The policy initiative galvanized Aboriginal communities across Canada, and Harold Cardinal, then president of the Indian Association of Alberta, responded with a document entitled the “Red Paper,” which “described how Indian peoples, as peoples with distinct cultures, wished to contribute to Canadian society while at the same time exercising political and economic power at the community level.”\textsuperscript{20} While the publication of Trudeau’s White Paper helped inflate overall Aboriginal and Indian politics, other issues simultaneously brought Aboriginal self-determination to the forefront of Canadian politics.

Throughout much of Canada, oil and gas exploration brought about a desire to resolve existing land claims. In addition, in northern Quebec they were also steered by provincial and federal political tensions. In Nunavik, in northern Quebec, a cooperative movement emerged by a group of artists-carvers who, tired of welfare and wasted resources due to rivalry between the federal and provincial governments, came together to form an association with the aim of getting better prices for their artwork. What eventually emerged was a grassroots attempt to control economic development in the region. Movement
participants focused on the art-sculpture and fishing industries, as well as those industries that were limited by government monopoly. More poignantly, they sought to break Inuit dependence on federal subsidies and the Hudson Bay Company. The political awareness generated from these economic efforts eventually led to the establishment of the Committee for Original Peoples Entitlement (COPE) in 1970. COPE came to represent the interests of all Inuit and Natives in northern Canada. Particularly in the western Arctic, COPE became the primary body for negotiating land claim disputes, including what would become the proposal for Nunavut beginning in 1979.

Between the parallel failure of the White Paper for the state to resolve Aboriginal issues and heightened indigenous political mobilization, what transpired at the national level was a reinvigorated need for renovating the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples. The process sought was constitutional reform. The opportunity for this change presented itself in 1978 with the election of Parti Québécois in Quebec. In 1971, the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC, later changed to ITK), a grassroots advocacy organization, was also created. In 1979, the ITC concluded that a committee needed to be established that would represent the interests of the Inuit in Canada at constitutional negotiations. Subsequently, the Inuit Committee on National Issues (ICNI) was created to pursue constitutional changes (particularly those recognizing Aboriginal rights) on behalf of Canadian Inuit. At this time, the federal government introduced a proposal for constitutional reform entitled "A Time for Action," along with draft legislation, Bill C-60. Together these proposals contained a draft charter of rights and freedoms which included a provision shielding certain Aboriginal rights from the general application of the individual rights clauses. The Progressive Conservative government of Joe Clark invited Aboriginal leaders for the first time to discuss formally with federal and provincial ministers the issues to be placed on the first ministers' constitutional agenda.

In January 1981, the federal proposal was revised following discussions with Aboriginal leaders. The proposal contained three sections addressing the concerns of Aboriginal peoples, much of which would eventually be written into the Constitution Act of 1982, the first portion of which was called the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, several incidents preceded this. When the first ministers' meeting convened in November of 1981, a draft constitutional amendment was created, supported by the federal government and nine provinces (minus Quebec). When completed, the drafted accord had left out Aboriginal rights entirely. Immediately following this, Aboriginal groups throughout Canada instigated an effort to restore Aboriginal rights into the constitutional discussions. Their work was accompanied by additional referendum fears concerning the rights of Canadian women. Women's groups and Aboriginal groups combined their lobbying efforts and, following concerted action by both parties, it was decided that the drafted
amendment would not apply to section 28, the sexual equality provision of the charter, and Aboriginal and treaty rights would be reinstated.28

When the Constitutional Conference finally convened in 1983, it was televised live. The outcome and received attention by the media became a vastly significant turning point in Canadian state/Aboriginal relations. According to the Indian and Northern Affairs Canada:

[T]he hopes and dreams of Aboriginal peoples were brought to viewers across the country. Aboriginal cultures were given a place of respect through the use of Aboriginal traditions—opening prayers, drumming, the passing of the great pipe of peace. For the first time since Confederation, Aboriginal leaders sat at the table as equals with first ministers.29

The final amendment, Part I of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Article 25, stated:

The Guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including (a) any rights and freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and (b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.

This amendment was complemented with Part II, Article 35 of the Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, which states:

The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. (2) In this Act, “aboriginal peoples of Canada” includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada. (3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) “treaty rights” includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.

Article 35.1 further states:

The government of Canada and the provincial governments are committed to the principle that, before any amendment is made to Class 24 of section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, to section 25 of this Act or to this Part
(a) a constitutional conference that includes in its agenda an item relating to the proposed amendment, composed of the Prime Minister of Canada and the first Ministers of the provinces, will be convened by the Prime Minister of Canada; and
the Prime Minister of Canada will invite representatives of the aboriginal peoples of Canada to participate in the discussions on that item.

The Constitutional Amendment Act of 1982, with its discussion and ratification of amendments, was followed by several constitutional conferences held between 1984 and 1986, all of which, however, failed to produce any amendments. The lack of consensus was directed at the basic question of whether the right of Aboriginal self-government emanated from "inherent and unextinguished Aboriginal sovereignty, and from treaty and Aboriginal rights," or whether it should be "delegated from federal and provincial governments."

In 1986, the federal and provincial governments held a Quebec round of constitutional discussions to try to continue the unresolved debates. As a consequence, the Meech Lake Accord was drafted. Included in the Accord was constitutional recognition of Quebec as a "distinct society." For the Inuit, this proposal contradicted Canadian constitutional aims, and thus, in response at the Parliamentary Conference on Aboriginal Matters, Mary Simon, then president of the ICC, stated:

While Quebec would be recognized as a "distinct society" the same accord denied similar recognition to the aboriginal peoples of Canada. In addition, the accord did not provide for any aboriginal involvement in future annual First Ministers Conferences concerning the constitution and the Economy.

Canadian Aboriginal groups overall opposed the Meech Lake Accord, and in the final days before the draft's expiration, the prime minister, in a final attempt to win their support, wrote to Phil Fontaine of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, outlining a six-point program addressing Aboriginal concerns. Included in this outline was a commitment by the government of Canada to full constitutional recognition of the Aboriginal peoples as a fundamental characteristic of Canada. Despite the prime minister's efforts, the attempt failed on June 22, 1990, when Newfoundland and Manitoba's Elijah Harper, sole Aboriginal legislative member, voted against the accord. Zebedee Nungak from the Inuit Committee on National Issues stated:

We continue to have a hope that this great country, which we embrace as our own, will have the sense and the decency—not that I doubt its decency—to someday, in my generation, recognize our rights, and complete the circle of Confederation, because if it is not going to be done in my generation, I have my son standing behind me who will take up the fight with your sons and your sons' sons.
Mary Simon similarly argued:

Quebec’s constitutional talks had its rightful place but it should not serve to, in effect, replace the outstanding concerns of Aboriginal People, nor should we be denied direct participation in Quebec’s constitutional negotiations. ...[W]e believe in the notion of cooperative federalism but this notion does not in our view only include federal, provincial, and territorial governments, but also the legitimate representatives of Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples.35

The failure of the Meech Lake Accord, however, only seemed to augment the need to adequately address Aboriginal self-government and existing unresolved claims. More generally, there was growing support for acknowledging the contributions of Aboriginal peoples to Canada.36 Despite the failures at the conferences to resolve the issue, the process itself—aiming for constitutional reform—transformed the significance of Canadian state/Aboriginal relations within overall Canadian identity.

By 1991, the federal government had created the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, comprised of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal commissioners. The mandate of the Commission was to find ways to rebuild the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in Canada.37 Further, during this time, a joint parliamentary committee (Beaudoin-Dobbie) was established to review the federal government’s existing proposals, which culminated with the publication of a booklet entitled Shaping Canada’s Future Together.38 The committee later added a sixth forum on Aboriginal issues, chaired by Joe Ghiz, former premier of Prince Edward Island, at the insistence of Aboriginal people.

Almost all provincial and territorial governments held public hearings, and funds were provided for national Aboriginal organizations to consult their people.39 What materialized was the Charlottetown Accord in 1992. The overall aim of the Accord was to conclude the “Canada Round of constitutional renewal.” The Accord recognized the inherent right of Aboriginal self-government at all levels of government: federal, provincial, and territorial.40 Through the negotiations, the Charlottetown Accord became the most extensive set of public consultations and negotiations held between the provinces, territories, and Aboriginal peoples of Canada. According to a Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs document entitled “The Constitutional File and the Unity File”:

[The] proposals are intended to serve as a reasonable compromise and as the basis for a renewed federalism that will secure our future together in one of the most successful countries in the world, a country the United Nations Development Programme considers the best place in the world to live.41
While a national referendum did not approve of the Charlottetown Accord, the Accord itself recognized the inherent right of Aboriginal peoples to self-government within Canada. Moreover, the Accord foreshadowed a renewed desire for Canada to export the idea of Inuit rights as an important feature of its multicultural landscape, which would eventually be framed as a Canadian model of liberal humanitarianism. According to Mary Simon, who from 1994 to 2007 served as the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the constitutional negotiations in general were:

...an irreversible and defining moment in Canadian history. The recognition by the federal and provincial governments that the self-government rights of aboriginal peoples are “inherent” reflects an understanding that these rights are “pre-existing” rights, meaning they are rights pre-existing the creation of Canada and reflect the fundamental nature of self-government... rights that can be recognized, affirmed and protected but not extinguished by other governments or peoples.42

At the Constitutional Consultation Conference in March of 1992, the ICC in its concluding remarks stated:

In the past few weeks we have witnessed extraordinary progress on the recognition of aboriginal and treaty rights in this country. We have gone from a ten year delay period to a ten week negotiation. While there is much to discuss and negotiate, the momentum for justice is truly thrilling...Canada needs aboriginal peoples in this most uncertain and critical time. We can bring our knowledge of the land and its peoples to the common awareness of this country.43

Overall, according to Simon and Peter Jull, the significance underlying these constitutional debates was that, “[w]hile Southern Canadians have sunk into despair over their constitutional failures, Inuit and other Northerners have been quietly remaking Canada’s formal and informal constitutional arrangements pertaining to their own territories.”44 While progress was being carried out domestically, world events also helped foster another turning point between Inuit politics and the Canadian government.

**Arctic Sovereignty**

Parallel to the ongoing constitutional discussions, in 1969 Canada’s sovereignty was again challenged as a United States icebreaker, the *Manhattan*, sailed through the Northwest Passage. In response, the government of Canada passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which affirmed a 100-mile pollution prevention zone in the area. The Act created an entirely new le-
gal concept for environmental law—a concept that was eventually supported through the Law of the Sea Conference. This did little, however, to deter the United States: Canada's sovereignty over the Northwest Passage was again challenged by the Polar Sea, which cruised through the Canadian Arctic waters in 1985 without permission. The House of Commons, in response, announced a number of measures, which included plans for drawing straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago to delineate its claim, increased aerial surveillance, naval activities in Canada's eastern Arctic waters, and construction of a class-8 polar icebreaker. Briefs submitted by the ITK, ICC, and other regional Inuit groups to the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations stressed another, more practical means for protecting sovereignty. The alternative, they argued, centered on recognition of Canadian Inuit. According to Mark Gordon, president of Makivik Corporation (a Quebec Inuit-owned corporation):

Canada's claim to the Arctic is more securely founded upon continuing Inuit use and occupation of the area than upon the construction of icebreakers, the promotion of increased tanker traffic, and investment in military hardware....Stability in the North could be gained by negotiating self-government and comprehensive claims agreements with Inuit. This would allow for the co-operative management and regulation of northern lands and the offshore, and would be a functional exercise of Canada's jurisdiction that could prove persuasive in international law.

When the House of Commons completed their discussions in 1986 the International Relations Committee devoted an entire chapter of its final report to a "northern dimension" for Canada's foreign policy. These recommendations diverged significantly from the original military suggestions put forth by the government. The International Relations Committee—a "special joint committee"—instead focused on "the critical importance of the Arctic to the direction Canadian foreign policy should take....[T]he government should give priority to Inuit interests, notably in the conclusion of an acceptable land claims agreement, the promotion of self-government in the Arctic, and support to Inuit renewable resource industries." The committee also recommended a northern policy aimed at improving relations with Canada's Arctic neighbors as well as the initiation of joint scientific work and developing environmental standards for the Arctic. Further, the committee demonstrated the need to enhance Canadian presence in Greenland by finding new opportunities for economic cooperation between the two countries. This included the proposal put forth by the ICC stating the committee's "strong" support for opening a consulate in Greenland. The Minister of External Affairs, Joe Clark, concluded by stating that the Arctic is:
"a heritage to the people of Canada" and that the federal government is determined to make a long-term commitment to its development, growth, and security. The Inuit have called upon the government to demonstrate that resolve; obviously, their arguments and proposals have already made a strong impression on the special committee. What remains to be seen is whether the government is prepared to take this advice.49

As one outcome of the report, the federal government announced six measures that were to help affirm Canadian sovereignty. Two of the issues centered directly on Aboriginal land claims and Arctic sovereignty and set the foundation for what would eventually foster the emergence of a new "northern" Canadian identity.

A New Arctic Identity

The ICC believes that...the Arctic [should] evolve into a zone of peace, based on the concept of common security. This concept must be defined not only in military terms, but in environmental, social, cultural and economic terms as well. And it must take into account the rights, values and perspectives of the Arctic's indigenous peoples.50

—ICC October 1994

Domestic events transformed the relationship between Canada and the Inuit in the midst of a larger reconstruction of Arctic identity as a whole. The end of the Cold War, while fundamentally shifting the global political landscape, equally changed the meaning and significance of the Arctic. The far North shifted from an economic periphery into a region where resources, indigenous peoples, the environment, and development all came to intersect into a political discourse dominated by the notion of sustainable development. More recently, this rhetoric has gone so far in certain circles as to assert that the Arctic serves as a world "barometer" for climate change and global warming.51

Most generally, the end of the Cold War officially reinvigorated a process of international Arctic regime building. Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk in 1987 is now viewed by many as the critical juncture that instigated this process. Gorbachev stated in his famous speech in the Russian Arctic:

A new, democratic philosophy of international relations, of world politics is breaking through. The new mode of thinking with its humane, universal criteria and values is penetrating diverse strata...[O]ur policy is an invitation to dialogue, to a search, to a better world, to normalization of international politics...[T]he potential of contemporary civilization could permit us to make the Arctic habitable for the benefit of national economies and other human interests of the near-Arctic states, for Europe
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and the entire international community.... Let the North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace. Let the North Pole be a pole of peace.52

This pivotal speech, according to Canadian political scientist Franklin Griffiths, "effectively altered the calculation of what was and is possible in Arctic international relations."53 In particular, this moment was significant in that it became the initial means for Canada and Canadian Inuit to export a growing partnership. As international relations scholar Carina Keskitalo points out:

...[T]he comparatively major Canadian view of the Arctic drew upon considerable domestic Arctic-related organization and discourse. Arctic discourse is interpreted in the work as a knowledge approach with a particular historical link to Canadian history and national identity related to the Arctic which is unsurpassed in any other state as a national focus.54

What followed the end of the Cold War was the beginning of a mounting formal collaboration between Canadian state/Inuit relations for export at both the international and the Arctic level.

The ICC: Transnational Arctic Inuit Politics

Canada celebrates and recognizes the strength that comes from diversity. Tragically, this has not always been the case. But today, Canada strives to be a place where different peoples and varied cultures can prosper and grow. The Canadian system strives to safeguard our plural identities and to make it possible for your Northern identities to be recognized and embraced across the country.

—President of the Privy Council and Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs before the Council for Canadian Unity, Yellowknife, Northwest Territories: June 21, 1999

Beginning in 1973, an international congress met in Rouen, France, to discuss issues pertaining to oil and gas exploration. The conference brought together state representatives and many Inuit throughout the Arctic, particularly Inuit representatives from both Canada and Greenland. That same year, the Inuit Tapirisat (Eskimo Brotherhood) of Canada organized an Arctic Peoples Conference based on the idea of “circumpolar community relations.” The Arctic Peoples Conference was held in Copenhagen in November of 1973. From the conference two resolutions emerged: a demand that Arctic populations be recognized as peoples, and a demand that Arctic peoples have more influence over development.55
This Arctic Peoples Conference has been considered "the specific event of greatest significance in launching Inuit internationalism in Canada." Following this, Eben Hopson, in his capacity as mayor of Alaska's North Slope Borough, established ties with other Inuit groups and started a foundation to help finance the possibilities for formalizing transborder Inuit cooperation. In October 1975, the Greenlandic groups and Vice-Mayor Billy Neakok from Barrow, Alaska, met in British Columbia and agreed to attend an Inuit Circumpolar Conference. Together, in cooperation with the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, the Northern Quebec Inuit Association, the Committee for Original Peoples Entitlement, the Greenlanders Association, and other Greenlandic community organizations, the ICC began its first meeting in Barrow on June 13, 1977. Since its inception, the ICC has become a recognized non-governmental organization. In 1983 it attained permanent consultative status within the UN, observer status within many international organizations, and permanent status on the Arctic Council (established in 1996).

Advancing a New Collaboration

Over time, the efforts of the ICC at varying agencies of the United Nations, combined with land claims settlements in Canada, afforded the Inuit an increased political voice in Canadian politics. For the ICC, Canadian state collaboration remained necessary to help transform the Arctic into an Inuit vision of the region. The Inuit sought to redraw the Arctic as a vital region with a precarious environment that represents the world's ecological barometer. As such, indigenous traditional knowledge is required in order to safeguard the land and resources through an overarching agenda of sustainable development. As Mark Nuttal points out:

...[T]he main IPOs [Indigenous Peoples' Organizations], namely the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC)...have set themselves in the vanguard of environmental protection. They are now major players on the stage of international diplomacy and policy-making concerning the future of the Arctic. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference, in particular, has been the driving force behind many recent initiatives in Arctic environmental protection and sustainable development.

ICC Canada in particular played a central role in this transformation. According to its mission, the aims of ICC Canada include:

...the sound management and protection of the Arctic and well-being of its peoples...We believe also that we have a contribution to make in international arctic development. And we can serve Canada by helping Canadians understand the nature and imperatives of a unique region which is becoming more and more important in North American life.
Together, the ICC and the Canadian federal government over time began to export this particular discourse of the Arctic as a laboratory for practicing sustainable development and a home to a vast number of indigenous peoples with a unique set of northern knowledge into the international system. This renewed relationship began in light of changing international perceptions of the significance and role of the world's indigenous communities as a whole. Despite Canadian and international reluctance to acknowledge indigenous rights at the international level, the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights did create a draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples. The significance of this was expressed by Mary Simon in an ICC speech in 1993:

Vienna, however, was a turning point....It was in Vienna that the world's governments finally understood that the indigenous peoples were simply asking for the same international recognition as other peoples.... We have to ask: How has this international activity been reflected back home? What difference has it made? Does it matter?

While Canada did not support the draft declaration, in its national report that same year to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Canada did address some of its indigenous issues. "The tone of [these] remarks sent us a clear signal that Canada is ready to tackle the challenge of developing partnerships with indigenous peoples to follow up UNCED."

At UNCED's Rio conference that same year, the ICC co-sponsored with Makivik Corporation (the aforementioned Inuit-owned corporation) a display with prototypes for Inuit environmental knowledge. The positive reception that the Inuit received for their display from many member states at Rio helped ignite in Canada's federal government the realization that both Canadian Inuit and the federal government indeed had a common objective. At the post-UNCED conference, Mary Simon went on to state:

Canada took a brave step in Rio and became a leader in developing a new vision for our planet. It was a brave step for several reasons, however, in my opinion the most impressive, is that having taken the step, there is no return. Canada has to follow through on its commitments. We will not permit otherwise.

Following the Vienna conference, Mary Simon maintained through ongoing speeches that the ICC, through creating an Arctic policy, should take initiative and become more engaged in international affairs. She spoke in favor of cooperation with national governments to encourage the signing and ratification of international conventions consistent with recognizing and protecting Inuit rights, collaboration with international organizations involved in
Arctic issues (e.g., the World Conservation Strategy, the UN working group on indigenous populations, the Human Rights Committee, and the Commission on Human Rights), and domestic lobbying in varying Arctic countries. She noted: “We subscribe fully to the notion put forward in the Special Joint Committee report ‘constructive internationalism’, and indeed, our ICC charter stresses the pursuit of peace and cooperation in our arctic region.”

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Joint Ventures: Arctic Regime Building

In 1990, Mary Simon, as ICC’s president, spoke to the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. Simon argued that the ICC would like to contribute to the final report on the study of Canada’s relations with the Soviet Union (which was soon to be published). Simon argued that “the ICC, as a non-governmental organization, encourages bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the circumpolar North.” Moreover, the ICC laid out several requests. Some of these included that the federal government, in collaboration with northern peoples, should identify concerns and develop specific Canadian objectives; that concepts of Arctic security, much like global security, must be redefined to include vital environmental, social, economic, and cultural dimensions; that Inuit “rights, values and concerns” must be respected by the Arctic state governments as a basic principle; and that cooperative Arctic development must include direct and active participation of Aboriginal peoples in all aspects of northern policy and decision-making. As Simon remarked:

In most instances, we have taken the lead on challenging and critical Arctic issues despite highly inadequate Canadian government support. It is crucial that the federal government, in collaboration with northern peoples, identify Canadian Arctic concerns and develop specific Canadian objectives.

The ICC pushed for Canadian institutional support to pursue its interests in the Arctic and international spheres. The pretext—according to the ICC—was that there were significant potential benefits for Canada. This included showcasing the Inuit to the international community as further testament to the fact that Canada is a strong and successful multicultural society. Additionally, vocal support for its Inuit was inherent testimony to sovereignty over its waters. The overall aims of the Canadian ICC included mutually reconstructing an Inuit/Canadian state relationship within the context of a new post–Cold War world. This reconstruction has been based on a shifting historical process between the Canadian state and Canadian Aboriginal peoples. A major feature of this renewal was the ascendance of Inuit political agency, and reinforcing this power shift grew to become the basis for a new Canadian state/Inuit narrative. Simon, at the same Canadian House of Commons hear-
ing, lobbied to reinforce this new mutually interdependent relationship. Due to Canadian Inuit involvement in the constitutional discussions, the ICC believed that Canada’s cooperation with ICC could be an important model for indigenous and Native issues elsewhere:

The Canadian Inuit played a role in constitutional talks with the Canadian federal, provincial and territorial governments. “Here Canada has expertise for export, and at a time when human rights issues relating to native peoples...are more discussed in the international community.”69

Simon further pointed out that ICC Canada entirely supported Canada’s claim to sovereignty over the archipelago under the premise that Inuit live there just as they have for thousands of years. ICC Canada believed that the Canadian government, by framing the Arctic as a historically Inuit-inhabited region, would strengthen its sovereignty in the North. Following the hearings, Simon asserted that ICC Canada successfully

...urged Prime Minister Mulroney to unequivocally recognize Inuit offshore aboriginal rights and claim the Arctic Archipelago as Canadian “historic” waters. Inuit use of northern waters and land fast ice can help to justify Canada’s claim to the Northwest Passage’s “historic” rather than merely “internal” waters. This would give Canada greater international legal authority to control future military and commercial uses by other countries of the Northwest Passage.70

Overall, ICC Canada maintained that if Inuit offshore rights were to be recognized, those rights would have to include Inuit rights to participate in marine and environmental management.71 Under this premise—given the highly complex legal and political issues concerning the Arctic as a whole—Mary Simon urged the Canadian government to develop an Arctic foreign policy.72 Simon argued: “Inuit economic and cultural values and concerns should be integrated in all aspects of such policy, as appropriate,”73 including helping to promote international understanding and cooperation in areas such as the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.74

A New Arctic Policy: The Arctic Council

Canada will continue to rely on the ICC not only in its role as a Permanent Participant in the Arctic Council, but as an organization which can act as a guide while we pursue our common objective of protecting, enhancing, and promoting the Arctic as a vital region.75

—Canadian 74th Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
From its origins, the ICC intended to create an international Arctic policy dealing with the environment. According to Eben Hopson, the ICC founder: “The primary focus of the first Inuit Circumpolar Conference at Barrow was Arctic conservation and environmental protection, with a view toward developing an international Arctic policy.” When the North began to shift away from being perceived solely as a security region, as it had been for decades, into a new center for environmental, economic, and marine policy in a post-Cold War world, the ICC already had a completed blueprint for managing the North, entitled “Principles and Elements for a Comprehensive Arctic Policy.” ICC Canada used this document to lobby the Canadian federal government on behalf of creating a Canadian Arctic foreign policy, and Canada itself eventually utilized the ICC perception of the Arctic at the negotiating table in the efforts to create the Arctic Council. In a 1987 speech to Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Mary Simon argued:

Canada must actively promote standards within our own country, as mentioned by the Special Joint Committee on International Relations... ICC is particularly conscious of environmental rights. We try to ensure that the international ecology and oceans of the arctic are managed so that our people can always rely on their bounty for food and a living. These, along with economic rights and land rights of aboriginal peoples, should be promoted as well as the more conventional human rights.

By 1990, momentum by the eight Arctic states for an Arctic regime was building. The central impetus behind the Arctic Council itself, when created, emanated most strongly from the government of Canada (alongside the Canadian ICC). In 1990, an independent Canadian Arctic Council Panel developed a proposal and submitted a preliminary report to the federal government concerning Canadian foreign policy. The following year the government published a comprehensive document entitled “To Establish an International Arctic Council: A Framework Report” in the Canadian journal Northern Perspectives. The article, focusing on the need to promote Arctic cooperation, included recommendations for Aboriginal peoples and the government. It concluded by supporting the idea of an Arctic Council made up of ten delegations representing the Arctic states, Aboriginal peoples, and territorial governments. The same year, the Rovaniemi Declaration was signed by the ministers of the environment of the eight Arctic states. The Rovaniemi Declaration called for cooperation on the creation of an Arctic environmental policy. It further recognized “the special relationship of the indigenous peoples and local populations to the Arctic and their unique contribution to the protection of the arctic environment.”

The Rovaniemi Declaration became the first official cooperative effort for forging international Arctic policy and eventually led to the creation of the
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Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). The AEPS recognized the ICC and several other Arctic indigenous groups as a fundamental component of Arctic sustainable development policy. According to the ICC: "From our point of view the creation of the AEPS was a major breakthrough in circumpolar diplomacy, as it promises to bring tangible benefits to Arctic peoples. We see it, in fact, as an instrument for environmental security in the North." 179

Eventually the AEPS was replaced by the Arctic Council in 1996. The Arctic Council is an international Arctic regime comprised of the eight Arctic states with a rotating chair every two years. In addition, the ICC as well as several other indigenous organizations maintain permanent status on the Council. The Council's mandate is to "address the common concerns and challenges faced by the Arctic governments and the people of the Arctic." The representatives of the eight Arctic member states, alongside the three original Aboriginal Permanent Participants (the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Saami Council, and the Association of the Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation), signed the Declaration of the Establishment of the Arctic Council in Ottawa in 1996. The Arctic Council, a consensus-based body instituted through political declaration rather than a legally binding charter, remains to date the only fully circumpolar intergovernmental institution.

By the time the ICC officially came to fruition, ICC Canada and Canadian foreign policy at the Arctic regional level had tangibly converged in many aspects. According to one ICC member:

...[T]he [Arctic] Council was finally instituted in 1996 with a focus on sustainable development....Significant as the first programmatic extension to an environmental protection approach, sustainable development here came to serve as the battleground for established "Arctic" conflicts between notably Canada and the ICC, vs. the US. 80

The overarching objective of the Arctic Council is as follows: . . . "uniquely among these institutional actors, [it] exists to unite all the circumpolar nations in a partnership with Arctic Aboriginal people's organizations around a common vision." This vision entails the ability to both accommodate sustainable development in the North and simultaneously protect the environment. As indicated by Rosemarie Kuptana, then president of the ITC, the Arctic Council will provide an "opportunity for the circumpolar nations to establish a model of partnership and cooperation with indigenous peoples on the most vital northern policy issues." 81 In essence, the establishment of the Arctic Council formalized political relations between its member states and various non-state actors, institutionalizing Inuit representation at the Arctic level. The 1997 "7th Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade" went so far as to state that the ICC and other "indigenous
groups have led the way in putting forward a substantive agenda for Arctic cooperation.82

Similarly, Carina Keski-talo affirms this Canadian state/Inuit relationship in international policy. According to Keski-talo, transformation of the Arctic from being either entirely ignored or considered uninhabited into an “international region conceived primarily on the basis of environmental and indigenous concerns”83 has been overshadowed by a North American perception of the Arctic.84 The Arctic, according to Keski-talo, has come to be dominated by a rhetoric focused on the Arctic as a frontier by those who “seldom inhabit the region themselves but consider it a potential for their society’s economic growth; as a wildland from the eyes of environmentalists; and as a homeland according to the North’s indigenous people.” Combined, these themes are “emerging as the new descriptive frame of the Arctic.”85 This vision, according to Keski-talo, is a North American and particularly Canadian definition of the Arctic as environmental, traditional, and indigenous.86 As Keski-talo asserts:

In North America, the “native people’s question” has become probably the most important single issue....In Northern Scandinavia, the Saamis87 have long been a small minority. There the distinction between aboriginals and immigrants becomes somewhat hazy, for some of the latter have been there for a thousand years. Most Saami gain their livelihood in just the same way as most immigrants and the factors that are common to the two groups greatly exceed in importance the factors that distinguish them.88

For Canada and the Canadian Inuit, the establishment of the Arctic Council served as a critical juncture reconstructing the ongoing interdependent relationship between Canada’s indigenous Inuit and the federal government. This bond—strengthened internationally through the ICC’s ties to the United Nations—is conveyed most eminently through its dominion over this new Arctic identity, which is premised on the need for stewardship over the land and sustainable development policy as the means for attaining this.

Securing Democracy and Sovereignty through Sustainable Development

Canadian, ITK, and ICC policies since the end of the Cold War have increasingly converged, creating a very particular definition of sustainable development. Together these political institutions not only have exported this definition into the international community, but also have become leading authorities concerning Arctic policy. The ICC has constructed an Inuit version of the Arctic by pressing for the legitimacy of traditional indigenous knowledge, identifying research problems, and providing the means for investigating them. In order to best secure traditional knowledge and see it implemented as
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a science, unto itself, the Inuit have argued for shared management approaches concerning their natural resources, a goal that has largely been accomplished through Inuit land claims agreements at home (including Alaska and Greenland in addition to Canada). “Co-management regimes give us more independence and control over the resources, but they also offer the possibility of Inuit hunters and government regulators sitting across the table as equals, all experts in their own areas.”

In return, Inuit land claims in Arctic Canada and control over the resources, land, and seas that inhabit this space have become Canada’s dominant arguments to make legitimate its claims over the Arctic North. In a report to the government, Foreign Affairs Minister Joe Clark argued that

Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible. It embraces land [sic] sea and ice, it extends without interruption to the seaward facing coasts of the Arctic Islands. These islands are joined and not divided by the waters between them. They are bridged for most of the year by the ice, and from the time immemorial Canada’s Inuit people have used and occupied the ice as they have used and occupied the land.

While these efforts have helped secure both Canada’s sovereignty over its Arctic region and Inuit rights over their own land, this new indigenized Canadian identity as a model of liberal humanitarianism has also helped foster new notions of indigenous sovereignty, in effect bringing about new conceptions of sovereignty in international relations. Canada and the ICC have both grown to embrace its new Canadian “northern” identity and continually export this relationship into the international community as a role model for multiculturalism. This is best epitomized by Canadian essayist and novelist John Ralston Saul in a lecture for the LaFontaine-Baldwin Project. In his lecture Saul stated, “Look at Canada as a whole. Its central, defining characteristic in global terms is to be the most important northern democracy. It is, or can be, the great northern nation.”

Together these two issues of sovereignty and liberal humanitarianism have merged and are illustrated most sharply in the 1999 “Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy.” The Northern Dimension, a policy which stemmed from Canada’s participation on the Arctic Council, most astutely combines Canada’s democratic ideology with its claims to Arctic sovereignty. The dimension’s policy, according to Mary Simon, “endeavours to reflect the values, perspectives and hopes of Canadians, especially northerners, and will guide Canada’s engagement with her circumpolar neighbors to promote and protect this rich, diverse, yet vulnerable part of the world.” Canada’s acquiescence and assertion of its northern identity—the essence of the Northern Dimension—is best demonstrated through the following excerpt of a speech by the President of the Privy Council and Minister of Intergovernmental Af-
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This is perhaps one of the greatest advantages that Canada has as a northern country: our geographic reality has helped to shape our Canadian sense of community and mutual responsibility. The geographical fact of our northernness has moulded our way of viewing the world. As a member of the Arctic Council, this organization presents another important forum for Canada to share and cooperate with other members of the world community. The governments of the NWT and Nunavut are based on consensus, rather than conflict. I believe that it is also reflected in our federal system. This system is the product of the values that Canadians share: solidarity, generosity and openness. You could say that these are the same values fostered by our northernness. Federalism is about accommodation and mutual respect—about embracing, organizing and making the most of our sense of interdependence.

Conclusion

The North is a place of great promise. The Government of Canada and the territorial governments have agreed to develop in cooperation with Aboriginal governments, organizations and Northern residents—the first-ever comprehensive strategy for the North. The North is a place where strong, responsive governments work together to build a prosperous, vibrant future for all. It is a place where Northern traditions of respect for the land and the environment are cherished, and actions and decision-making are anchored in the principles of responsible, sustainable development. It is a place where citizens celebrate their diversity. The North is a place where the territories and their governments are strong contributing partners in a dynamic and secure federation.

Over a vast majority of Canadian history, Canada has strived to maintain its legitimacy as a liberal state as well as its sovereignty over the Arctic. Over time, not only have these two themes merged, but they have fused with a Canadian Inuit vision of northern Canada, creating a hybrid Arctic identity based on both state and Aboriginal policy. This is reflected in one of Canada's proposed Northern Dimension goals: to “engage all partners in the North in the protection and stewardship of the environment.” In order to ensure this, the northern policy also proposes that Canada play a leading role in taking international action on circumpolar issues and that northern concerns be taken into consideration in national efforts to reinforce Canadian sovereignty, security, and circumpolar cooperation. On December 14, 2004, Prime
Minister Paul Martin and First Ministers Joseph Handley (Northwest Territories), Dennis Fentie (Yukon), and Paul Okalik (Nunavut) officially released the framework for Canada’s Northern Strategy. The prime minister and the first ministers stated that the primary purpose of the Northern Strategy was to “make a real difference in the quality of life of Northerners and in the capacity of Northerners to manage their own affairs.” They added,

This is an exciting opportunity for Yukoners to work together to develop a strategy for the North that celebrates our diversity and ensures we are strong contributors in the federation with healthier, more vital communities....We are looking forward to enhancing an already excellent working relationship with the other two territories and continuing a new era of co-operation with the federal government in order to get this done.

Under the framework of the northern policy, the governments of Canada and the territories, in cooperation with Aboriginal governments, Aboriginal organizations, and northern residents, would aim at “strengthening governance, partnerships and institutions; establishing strong foundations for economic development; protecting the environment; building healthy and safe communities; reinforcing sovereignty, national security and circumpolar cooperation; preserving, revitalizing and promoting culture and identity; and developing northern science and research.” The authors of the policy reaffirmed this new relationship between Canada and the North.

This narrative of the shifting relationship between Canadian Inuit and Canadian state identity is astutely summarized through two newspaper articles, addressed below. These articles depict Canada’s Inuit not only as Inuit but equally as Canadian. Moreover, the articles represent a Canadian state identity not only as a “northern” country but also as a vibrant multicultural democracy, exhibited through its relationship with the Inuit who inhabit this Arctic space. The Kingston Whig Standard, on October 18, 2004, had a feature entitled “Danes cause international chill by launching a bid for North Pole.” The article centered on the proposed bid by Copenhagen for sovereignty over the North Pole under the pretence that the North Pole and Greenland are linked by 1,240 kilometers of underwater mountain range. Despite Denmark’s claim, the article stated that Canada first asserted its sovereignty over the North Pole in the 1950s, culminating with an international tribunal stipulating that, if no disputing claim was made within 100 years, it would become Canadian territory. Consequent to this Danish announcement, Canada as a whole, according to the Kingston Whig Standard, received the news with unease. In particular, this unease was felt by the indigenous Inuit living in the North. In Resolute Bay, a tiny Inuit community on the edge of the Arctic Ocean, the notion of the region answering to Copenhagen seemed nothing more than
"absurd." Angela Idlout, an Inuit receptionist at the Qausuittug Inn, the only settlement hotel, told the *Daily Telegraph*: "If you ask me what I feel my nationality is I will tell you that I feel Canadian not Danish."\(^{102}\)

Likewise, on April 25, 2005, the *Vancouver Sun* wrote an article entitled "Inukshuk picked as symbol of Olympics." The article, relating to the upcoming Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games, focused on the Olympic Committee's unveiling of its new official emblem. The emblem chosen was a five-piece multicolored inukshuk called Ilanaaq (ih-lah-nawk). The inukshuk is an Inuit symbol for friendship, hospitality, and teamwork. According to the *Sun*, the motivation for picking the symbol was "its strength from the true spirit of teamwork." Paul Okalik, premier of the territory of Nunavut, was quoted as stating: "We're very proud that a symbol from our culture is going to be used in an international event." Yet the significance of the inukshuk symbolizing the Canadian Olympic Games is best epitomized by the comments of John Furlong, CEO of Vanoc, the organizing committee for the Vancouver games. According to Furlong, the reason for choosing the inukshuk was that "[w]e wanted to really connect back to the values of Canada....It [Ilanaaq] touches all that we are and symbolizes the great story of a young but great country," a country which is distinctly not only northern but equally Inuit.\(^{103}\)

Notes

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2. The author realizes that there are a host of Aboriginal and First Nation groups in Canada that have contributed to the identity of Canada. Nevertheless, this paper is a particular examination of the relationship between the Canadian state and the Canadian Inuit.

3. This is not to say that contentions between Canadian Inuit and federal activities at the international level do not persist. A recent example of political incongruence is the determination by the UN to postpone the decision to adopt the International Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (a resolution put forth by Namibia). The ICC and the Saami Council sent out a press release that named Canada, among other states, as being responsible for influencing the UN against ratifying the new resolution. For the actual press release, see http://inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?auto_slide=&ID=372&Lang=En&Parent_ID=&current_slide_num=.

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6. For more on this, see Canada Communication Group 1991.


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid., xi.

11. For an in-depth discussion of this, see Mitchell 1996.


13. Ibid., 14.


17. Ibid. 1994, 17–18. These relocations went on to become one of the most controversial policies of Canada’s past. For more see Tester and Kulchyski 1994 and Emberley 1999.


19. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, October 1996.

20. Ibid.


23. Aside from land claims issues, this committee took over most of the other responsibilities of the Committee for Original Peoples Entitlement (COPE). COPE, established in 1969, grew to serve as the umbrella for many Inuit corporations and committees, including the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation, the Inuit Development Corporation, the Inuit Cultural Institute, and the Inuit Committee on National Issues. After ITK took over these responsibilities COPE remained the primary negotiating body for several of Canada’s land claims agreements. Vallee, Smith, and Cooper in Sturtevant 1984, 671.


25. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada October 1996.

26. Ibid.

27. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada October 1996.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.
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30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
33. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada October 1996.
34. Ibid.
36. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada October 1996.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
44. Simon and Jull September 1994, 11.
45. Canadian Arctic Resources Committee: September–October 1986.
47. Jeff Richstone in Canadian Arctic Resources Committee: September–October 1986.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
52. Gorbachev October 1, 1987.
57. Petersen in Sturtevant 1984, 725.
58. These include the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA), passed in 1975, and the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, Northwest Territories, in 1984. The NWT agreement was followed nine years later by the Nunavut Agreement in 1993, which was finally put into effect in 1999. In the 1990s the Labrador Inuit Association and Canada began negotiations, and in 2005 an agreement was reached (Fox 2002, 4).


61. Early Canadian resistance to live up to its domestic ideologies prevailed. One illustration can be traced back to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights. At this time, new countries were in the process of being carved out of the former Soviet Union and contributed to an overall precarious international context concerning indigenous rights. The post–Cold War international spirit of the time made it problematic for varying countries, Canada included, to affirm to include a specific agenda item dedicated to indigenous peoples. According to the ITK, “Canada has acquired a reputation in and outside Canada as regressive and obstructive on international indigenous issues. Canada is quite active in attempting to contain and restrict initiatives by indigenous peoples for progress within the UN on indigenous issues....Canada continues to fight against recognizing aboriginal peoples as ‘peoples’ with the right to self-determination” (ITK March 31, 1993, 4). Despite Canada’s liberal humanitarian rhetoric and ongoing changes in its relationship with its indigenous at home, it was one of many countries that resisted the inclusion of an agenda item dedicated to indigenous people. As the ITK points out, that resistance reflected “the notion that the rights of indigenous peoples are somehow not human rights, or else that some existing human rights, such as the right to self-determination, do not apply to indigenous peoples. Several States, including Canada, have attempted to characterize our rights more as cultural than political or more as social than economic” (Simon October 22, 1993, 4). Canada further refused to support the idea of a United Nations international year regarding indigenous rights and pushed to change the wording in the proposal from International Year of Indigenous Peoples to People. The effort to be recognized as peoples was then again refused at the World Conference for Human Rights. The government of Canada argued for and obtained substantial compromises regarding the recognition of indigenous rights in Convention No. 169 on the premise that a less strongly worded convention would attract more ratifications. In spite of this, Canada itself has not ratified this international convention. Of particular note is Canada’s successful bid to neutralize indigenous peoples’ aspirations toward unequivocal recognition of their status as “peoples” (Simon October 22, 1993, 5).


64. Ibid.

65. Simon 1985, 75–76.


68. Ibid., 3.


70. Simon 1985, 71.

71. Ibid.
72. Simon 1985, 70.
73. Ibid., 74.
74. Simon 1985, 74.
78. Tennberg December 1996.
79. ICC October 1994, 3.
80. Keskitalo ISA, 12.
83. Keskitalo ISA, 2.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., 6.
86. Ibid., 7.
87. It should be noted that Sami is generally spelled with two As in English, while in the Sami language it is spelled Sámi.
93. President of the Privy Council and Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs before the Council for Canadian Unity, Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, June 21, 1999.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
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99. As a more recent example of that new relationship, the Geographical Names Board of Canada has altered its delineation guidelines in order to accommodate an ongoing place names project by the Inuit Heritage Trust. This project is collecting Inuktitut place names and putting them on digitized maps to be officially approved by the Government of Nunavut. For more information, see: http://www.ihti.ca/eng/projectsn.html.


101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.


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