ABSTRACT. The distinction between teleology and deontology is today almost universally accepted within practical philosophy, but deontology is and has from the beginning been subordinate to utilitarianism. ‘Deontology’ was constructed by Bentham to signify the art and science of private morality within a utilitarian worldview. The classical distinction was constructed by Broad as a refinement of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism, and then adopted by Frankena. To Broad it signified two opposite tendencies in ethics, in Frankena’s textbooks, however, it becomes an exclusive distinction, where deontology signifies disregard for consequences, and it is therefore almost impossible to think of deontology as a framework for a comprehensive ethical theory. This conception, however, is adopted by Rawls, and in his contractarian interpretation of deontology it is in fact no more within the sphere of ethics.

Introduction

One of the most generally acknowledged distinctions in ethics is the distinction between deontology and teleology. The concept of deontology plays a crucial role in analyses and discussions not just in ethics, but also in political philosophy, philosophy of law and various sciences. Nevertheless, very few scholars have given the concept of deontology the close attention that such prominence should merit. This article will contribute to filling out this gap by arguing that the widespread understanding of deontology as formally opposed to – and thus, in a sense equal to – teleology or consequentialism is not just incomplete, but actually misleading. Through an analysis of different conceptions of ‘deontology’, I will argue that deontology as a category is and has always been subordinate to a utilitarian frame of mind; therefore, opponents of utilitarianism or consequentialism like John Rawls should not identify themselves as deontologists. The main figures in this analysis are Bentham, Broad and Frankena, but neither my claim nor my arguments are primarily historical. Before venturing
into the main part of my analysis, I will therefore elaborate on the systematic perspective.

In mainstream practical philosophy it is widely accepted that the roots of the modern concept of deontology are found in Broad’s distinction between deontology and teleology in his book *Five Types of Ethical Theory* (1930). From its origins as a relatively esoteric analytical term in pre-war Anglo-Saxon ethics, ‘deontology’ became institutionalized as an important ethical category in the textbooks of P.H. Nowell-Smith (1954) and William K. Frankena (1963 and 1974). Since these publications deontological theories have been considered to be opposed to teleological theories in Anglophone ethics, the standard example of the former being the ethics of Kant (cf. e.g. Nowell-Smith 1954, 134; Frankena 1963, 25; Hallgarth 1998, 610), whereas the latter usually is exemplified by some kind of utilitarianism. ‘Deontology’ in this sense was the point of departure for the political philosophy of Rawls (1971/99, 26), and it was also in this sense understood on the continent by Jürgen Habermas (cf. e.g. 1991, 168).

However, a brief survey of ‘deontology’ in non-Anglophone philosophical encyclopedias and dictionaries (cf. e.g. Ferrater Mora 1994, 816; Lalande 1991, 816; Canto-Sperber 1996, 401; Ritter 1972, 114) reveals an older, more basic conception of ‘deontology’, which is derived from the Greek words ‘to deon’ and ‘logos’. The latter should not cause us any trouble, and the former can be translated as “that which is proper” or “what ought to be”. As a first approach to the meaning of ‘deontology’ it therefore seems reasonable to define it as “the teachings or science of what is proper and what ought to be”, in short, “the science of duty”. This conception can be encountered in modern ethics, especially on the continent, as demonstrated by the dictionaries just mentioned, but also in the Anglophone world (cf. e.g. Muirhead 1940, Carmichael 1949, Campbell Garnett 1956 and Nowell-Smith 1954, 185).

What is even more surprising, however, is that the man who constructed the neo-logism ‘deontology’ apparently was the same one, who invented utilitarianism, namely Bentham himself. Bentham even left an unfinished manuscript, which was published in 1834, with the title *Deontology*, which was thought to complete utilitarianism as a general worldview. The manuscript stated, for the first and only time, the specifics of Bentham’s utilitarianism as moral philosophy. For Bentham, ‘deontology’ was therefore not at all intended to be opposed to utilitarianism; quite the contrary.

Originally, deontology was constructed as a part of utilitarianism; today they are seen as opposed. What shall we make out of this shift? Is it just a curious
fact, which shows the contingency of semantical meaning and the irony of history? Or can it give us a hint of something more substantial? I will argue that this curious historical fact about deontology does indeed express something of substantial conceptual interest, namely that in the distinction between deontology and teleology, deontology is and has always been the subordinate and relatively less important aspect. From the very beginning, the meaning of ‘deontology’ has been tied to that of ‘utilitarianism’ and this is still the case, although both the meaning of utilitarianism, of deontology and the content of the relation between the two terms have changed.

Considering the teleological aspect, utilitarianism has been criticised by moralists ever since its conception more than 200 years ago (Schneewind 1977, 128-30), but nevertheless it has dominated Anglophone ethics for decades (Schneewind 1993, 155). Today it seems more fitting than ever, and this is reflected in the development of the vocabulary used in textbooks and academic discussions. In accordance with its etymological roots (telos = ‘goal’ or ‘end’), teleological ethics is taken to stress the importance of the end in moral action and ethical theory. From this perspective, utilitarianism can be grouped together with the ethics of Aristotle (cf. Edel 1973, 175), and this is also how Rawls considers it (1971/99, 22, 35). As the standard counter-position of ‘deontology’, however, the traditional category ‘teleology’ is today in most cases replaced by the term ‘consequentialism’ (cf. e.g. Stegmüller 1989, 227), a term, which is even more closely related to utilitarianism than is teleology. Using ‘consequentialism’ implies a direct identification of the general ethical category with the utilitarian scheme of thought, since utilitarians explicitly state that only the consequences of an action – in the classical view, the resulting happiness – should count as reasons to decide whether an action is dutiful or not.4

This terminological development is also reflected in the other aspect of the distinction, where ‘deontology’ nowadays often is substituted by ‘non-consequentialism’, indicating – sometimes explicitly – that it is hard to give deontology a positive meaning, and therefore that it is best understood in contrast to consequentialism (Davis 1993, 206). Furthermore, one can point to the common understanding of deontology in terms like ‘agent-relativity’ (cf. e.g. Ellis 1992, 856), ‘deontological constraints’ (e.g. Nagel 1986; Kymlicka 1988, 180), or ‘agent-centred restrictions’ (e.g. Scheffler 1984; Brook 1991, 190), which all tend to reduce deontology to a set of exceptions, which must be taken into account by ethics, but which cannot be understood in a sufficiently coherent way to constitute in itself a theoretical approach to philosophical ethics.
I will argue that from the days of Bentham until today, the structural position of deontology in relation to utilitarianism has remained the same, even though the referential content of the two terms has changed. This way of construing the relation reflects a more general point, which is central to the argument of this article. Every word is one aspect of one or more distinctions, and every distinction has two or more aspects, which are relative to each other. A distinction is, however, not just given. It is always the answer to a specific concern and therefore expresses a special point of view. This makes it possible to question the universal validity – or applicability – of a distinction, even when it is almost universally accepted, as it has been shown by American pragmatists in relation to analytical distinctions like *a priori/a posteriori* (cf. C. I. Lewis), and analytic/synthetic (cf. Quine).

I will, however, go one step further and follow Derrida in claiming that since every distinction has a special point of view, it both has a focus of attention and a horizon, a centre and a periphery (cf. e.g. Derrida 1968, 128). As such it is not only contingent, but it is also basically asymmetrical, and the revelation of the hierarchical pattern is at the same time an exposure of the preconditions, which make the distinction meaningful. Consequently, a distinction can be seen as an expression of a relation of power. In the distinction in question, I will claim that deontology plays the subordinate part, conceived within and still dominated by the utilitarian scheme of thought.5

This argument becomes important when the intention is to formulate alternatives to utilitarianism within practical philosophy. Expressing this resistance in terms of a positive identification with deontology – as done by Rawls – is to stay within a conceptual framework defined by utilitarianism. No matter how good one’s intentions, or how excellent one’s terminological skills and moral insight may be, identifying positively with deontology makes it almost impossible to counter the utilitarian programme and its domination in ethics.

In this article, developing on an earlier suggestion (Sørensen 2003, 42-49), I analyze three classical concepts of deontology from the perspective sketched above. First, I present Bentham’s original concept of deontology, which is closely connected to utilitarianism (1). Second, as the main part, I analyse the classical teleology-deontology distinction as conceived of by Broad (2), and developed by Frankena (3), where deontology as the disregard of consequences is considered irrational in relation to an overall conception of ethics determined by teleology and utilitarianism. Finally, I present the distinction in the
form which is accepted by Rawls in *A Theory of Justice*, and how it makes egoism the basis of his deontological political philosophy (4).

Even though my approach is not historical, I will present the main conceptions of deontology in chronological order. However, I will not investigate the historical transformations of the concept, but focus on each particular conception of deontology, in order to demonstrate the specifics of each particular subordination to utilitarianism.

1. Bentham

The foundation on which Bentham constructed the neo-logism ‘deontology’ was the Greek words mentioned above, and its basic meaning is the ‘science of duty’. This meaning is in accordance with what Bentham himself writes in his pedagogical treatise *Chrestomathia* from 1817, where ‘deontology’ is defined as

> an account or an indication of that which, on the occasion in question, whatsoever it be, is – (i.e. by him who speaks or writes is regarded as being) – fit, fitting, becoming, proper.

(Goldworth 1983, xx)

This definition (which is one of the few examples of Bentham’s use of the term in texts printed while he was still alive) can be understood as containing both a theoretical and a practical aspect in the Aristotelian sense of the words. Giving an ‘account’ can be merely theoretical; but ‘indicating’ what one considers to be proper in a particular situation is at the same time an evaluation or a recommendation, and as such an ‘indication’ is always practical, i.e. ethical or political.

Accordingly, the *Deontology* is divided in two parts, an “exegetical”, “expository” part, normally called the theoretical part and a more “practical part”.6 Both parts, however, are meant to be conducive to the “ultimate and practical result” of “this work”, which is

> the pointing out to each man on each occasion what course of conduct promises to be in the highest degree conducive to his happiness: to his own happiness, first and last; to the happiness of others, no farther than in so far as his happiness is promoted by promoting theirs, than his interest coincides with theirs. (*Deont.*, 123)

The theoretical part relates virtues and vices to happiness or “well-being” (*Deont.*, 130), as Bentham prefers to call it here. Virtues and vices are “fictitious entities, imagined and spoken of as real for the purpose of discourse”, without
which, however, “discourse on subjects such as this could not be carried on” (Deont., 126). Accordingly, Bentham wants to explain virtues and vices in terms of the only real entities, pleasure and pain. Hence, he will show that all virtues can be seen as “modifications of two all comprehensive ones”, “prudence and benevolence”.

In accordance with the overall goal of the Deontology, the practical part is first of all about “dictates of purely self-regarding prudence”. However, because the conduct of oneself affects the well-being of others, it is necessary both to consider the “dictates of benevolence” and the “dictates of extra-regarding prudence” (Deont., 122-24). The second part is therefore divided into these three subdivisions.

Seen as an art, the purpose of deontology is to promote “human welfare”. The distinction between self-regarding and extra-regarding prudence, therefore, becomes a distinction between “self-regarding deontology”, which aims to promote the welfare of the actor in question, and “extra-regarding deontology”, which aims to promote the welfare of “all persons concerned other than the individual agent” (Deont., 198).

Bentham apparently considers deontology to be primarily concerned with one’s own happiness, especially in one’s private life; but this does not mean – or is not intended to mean – that one should be self-centred in a selfish way. The individual achievement of particular pleasures is only a “means” in respect of the general end, i.e. mere “subordinate ends” (Deont., 125). Among these particular pleasures are those stemming from sympathy, and they include the genuine pleasure of knowing that others fare well. The “business of the deontologist” (Deont., 193) is precisely to “bring to view these comparatively latent ties” (Deont., 195) between self-regarding and extra-regarding interests, and to show their “points of coincidence” (Deont., 193).

The purpose of the Deontology is to persuade the readers to accept the basic principles of utilitarianism, and then to offer guidelines for how to act correctly as a utilitarian in private life – “morality made easy” (Deont. 119), as Bentham writes on the drafts for the title page. However, if we consider the concept of ‘deontology’ as such – as distinguished from the work called Deontology – it has a more “general end”, which is:

the same end or object which not only every branch of art or science has, but every human thought as well as every human action has – and not only has but ought to have: the giving increase in some shape or other to man’s well-being – say in one word the sum of human happiness. (Deont., 125)
In so far as man’s conduct is conducive to this end, it is to be called ‘virtuous’; ‘virtue’ is then a ‘characteristic’ of man, which is manifested by “his conduct, his actions, his deportment”. ‘Vicious’ and ‘vice’ are not surprisingly defined as the opposite of ‘virtuous’ and ‘virtue’ (Deont., 125). Deontology, therefore, must have as its goal the promotion of virtuous acts and virtues as such, and with such a goal, deontology has to take obligations into account. Basically obligations are also considered “a species of fictitious entity”, but nevertheless the ‘business’ of deontology includes:

the distribution of obligations, [...] marking in the field of action the spots upon which it is proper that obligation in one shape or another should consider itself as attaching; and, in the case of a conflict between obligations issuing from different sources, in determining which should obtain and which should yield the preference. (Deont., 171)

Understanding the ends of deontology as such, Bentham considers it a branch of the art and science which has for its object the learning and shewing for the information of each individual, by what means the net amount of his happiness may be made as large as possible; of each in so far as it is dependent on his own conduct: the happiness of each individual separately being considered, and thereby that of every individual among those whose happiness on this occasion an object of regard (Deont., 124-25).

Deontology is in general described as a branch “of the art and science of Eudaemonics”, and at the same time ‘deontology’ is the same as “Ethics (taken in the largest sense of the word)” (Deont., 124-25). Deontology is, we must conclude, ethics at large, and as such it is a branch of the science and art of eudaemonics.

A deontologist, then, apparently does not have to be utilitarian. In Bentham’s terms, he can also be ascetic, or ‘ipsedixital’, i.e. basing his indication on an ‘opinion’, without reference to “happiness or unhappiness” (Util., 304-05). The term ‘deontology’ is not meant to be exclusively utilitarian. Other worldviews can have their deontologies as well. As such, deontology is something relatively limited, i.e. just a part of an all-inclusive faith such as utilitarianism.

‘Deontology’ in this sense apparently refers to the teaching of private morality, that is, of duties that can be deduced from the general principles. In other words, deontology cannot be defined substantially on its own terms; its content can only be deduced from already accepted general principles. In this case,
there is nothing that conceals that deontology is dominated by something else; deontology is simply defined as a sub-category, the teachings of duties consistent with an already accepted worldview.

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In sum, Bentham apparently has at least two conceptions of deontology. The first conception takes deontology – as art and science, or art with science attached – as the most comprehensive category, divided into private deontology, which is private morality, and public deontology, which includes legislation and government in general. This conception is consistent both with the remark that considers deontology as ethics in general, i.e. practical philosophy, and with the specification of deontology as a subcategory of a more comprehensive worldview.7

The second conception takes eudaemonics – again, as arts and sciences, or arts only – to be the most comprehensive category, and it comprises deontology, understood as private morality, politics, legislation, and government, all on the same footing. If deontology is ethics in this sense, then ethics is concerned with private morality, but pre-defined as eudaemonic, as an activity aiming at one specific telos, namely happiness. As such, deontology is a subcategory within a teleological framework, in casu utilitarianism.

The first conception of deontology is apparently relatively neutral towards the utilitarian scheme of thought, but since it is only a formal conception, it must get its content from the worldview of which it is a part. Consequently, when Bentham defines the content of deontology, it is utilitarian. The second conception of deontology adds to this point. It shows that Bentham considers ethics as such to be inherently teleological, and that makes deontology subordinate to this scheme of thought as well.

2. Broad

Both of Bentham’s conceptions of ‘deontology’ are consistent with the general understanding of deontology as the science of duties. As mentioned above, however, when it comes to the modern philosophical sense of ‘deontology’, one normally refers to Broad’s Five Types of Ethical Theory (F.T.). Here the term deontology is introduced without any reference to Bentham in a specific context, namely the analysis of the Sidgwick’s Method of Ethics. Broad wants
to qualify the applications of ‘ought’ in judgements, and the distinctions between deontological, teleological and logical are offered as such qualifications.

To Broad, the deontological use of ‘ought’ in a judgement means that an action should be performed in a certain type of situation, “regardless of the goodness or badness of the probable consequences” (F.T., 162). Broad notes that many people would deny that they ever make such ‘unconditional’ judgements, but they can probably be seen as making statements which employ ‘ought’ teleologically, meaning “that everyone ought to aim at certain ends without any ulterior motive, e.g. his own greatest happiness, at the greatest happiness of all sentient being, and so on.” At last, ‘ought’ can be applied logically, meaning that if someone considers a certain end to be ultimate, “then he ought to be consistent about it” (F.T., 162).

Broad considers whether these three applications of ‘ought’ also involve three different meanings. He distinguishes between the narrow sense of ‘ought’, applied to actions “which an agent could do if he willed” (F.T., 161), and the wider sense, where this condition does not apply. According to Broad, the wide sense is involved in the teleological application of ‘ought’, and the narrow, in the logical application. “For we believe it is within the powers of any sane human being to be consistent if he tries.” However, “the logical ought is just a special case of the deontological ought” (F.T., 163), and this relation is important, because the narrow sense of ought is made acceptable to those who do not acknowledge the deontological application of ‘ought’ in general.

Broad ends up with the classical binary distinction between teleology and deontology. What is interesting, however, is that the logical and thus deontological use of ought is based on the idea of consistency in action and not in relation to propositions. Apparently, Broad thinks that ‘consistent’ means that one ought to choose the appropriate means to realize an end, and to avoid actions “inconsistent with its realisation” (F.T., 163). With this concept of consistency, however, it seems strange to subsume the logical meaning of ‘ought’ under the deontological, since it is teleology which by definition should be focused on actions as a means to an end, and not deontology, which is more preoccupied with the actions in themselves.

To make this point more clearly, one can employ Weber’s famous distinction between means-end rationality, often called instrumental rationality, and value-rationality. Means-end rationality is the kind of rationality that is employed by economic theory and rational choice theory, where what matters is
the right choice of means in view of the optimal realization of given ends (Weber 1921-22, 12). The rationality involved in value-rationality is rationality in another sense, i.e. the kind of rationality employed in logical reasoning, e.g. in the deduction from premises to a valid conclusion. To Weber, it is this latter kind of rationality that can be attributed to the protestant ‘ethics of intention’, which like deontology is defined by its disregard for consequences (Weber 1919, 551). An ethics of intention is rational and consistent in the strictly logical sense that its particular judgement can be deduced from one or more general principles and that it is therefore non-contradictory.

One would think that it was consistency and rationality in this latter sense, i.e. the rationality involved in making non-contradictory judgements, that must be involved, if the logical sense of ‘ought’ is to be subsumed under deontology. And it would be tempting to interpret Broad’s distinction between a wider and a narrower sense of ‘ought’ as the distinction between a weak and a strong sense, i.e. as the distinction between what one ought to do in relation to given ends – e.g. one ought to love one’s neighbours – and what one ought to do in relation to logical constraints – that one ought not to contradict oneself. Especially since Broad does think of rationality in this way, when he interprets Kant (F.T., 128).

But in his analysis of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism, Broad uses the concept of means-end rationality in his notion of consistency, although both he and Sidgwick (in contrast to Weber) are aware that rationality in the sense of “hypothetical imperatives” (F.T., 152) can be employed both in an egoistic way and in a universal or utilitarian way. Even though consistency is a fair demand to the deontological and logical use of ‘ought’, neither Broad’s logical application of ‘ought’, nor his conception of deontology has anything to do with logic in a strict sense. The difference between these two conceptions of rationality becomes even more important with Rawls’ idea of himself as an deontologist, as we shall see below.

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It is this distinction concerning the application and meaning of ‘ought’ that Broads generalizes to divide ethical theory into two classes. Deontological theories contain propositions of the form “Such and such a kind of action would always be right (or wrong) in such and such circumstances, no matter what the consequences might be.” Teleological theories judge the rightness or wrong-
ness of an action by its “tendency to produce certain consequences which are intrinsically good or bad” (F.T., 206-07). Broad thinks that both types of theories can be found in monistic and in pluralistic versions, and that teleological theories can be divided into egoistic and non-egoistic types, with utilitarianism being an example of the latter.

Broad considers this classification to be clearer than Sidgwick’s, which distinguishes between intuitionism, egoistic hedonism and utilitarianism, since his own classification is independent of epistemological considerations. From a logical point of view, he is no doubt correct. However, one can ask why deontological theories cannot be either egoistic or non-egoistic. Is being egoistic regardless of the consequences not an option for ethical theory?

The hidden premise that rules out this idea as senseless seems to be that morality, and hence ethics, must be good for something, if not for the individual then for society or humanity in general. And deontological egoism does not seem to be good for anything, neither for oneself nor for anybody else. Keeping in mind Broad’s concept of consistency and the concept of rationality implied by it, ethics appears then as a whole to be teleological, which means that the two aspects of the distinction in question cannot be of equal value.

This conclusion is supported by the way Broad analyses Sidgwick’s intuitionism in relation to deontology. Trying to make sense of deontology, Broad understands it as claiming that in order to determine the rightness of an action it is sufficient to consider “one or a few characteristics of its immediate consequences”, treating as irrelevant “the more remote consequences and the other characteristics of the consequences” (F.T., 214). It is claims about the necessary connection between certain kinds of actions and their immediate consequences that Broad finds characteristic of deontology, and those claims are considered to be ‘a priori’ judgements.

According to Broad, the difference between teleology and deontology is that the former makes empirically based judgements about the relative non-moral goodness of all of the consequences of an action, whereas the latter makes a priori judgements about the connection between some kinds of actions and their immediate moral consequences. Both types of judgement are based on consequences, but teleology makes more comprehensive, empirically based and – from Broad’s perspective – therefore better judgements. From a deontological point of view, Broad’s concession to utilitarian ethics appears inconsistent (Campbell Garnett 1941, 421). Broad’s perspective, however, is teleological, at least in his analysis of Sidgwick, and, as Schneewind remarks, the idea
that an “action can only be right because it produces good” is “deeply rooted” (Schneewind 1993, 150) in ethics.

Weber made it perfectly clear that in the perspective of calculating means-end rationality, deductive value-rationality was not rational (Weber 1921-22, 13). Not so with Broad. His conception of ethics is not made explicit, but the result is the same. Like the ethics of intention, deontology cannot be understood as rational in the full sense, but appears to be a dogmatic, deficient mode of teleology. Since ethics as such has to be teleological and rationally consistent with regard to means-end, deontology is not an option. In the end, deontology can only be an exception, a category which attracts irrational moralists, fanatics and the like. It is not possible to form a rational ethical theory on this basis.

This bias in favour of teleology, however, should not come as a surprise, since the distinction between deontology and teleology is based on Sidgwick’s tri-partition of ethics in intuitionism, egoistic hedonism, and universal hedonism. The distinction thus reflects what utilitarians themselves often consider the main opposition to utilitarianism, egoism and intuitionism, i.e. those who are selfish and those who on moral grounds oppose the rational calculation of means and ends, i.e. those whom Bentham called “ipse-dixits”. Broad states in the beginning of Five Types that he has chosen ‘men of genius whose views differ from each other as much as possible’ (F.T., 1). The distinction between teleology and deontology, however, only appears in the final analysis of Sidgwick, not in relation to the four preceding theories, those of Spinoza, Butler, Hume and Kant. Kant is considered a deontologist (F.T., 207), but only within Sidgwick’s utilitarian classification of ethical theories.

Broad’s distinction is clearly an improvement on Sidgwick’s. Through “a slight shift in terminology” he clarifies “what is inherent in Sidgwick’s position”, adding only a sight “modification”, but resting on “the same essential principles” (Salzman 1995, 76-78). In Derrida’s terminology, one could consider Broad’s reading of Sidgwick a “displacement” (cf. e.g. Derrida 1967, 29). It is an improvement from a logical point of view, but Broad’s new concept of deontology is still conceived within the utilitarian scheme of thought, although differently than in Bentham’s original conception.

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The relation between the terms, however, is even more complex than suggested by the analysis so far. Broad states that “purely deontological and purely teleological theories are rather ideal limits than real existents” (F.T., 207), and even that “neither concept might be definable in terms of the other” (F.T., 278). This way of employing the distinction shows the bi-partition to be less a classification of theories than an analytical distinction, which is used to clarify two aspects, which Broad considers to be inherent in almost every ethical theory: the teleological focus on the ends and consequences of an action; and the deontological focus on what is considered to be intrinsically right. And in this latter context, Broad does not mention the disregard for the consequences of an action performed in accordance with such an ideal.

Teleology and deontology can be understood as two almost independent – or to employ Weber’s terminology, “ideal-typical” (cf. Weber 1904, 190-92) – aspects of ethical theory. “Most actual theories are mixed, some being predominantly deontological and others predominantly teleological”. To Broad, Sidgwick’s utilitarianism is an example of an “almost purely teleological theory”, but even in such a theory there is something considered “intrinsically right”, namely a “mode of distribution”, and “to this extent Sidgwick’s theory must be counted as deontological” (F.T. 207-08).9

Broad develops this conception of the distinction in more detail. In general, he characterizes teleology as “an empirical or inductive theory”, taking probable tendencies in the overall consequences into consideration. Deontology is claiming a priori rightness or wrongness in such judgements, whereas a teleologist demands empirical evidence. But since the distinction is to be understood as analytical, Broad’s general point is that “every Teleological theory does involve at least one a priori judgement”, namely one that “expresses a necessary connection between a certain non-ethical characteristic and the ethical characteristic of goodness” (F.T., 213-14).

Deontology becomes in this sense the a priori aspects of an ethical theory, including not only the a priori claims that some actions or modes of actions are unconditionally right, but also that some things are intrinsically good. Sidgwick, even though a hedonist, “is not a pure teleologist, since his six ethical intuitions are deontological propositions” (F.T., 228).

This conception of the distinction between deontology and teleology is epistemological. Hence, the distinction can no longer be considered merely a classification of theories operating within the limits of normative ethics. By changing the criteria of distinction from the significance of ends and consequences
to the question of *a priori* versus empirical evidence, the distinction becomes meta-ethical. Broad tried to escape the epistemological premises inherent in Sidgwick’s classification by an analytical clarification. But epistemology seems to have sneaked in again, behind his back, so to speak!¹⁰

Since the distinction is normative in one sense and meta-ethical in another, all kinds of utilitarian ethics can be labelled as deontological, at least to a certain extent. This conception of the distinction, however, makes it possible to give sense to the logically constructed idea of egoistic deontological theories. Consider for example those ethical theories that hold freedom as the ultimate value, based on an idea of a moral sense and on a firm belief in the invisible hand or the equilibrium theory of neo-classical economy. To a non-believer, they often seem to regard the freedom expressed in rational market-behaviour as intrinsically right, as *a priori* valuable, disregarding empirical evidence showing the obvious inhuman consequences of the free market in society at large.

Such ethical theories could, with this extension of Broad’s terminology, be called predominantly deontological in both the meta-ethical and the normative sense to the extent that they consider egoism – sometimes disguised under the term ‘prudence’ – as intrinsically right, no matter what the consequences might be. In contrast, such ethicists would be predominantly teleological in the normative sense, to the extent that they justify egoism by an end like the wealth of nations or the universal happiness of mankind. However, they would be teleological in both senses only to the extent that they actually would be capable of being proven wrong by empirical evidence. And this happens very rarely in matters of politics and ethics, since practical philosophy not only acknowledges reality, but also ideal – i.e. non-real – matters.

Even though deontology is inherent in most actual ethical theories, it is clear that deontology as such cannot be regarded as a rational ethical position, as conceived of by Broad. The empiricism and means-end rationality implicit in teleology, as well as the concept of consistency as choosing the right means to a given end, does not admit of any good reasons for adopting a pure deontological approach, either in the normative or in the meta-ethical sense. Because of the teleological conception of ethics inherent in Broad’s analysis of Sidgwick, deontology simply refers to the unconditional, dogmatic and hence non-justified and irrational aspect of morality, which, however, must be accounted for by any comprehensive ethical theory.
3. Frankena

Broad made substantial contributions to the clarification of Sidgwick's utilitarianism and made the line of thinking behind his own distinction very clear. The distinction is today well established in practical philosophy in Broad's original wording thanks to Nowell-Smith and especially Frankena, whose textbooks from the 1960s and 1970s became a widely used references within Anglophone ethics. And Anglophone ethics was all there was in these two decades, while the continental mainstream formulated normative matters in terms of politics. Textbooks – it is usually thought – must be simple and unambiguous. And what Frankena does is to remove all possibilities of confusion in Broad's distinction, and place it firmly within a general conception of ethics structured by teleology.

Broad's last word in *Five Types* was a warning against the "danger of oversimplification" (F.T., 284) in ethics. In Frankena's textbooks oversimplification is not considered to be a danger at all; quite the contrary, it is understood as the goal to be achieved. Even though the resulting account of ethics is rather strange, it has one great advantage. One does not have to interpret the text as closely as is the case for Bentham's and Broad's texts. When the basic definitions and the overall structure are grasped, then the rest of the content can almost be deduced logically. The problem, however, is that the readers – i.e., students – not only might take this simple picture as the whole truth, but also – and this is much worse – take logical simplification and rigid classification as all there is to thinking about matters of morality and ethics. And this is, I would claim, to a great extent what has happened to ethics in the Anglophone world.

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The general framework of Frankena's textbooks is the well-known tripartite division of ethics into "three kinds of thinking which relate to morality" (Frankena 1963, 4) in different ways, namely descriptive inquiry, normative judgements and meta-ethical thinking. But the structure of the books also reflects a teleological conception of ethics. Two chapters are dedicated to a normative "theory of obligation" (Frankena 1963, 10): the first to egoism and deontology, the second to teleology, *in casu* utilitarianism. According to the teleological scheme of thought as exposed by Sidgwick et al., a theory of obligation, of what is right to do, must be supplemented by a theory of value, of what is good.
Frankena writes, “a utilitarian must accept some particular theory of value” (Frankena 1963, 15). When Broad’s teleologically framed distinction is employed within normative ethics, it is then not so much a question of regarding or disregarding consequences, as of which kind of consequences should be weighed, the moral or the non-moral. Accordingly, there is one chapter about moral value and one about non-moral value, the latter being the ground on which teleological ethics bases its judgements. The final chapter of the book is dedicated solely to meta-ethical questions.

Within this overall teleological structure, a teleological theory is defined as providing the “ultimate criterion or standard of what is morally right, wrong, obligatory etc. [...] the non-moral value that is brought into being”. Frankena argues that the justification for this definition is logical, since it would be ‘circular’ to let the moral value of something depend on “the moral value it promotes” (Frankena 1963, 13). This formally strong argument for basing moral judgement on something non-moral is on its own premises hard to counter, but that is exactly what deontology is supposed to do, since deontological theories are negatively defined to “deny what teleological theories affirm” (Frankena 1963, 14).

The definition of deontology is then deduced logically by negating the statements defining teleology, i.e. by denying that that the non-moral value brought into being is the only criterion of moral value. This implies either that there are one or more criteria for what is right to do besides the one proposed by teleology, or that there are one or more completely different criteria. The deontologist can judge an action “right or obligatory simply because of some other fact about it or because of its own nature” and “may adopt any kind of view about what is good or bad in the non-moral sense” (Frankena 1963, 14). This negative definition of ‘deontology’ leaves no doubt about which side of the distinction is the centre and which is peripheral. It is like dividing the world into fish and non-fish, the latter category being everything in the world, which is not a fish.

It is important to bear in mind that the premises of the general teleological conception of ethics, i.e. means-end rationality and empiricism, have direct implications for the conception of normative ethics. The point of departure for normative ethics is a situation where somebody is to do something of moral relevance, but does not know what to do. It is the teleological perspective as conceived by Broad that defines normative ethics to be about what one ought to do in a specific and particular sense rather than how one ought to live. The
primary matter of moral importance becomes the act, not life as a whole. In principle, every single act in a life can be right, and for Frankena this can be the case if we are guided by the right ethical theory. In the attempt to find a non-circular, empirically based and means-end rational justification for what is right to do, the non-moral consequence of the act becomes relevant.

As paradigmatic of what ethics is all about, Frankena analyses Socrates’ situation the night before his execution, considering whether to flee or to stay. Behind Socrates’ reasoning in the *Crito*, he finds the following ideal:

(1) We must not let our decision be affected by our emotions, but must examine the question and follow the best reasoning. We must try to get our facts straight and to keep our minds clear. Questions like this can and should be settled by reason.

(2) We cannot answer such questions by appealing to what people generally think. They may be wrong. We must try to find an answer we ourselves can regard as correct. We must think for ourselves.

(3) We ought never to do what is morally wrong. The only question we need answer is whether what is proposed is right or wrong, not what will happen to us, what people will think of us, or how we feel about what has happened. (Frankena 1963, 1-2)

In Frankena’s view, however, ethics is not directly concerned with solving particular problems in specific situations. But indirectly that is what ethics aims at all the time. Any ethical theory is assumed to presuppose this model of an agent in a situation confronted with a specific problem. As Frankena formulates it, ethics is primarily thought to “provide the general outlines of a normative theory to help us in answering problems about what is right, or ought to be done” (Frankena 1963, 5). In short, ethics is primarily normative ethics.

* Summarizing the point above, I argue that ‘deontology’ is defined as ‘non-tel- leology’, but within a teleological conception of ethics in general and of normative ethics in particular. This being the case, even though ‘deontology’ is negatively and thus in principle very broadly defined, in reality, because of the general teleological framework, the possibilities of giving ‘deontology’ a positive meaning are very limited, as is obvious from Frankena’s attempt to do so.

Like Sidgwick and Broad, Frankena’s basic distinction within teleology is between egoism and universalism, i.e. utilitarianism. Considering deontology,
however, even though Frankena appears to be much stricter in his classificatory logic than his predecessors, this distinction is again avoided. Instead, we are presented with the distinction between act-deontological and rule-deontological theories (Frankena 1963, 14-15). Shifting back to teleology again, one would expect to find a distinction between act-teleological and rule-teleological theories, but instead we find act-utilitarianism confronting rule-utilitarianism (Frankena 1963, 30), that is, a distinction at one level below. How can that be?

The explanation for the confusion of levels of classification is, I will argue, found in the implicit teleological framework, or to be more precise, the inherent utilitarianism in the classificatory logic. Rule-utilitarianism is the well-known answer to one of the most basic critiques of classical utilitarianism, namely that it seems very impractical to have to calculate the balance of good over evil for all foreseeable consequences every time we are to do something. The utilitarian answer is that, if this is really the case, then we must act according to some rules of conduct, and those rules must in turn be justified in the way specified. Hence we can distinguish between act-utilitarians and rule-utilitarians. The two aspects of this distinction, however, are not equal. Act-utilitarianism is the problem, while rule-utilitarianism is the solution.

With this background in mind, it is no wonder that things get a little complicated when this utilitarian sub-distinction is transferred to classify various kinds of deontological theories, i.e. ethical theories that are defined as non-utilitarian. For Frankena, ethics is teleological in the sense defined above and therefore focuses on acts and consequences. This means that both teleology and deontology can only be understood in relation to acts and consequences. This is not a problem for those theories that are already teleological, i.e. utilitarians of various sorts. But for those completely different kinds of ethical thinking, which have to be classified as deontological, since Frankena’s exclusive conception of the distinction does not admit of any third possibility, the result is rather bizarre. Act-deontological theories are ethical theories which state that “basic judgements of obligation are all purely particular” and that

we can and must see or somehow decide separately in each particular situation what is the right or obligatory thing to do, without appealing to any rules. (Frankena 1963, 15)

And this approach that the ethics of Aristotle is categorized as act-deontological because of his remark that “the decision rests with perception” (Frankena 1963, 15). 13
Frankena’s generalization of the distinction opens up for the transition from teleology to consequentialism. Broad himself, however, also contributed to both of the revisions just mentioned: He dropped the use of the term ‘deontology’ (cf. Salzman 1995, 101) and later preferred to distinguish between teleology and non-teleology (cf. Broad 1985, 229); and he distinguished between hedonism as a theory of good and evil, i.e. a value theory, and utilitarianism as a theory of right and wrong (cf. Broad 1985, 196), which is exactly the conception of utilitarianism from which the term ‘consequentialism’ is derived. What is only implicit by Broad, however, is made explicit by Frankena in the structure of his textbooks. For Frankena, deontology is simply non-teleology, and teleology is defined exclusively in terms of consequences. Taken together, this position makes deontology identical to non-consequentialism; and this is indeed the most common understanding of deontology in ethics today.

4. Rawls

It is obvious, however, that apart from the logically very strict construction of deontology, Frankena had serious problems positively specifying what a viable deontological theory could be. In spite of this, a theory of major importance, explicitly referring to Frankena’s classification, voluntarily takes this burden upon itself. In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls states that his “justice as fairness” view is not a utilitarian theory, and that it as non-teleological therefore, “by definition” (1971/99, 26), is a deontological theory. Rawls takes an explicit stand for deontology, but the way he develops this stand turns the concept of deontology upside down.

Rawls accepts Frankena’s conception of ethics as structured by the distinction and the relation between what is right and what is good. Teleology simply defines what is right to do in terms of what is good (Rawls 1971/99, 21), and deontological theories are defined as non-teleological, as theories that either do not specify the good independently from the right, or do not interpret the right as maximizing the good. Rawls prefers this logical conception of deontology as non-teleology to the view “that characterizes the rightness of institutions and acts independently from their consequences”, i.e. Broad’s first characterization of deontology and Weber’s conception of the ethics of intention. Such a conception of ethics is to Rawls simply ‘irrational, crazy’ (1971/99, 26).

To Rawls, the concept of rationality is embodied in teleology; to be rational is simply to “strive for as high an absolute score as possible” (1971/99, 125).
With this identification of rationality with means-end rationality Rawls thus stays within the overall teleological conception of ethics exposed above, and that strategy does not leave him much choice when utilitarianism and deontology as ethics of intention are ruled out. Staying within the classifications of Sidgwick et al. there is only one conceptual possibility, namely ‘enlightened’ egoism (Frankena 1963, 16), or self-regarding deontology, as Bentham would call it, and that is actually what Rawls ends up with. His concept of rationality thus in the end becomes equal to the means-end rationality of the inherently selfish homo economicus as construed by Weber. This should, however, not come as a surprise given Rawls’ interest in game theory and contractual theories (cf. Rawls 1958); the weight put on rational self-interest was clearly visible from the very first conception of “justice as fairness” (Hall 1957, 663). Contracting parties always employ the rationality of game theory, i.e. the rationality of economic man, where each is supposed to maximize rationally his own long-term good.

Apparently Rawls has forgotten that not every opposition to utilitarianism “by definition” is deontological, i.e. that egoism can be considered a teleological opposition to utilitarianism (Frankena 1963, 14). To Rawls, deontology is simply non-teleology, which is equal to non-utilitarianism. Therefore, deontology does not exclude rational egoism, and that makes it possible to let the alleged lack of concern for persons in utilitarianism – because of its impartiality – to be filled out by selfish partiality. A contract between two rational egoists is thus “by definition” for Rawls an expression of deontology.

Unfortunately, Rawls’ understanding of his own practical philosophy as deontological has been widely accepted, and when deontology is understood as an expression of “agent-centered” restrictions on the strictly moral utilitarianism, then that position easily becomes equivalent to endorsing egoism. In sum, then, Rawls’ political philosophy does not have much to contribute to ethics. Rawls’ contract is based on a concept of man as totally selfish, whereas utilitarians at least accept man as inherently moral in some sense. Ethics simply presupposes that human beings do not want to be just selfish, but have sincere and serious doubts about what systematic egoist behaviour would imply for real human life. Economic man, however, is constructed as totally immoral – he does not even have a moral sense – and accepting the way Rawls opposes utilitarianism thus means as a moral-philosopher to leave the sphere of ethics as such.

In fact, Rawls could have chosen other strategies to oppose utilitarianism, but he fails to do so. He knows from Frankena that ethics is supposed to be
rational, but he can only understand rationality in terms of rational choice theories (1971/99, 123-24), and that makes even a thoroughly logical consistent ethics of intention irrational, since it does not calculate the consequences. He can only understand consistency as Broad’s concept of logical consistency, i.e. consistency in action, choosing the right means in view of the optimal realization of a given end. In contrast to Weber, Rawls cannot see that it is only from the limited perspective of means-end rationality that deontology and the ethics of intention are irrational, because Rawls has only this one concept of rationality.

It is precisely the concept of rationality as deductive rationality or, simply, reason, that Kant – and the neo-Kantian, Weber – understands to be central to ethics, and which Rawls ignores. It is precisely this idea of rationality that makes the Kantian distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting out of duty meaningful; ethics is concerned with how to act out of duty, how to make such an act reasonable (Kant 1785/86, 20-22). Kant is not at all worried about the actual actions of people; he wants to justify their actions with reasons related to the law of reason. Kant wants to understand people as free, autonomous, self-legislative, subjugated only to the law of reason, the reason, which is our human nature.

In fact, the case of Rawls can be seen as tragic. Rawls explicitly wants to oppose utilitarianism in Sidgwick’s version (Rawls 1971/99, 26), but in choosing to identify with deontology in Frankena’s sense, he actually stays within Sidgwick’s utilitarian scheme of thought, although transmitted through the more refined vocabulary of Broad and Frankena. Furthermore, he explicitly wants to identify with Kant (Rawls 1971/99, xviii), but as far as I can see, he simply does not understand the fundamentals of Kantian ethics. Rawls describes Kant as giving priority to the right over the good (Rawls 1971/99, 28), and in the classification of Frankena this means that Kant is a deontologist; but, as mentioned above, Kant is only a deontologist when considered from within the perspective of Broad’s refinement of Sidgwick’s classification. Frankena simply misunderstands this point, claiming that Kant “purports to be” (Frankena 1963, 26) a deontologist, and this misunderstanding is apparently transmitted to Rawls. However, even without the misrepresentation of Frankena, Rawls would, with his very limited notion of rationality, have missed what Kant is talking about.
Deontology was constructed by Bentham, but got its philosophical significance from Broad’s classical distinction. Today, however, Broad’s distinction is known primarily through Frankena, who codified it to be relevant only within normative ethics. With this in mind, one final thing should be noticed, i.e. the small shift in focus from Broad’s first conception of the distinction to the second. In the discussion of the application of ought, Broad defines deontology in terms of the disregard for the consequences of an action. Teleology is not defined in terms of consequences, but in terms of the ends of an action. In the second version of the distinction, both deontology and teleology are defined in terms of consequences, the former through disregard and the latter through both the ends and the “tendency to produce certain consequences”.

To Broad, this shift means very little, since he thinks of consequences only as “intended consequences” (F.T., 210) as far as they can be “foreseen” (F.T., 213); it is, however, of major significance. As long as teleology is defined in terms of ends, one can, as Rawls does, label an ethical theory like Aristotle’s as teleological. The shift of focus in teleology from ends to actions and their consequences, however, makes both the category of teleology more exclusive and the identification of teleology and utilitarianism much stronger. This shift pushes Aristotle over to the side of deontology, as in Frankena’s classification. If such a strong identification is combined with an overall teleological – or, later, consequentialist – conception of ethics, there is hardly any sense left for deontology, either as an ethics of intention, or as any other kind of ethics.

Today this displacement is almost complete. On the one hand, the original teleology-deontology distinction is now normally understood as identical with consequentialism-deontology or even consequentialism-non-consequentialism. On the other hand, discussions about utilitarianism have been reformulated into discussions about consequentialism. With the help of Frankena’s classificatory skills, Broad’s ideal-typical distinction has developed into a complete and non-arbitrary classification, which by definition – by law of the excluded middle – covers the whole field of normative ethics.

This is clearly a logical improvement, making the distinction simple and complete, just like Broad’s own clarification of Sidgwick’s classification was a step forward in this sense. But by making it logically stricter, Frankena actually emptied deontology of any positive content, while at the same time making it the only possibility for opposing utilitarianism. But having an exclusive and strict distinction between two types of ethical theories, where one of the aspects is impossible to take seriously, amounts to having no real distinction at
all. And what is worse, the negative definition of deontology and Rawls’ influential misunderstandings have made it possible for consequentialism to monopolize the idea of impartiality in ethics and to interpret the so-called agent relativity of deontology as partiality. This means that deontology is understood as egoism and thereby, “by definition”, is inadmissible for most people as an ethical position.

From the very beginning deontology has been defined within a utilitarian scheme of thought. Deontology was constructed by Bentham, reconstructed by Broad in a completely different, but still utilitarian sense, first as an ideal limit and later as the marginal aspect of an exclusive distinction. Frankena generalized the logical definition, and this displacement was accepted by Rawls, who, however, was caught in the middle on the way from ideal limits to logical completeness. Whatever the reason, he turned things upside down, constructing the modern conception of deontology as virtually egoistic, a conception which is actually close to Bentham’s original conception, but is the opposite of Broad’s and Frankena’s. In a way, the circle is then closed. No matter which conception of deontology is chosen, accepting ‘deontology’ as a meaningful expression is submitting to the utilitarian scheme of thought. And if one finally asks why utilitarianism has had such an attraction within ethics, part of the answer is no doubt that it promises a conceptual development without having to bring troublesome concepts such as the self, intention and freedom into consideration (Ashby 1950, 772-73).

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Notes

1. This article has in various versions passed through many hands and been presented in many places. I would therefore like to thank the following for valuable criticism, suggestions, and comments on earlier versions: Anders Bordum, Asmund Born, Bent Meier Sørensen, Brian Barry, Christine Korsgaard, Helen Korsgaard, Jacob Vestergaard, Roberto Mordacci, Robin May Schott, Sergio Cremaschi, Steen Valentin and Thomas Basboll.

2. Normally, Bentham’s utilitarian ethics is extracted from his An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (cf. e.g. Ryan 1987, 9), and in spite of the fact that Deontology is Bentham’s only attempt to develop systematically the moral philosophy implied by utilitarianism, one rarely sees any references to it in ethical debates about utilitarianism. An exception is Edel, whose systematic conception of utilitarianism is informed by Deontology (1937, 620).

3. In a recent anthology on Mill’s Utilitarianism, Bentham’s construction of the term ‘deontology’ is noticed (Postema 2006, 28), but without any reflections about the possible terminological and conceptual consequences.

4. It is from this perspective that Kymlicka can criticize Rawls for confusing things, precisely because Rawls thinks of teleology as including perfectionism (Kymlicka 1988, 185-88).

5. In fact, I would like to claim that the history of Anglophone ethics in the twentieth century can be reconstructed as an on-going refinement and development of distinctions forced upon ethics by the insistent pressure of the utilitarians with their amoral preconception of ethics. Since this point is too general to be argued convincingly within the limits of an article, I will
constrain myself to analyse this – I think – crucial and very clear case as an illustration of the more general story.

6. This bi-partition is apparently the result of an editorial decision. Whether this also was Bentham’s own division is not altogether clear in Goldworth’s commentary (Goldworth 1983, xixff., xxixff.), but it seems to be in accordance with Bentham’s general line of thought.

7. Although, admittedly, we must then assume that Bentham forgot to qualify the definition of deontology as concerned with private morality as a definition of private deontology.

8. Broad’s refinement of Sidgwick’s classification makes it possible to think of ethics as divided into two branches, one concerned only with epistemology and questions of meaning, i.e. meta-ethics, and one pretending not to be concerned with these matters at all, normative ethics, thought to be totally independent from meta-ethics. This is another instance of the more general phenomenon in Anglophone ethics mentioned above, namely that utilitarianism plays the decisive role in the continuous development of the increasingly refined ethical distinctions. It would, however, require much more research and analysis to substantiate my claim, and in this context the matter is further obscured by the fact that Broad describes his own distinction as ontological (Broad 1930, 213).

9. The conception of deontology as defined positively in relation to the mode of the action in question, and the intrinsic rightness of this mode, can also be found in modern continental European interpretation treatments of ethics (Kutschera 1982, 2; Stegmüller 1989, 231). In Gaus’ analysis of the Anglo-American discussions, however, this conception is not given much attention (cf. Gaus 2001a, 36 and 2001b, 183).

10. Salzman insists that the distinction is altogether meta-ethical (Salzman 1995, 4), but this mistake must rest on his identification of the analytical approach to ethics with meta-ethics as such (1995, 32).

11. Even today, Frankena can be considered the suitable starting point for a comprehensive analysis of deontology (Gaus 2001a, 27), bypassing thereby both Bentham and Broad.

12. It should be noted that this focus, already implicit in Bentham’s utilitarianism, is the exact opposite of the traditional, pre-modern ethical focus (cf. e.g. Aranguren 1958, 182).

13. This quote is the only one by Aristotle in Ross’ analysis of the right and the good (cf. e.g. Ross 1930, 42), and one might suspect that Frankena simply has copied it from Ross.

14. Instead, in the posthumously published manuscripts Broad uses the term ‘deontic’ to characterize all sentences employing words like ‘duty’, ‘obligation’ and the like (Broad 1985, 225). In this sense, ‘deontic’ thus comes close to the general conception of deontology as a science of duties, and such a conception makes it possible for Broad to compare anew Kant with Ross and Sidgwick. However, since he considers the categorical imperative ‘vague’ (Broad 1985, 219), the only two possibilities are “the irreducible pluralism of Ross” and the utilitarian “theory of a single ultimate self-evident obligation”, which “have strong claims to be considered self-evident” (Broad 1985, 242), and which do not leave deontology many chances within ethics.

15. Gaus fails to find one positive definition common to the various current uses of ‘deontology’. The only common denominator is negative, namely the opposition to consequentialism (Gaus 2001b, 190).

16. In fact, the teleological conception of rationality is such a commonplace in Anglophone discussions of these matters that it often passes unnoticed, as for instance in Freeman’s defence of Rawls against the critique of Kymlicka (Freemann 1994, 313).

17. Freeman denies that Rawls’ contracting parties in the original position are egoists (Freeman 2003, 13), since they allegedly have a capacity for justice. Still, he describes them as “con-
cerned only with promoting their own interests” (2003, 14), which is precisely what egoism is about.

18. Allan Bloom points to the same differences in the understanding of rationality between Rawls and Kant, and argues convincingly that the thought of Rawls “has nothing to do with that of Kant” (Bloom 1975, 657).

19. The contrast between the Hobbesian concepts of rationality common in Anglo-American practical philosophy and Kant’s concept of reason is underlined strongly by Apel (Apel 1993, 152-54).

20. Aristotle takes as his point of departure what man strives toward, *i.e.* an end, and later – after various analyses of the dynamic character of moral and intellectual virtues – defines this end as the good life, where happiness consists in actions in conformity with virtues (cf. *Eth.Nic.*, 1176). Broad, however, does not categorize the ethics of Aristotle as teleological; in fact, Aristotle is not mentioned in *Five Types* at all.

21. With almost all the moral weight put on the consequences as such, the intended end is now treated as only of minor moral importance, and this creates new ethical problems, like those of acts and omissions and the so-called double-effect (cf. Benn 1998, 74, 78).

22. The biographer of Bentham, Elie Halévy, simply concludes that to Bentham “egoism [was] installed at the very basis of morality” (Halévy 1901-04, 477).