Les intuitions rationnelles sont-elles des intuitions modales?

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Translated title of the contributionAre rational intuitions modal?
We discuss the view, accepted by many rational intuition theorists, that rational intuitions involve appearances of necessity. The fact that we can have rational intuitions of contingent propositions casts a doubt on the adequacy of this view. This fact can be accommodated by a fallibilist theory of rational intuitions, provided one accepts that these intuitions generate ineliminable modal illusions. Drawing on two-dimensional explanations of the contingent a priori, we defend an alternative view according to which the appearances involved in rational intuitions are not appearances of necessity but rather an expression of their a priori status.
Original languageFrench
Issue number1
Pages (from-to)49-71
Number of pages22
StatePublished - 2017

    Research areas

  • Intuition, Necessity, Two-dimensional semantics, A priori

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