Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Policy Making


  • Finke, Daniel (Project participant)
  • Herbel, Annika, Heidelberg University, Germany (Project participant)
See relations at Aarhus University
The delegation of decision making competences from the national to the European level has increased governmental discretion vis-à-vis national parliaments. Due to the nontransparent decision making procedures national parliaments find it difficult to effectively control their governments when acting at the European level.
For this reason, normative democratic theory suggests extended scrutiny powers for both, national parliaments and the European Parliament. Against this background, we raise the question of why under a given set of procedural rules some EU policy proposals are scrutinized by parliamentary committees whereas others go unchecked. Specifically, we answer this question for twelve national parliaments in the European Union which sponsor a significant variation of procedural rules. On the empirical side, we compile a data set which contains information on the scrutiny activities at the level of policy proposal drafted by either the European Commission or the Council. In order to validate the data and to render the information comparable across countries we plan to conduct a series of interviews with members of the parliamentary administrations responsible for data base maintenance. The results obtained by the quantitative analysis will be validated by case studies and expert interviews (triangulation).
Financing sourceOther public support (public)
Research programmeDeutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Internet address
Amount210,000.00 Euro

ID: 90664277