Department of Economics and Business Economics

Marianne Simonsen

Playing the Fertility Game at Work: An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal article

Standard

Playing the Fertility Game at Work : An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects. / Ciliberto, Federico; Miller, Amalia Rebecca; Nielsen, Helena Skyt; Simonsen, Marianne.

In: International Economic Review, Vol. 57, No. 3, 2016, p. 827-856.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal article

Harvard

Ciliberto, F, Miller, AR, Nielsen, HS & Simonsen, M 2016, 'Playing the Fertility Game at Work: An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects' International Economic Review, vol 57, no. 3, pp. 827-856. DOI: 10.1111/iere.12177

APA

Ciliberto, F., Miller, A. R., Nielsen, H. S., & Simonsen, M. (2016). Playing the Fertility Game at Work: An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects. International Economic Review, 57(3), 827-856. DOI: 10.1111/iere.12177

CBE

Ciliberto F, Miller AR, Nielsen HS, Simonsen M. 2016. Playing the Fertility Game at Work: An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects. International Economic Review. 57(3):827-856. Available from: 10.1111/iere.12177

MLA

Ciliberto, Federico et al."Playing the Fertility Game at Work: An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects". International Economic Review. 2016, 57(3). 827-856. Available: 10.1111/iere.12177

Vancouver

Ciliberto F, Miller AR, Nielsen HS, Simonsen M. Playing the Fertility Game at Work: An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects. International Economic Review. 2016;57(3):827-856. Available from, DOI: 10.1111/iere.12177

Author

Ciliberto, Federico ; Miller, Amalia Rebecca ; Nielsen, Helena Skyt ; Simonsen, Marianne. / Playing the Fertility Game at Work : An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects. In: International Economic Review. 2016 ; Vol. 57, No. 3. pp. 827-856

Bibtex

@article{57e52937ed4942758025663767e9ba20,
title = "Playing the Fertility Game at Work: An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects",
abstract = "We study workplace peer effects in fertility decisions using a game theory model of strategic interactions among coworkers that allows for multiple equilibria. Using register-based data on fertile-aged women working in medium sizedestablishments in Denmark, we uncover negative average peer effects. Allowing for heterogeneous effects by worker type, we find that positive effects dominate across worker types defined by age or education. Negative effects dominate within age groups and among low-education types. Policy simulations show that these estimated effects make the distribution of where women work an important consideration, beyond simply if they work, in predicting population fertility.",
author = "Federico Ciliberto and Miller, {Amalia Rebecca} and Nielsen, {Helena Skyt} and Marianne Simonsen",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1111/iere.12177",
language = "English",
volume = "57",
pages = "827--856",
journal = "International Economic Review",
issn = "0020-6598",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Playing the Fertility Game at Work

T2 - International Economic Review

AU - Ciliberto,Federico

AU - Miller,Amalia Rebecca

AU - Nielsen,Helena Skyt

AU - Simonsen,Marianne

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - We study workplace peer effects in fertility decisions using a game theory model of strategic interactions among coworkers that allows for multiple equilibria. Using register-based data on fertile-aged women working in medium sizedestablishments in Denmark, we uncover negative average peer effects. Allowing for heterogeneous effects by worker type, we find that positive effects dominate across worker types defined by age or education. Negative effects dominate within age groups and among low-education types. Policy simulations show that these estimated effects make the distribution of where women work an important consideration, beyond simply if they work, in predicting population fertility.

AB - We study workplace peer effects in fertility decisions using a game theory model of strategic interactions among coworkers that allows for multiple equilibria. Using register-based data on fertile-aged women working in medium sizedestablishments in Denmark, we uncover negative average peer effects. Allowing for heterogeneous effects by worker type, we find that positive effects dominate across worker types defined by age or education. Negative effects dominate within age groups and among low-education types. Policy simulations show that these estimated effects make the distribution of where women work an important consideration, beyond simply if they work, in predicting population fertility.

U2 - 10.1111/iere.12177

DO - 10.1111/iere.12177

M3 - Journal article

VL - 57

SP - 827

EP - 856

JO - International Economic Review

JF - International Economic Review

SN - 0020-6598

IS - 3

ER -